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Local governments have spent an estimated $15 to 18 billion in public subsidies 
to professional sport teams over the last two decades.  Once a team has selected its home 
and a financing package is approved, cities rarely implement tactics necessary to realize 
these benefits, and teams aren’t made to deliver on their promises.  At the same time, 
other benefits may be ignored by city leaders and residents.   This research project is 
comprised of two related studies that address the following issues related to the public 
subsidization of professional sport teams:  (1) how do a community’s expectations about 
hosting a team compare with the actual outcomes it experiences; and (2) what factors 
enable and inhibit the use of a professional sport team to accomplish community 
development goals.   
The first study is a qualitative examination of community expectations related to 
hosting the Corpus Christi Hooks, the double-A affiliate of the Houston Astros.  Using 
media and public document analysis, participant observation, and stakeholder interviews, 
 viii 
the following categories of benefits were identified:  economic development, community 
self-esteem/image, entertainment/leisure, and social welfare.  The community 
successfully leveraged the baseball referendum to pass broader economic development 
and affordable housing measures. The city also has developed a successful event 
attraction strategy around its professional sport facilities and has experienced improved 
community self-esteem.  However, the city has done little to leverage the team, and 
expected benefits have failed to materialize.   
The second study explores the process of sport team leverage.  Using an action 
research approach, the efforts of a community health coalition to partner with the Hooks 
to address obesity prevention through a cause-marketing program was examined.  
Professional teams have a range of unique assets to contribute to a cause-marketing 
program.  In this case, the team was reluctant to contribute its assets to the program.  
Consequently, the partnership resulted in a limited community relations program that 
failed to fully deliver benefits to the health coalition and the team.  The following factors 
were identified as affecting the team’s involvement:  the issue’s importance and salience, 
competition among local nonprofit organizations, the coalition’s leadership and brand 
equity, and the team’s stability and resources. 
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Chapter 1:  Public Policy Relevance of Professional Sport Team 
Attraction and Retention Schemes 
Professional sport teams are vital parts of their communities, and the home team 
is one of the most visible and enduring representations of a city (Cashmore, 2005; 
Danielson, 1997; Eckstein & Delaney, 2002; Ingham & McDonald, 2003; Schwarz & 
Barsky, 1977).  The emotional connection between cities and their sport teams and the 
cultural relevance of professional sport create pressure on city leaders to retain or attract a 
team, as politicians and residents believe that hosting a team will deliver a range of 
benefits to the city (Bachelor, 1998; Euchner, 1993; Friedman & Mason, 2004; Henry & 
Paramio-Salcines, 1999; Pelissero, Henschen, & Sidlow, 1991).  The demand for teams is 
far greater than the supply, which creates an environment where cities use financial 
incentive packages to compete against each other for the right to host teams (Leeds & 
von Allmen, 2004; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997; Quirk & Fort, 1992). At the same time that 
cities are wooing teams with attractive financial packages, neoliberal policies require 
local officials and agencies to do more with fewer resources.  Yet, when cities invest 
taxpayer monies in professional sport facilities, they may neglect other community 
concerns. 
The issue of opportunity cost was considered important enough to attract the 
attention of the federal government.  In October 2007, the House Committee of Oversight 
and Government Reform conducted hearings on the public subsidization of sport 
facilities (United States House of Representatives, 2007b).  The hearings were held soon 
after the Interstate-35 West bridge in Minnesota collapsed, killing 13 people.  The key 
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issue at hand was whether the public subsidization of professional sport teams by local 
and state governments diverts taxpayer funds from critical infrastructure projects.  In the 
years prior to the bridge collapse, the governor of Minnesota consistently vetoed a 
gasoline tax, the revenues from which would have been used for bridge and road repair 
throughout the state.  At the same time, he signed a bill that allowed Hennepin County 
(the host county of Major League Baseball’s Minnesota Twins) to raise its county sales 
tax without receiving voter approval (United States House of Representatives, 2007b).  
The beneficiary of the tax?  The Minnesota Twins, who had successfully negotiated a 
new $522 million ballpark just one year before the I-35 bridge collapse.  This story of 
public subsidization and failing infrastructure is not unique to Minnesota.  Baltimore has 
2 publicly financed stadiums (for MLB’s Baltimore Orioles and the NFL’s Baltimore 
Ravens) and 8 structurally deficient bridges in the host county; Philadelphia has 3 
publicly financed stadiums (for MLB’s Philadelphia Phillies, the NFL’s Philadelphia 
Eagles, and the NBA’s Philadelphia 76’ers) and 42 structurally deficient bridges; 
Chicago has 2 publicly financed stadiums (for the NFL’s Chicago Bears and the Chicago 
White Sox) and 82 structurally deficient bridges (United States House of Representatives, 
2007b).  In each of these examples, government officials at the local and state level have 
made the attraction or retention of professional sport franchises a priority, above other 
public services and infrastructure projects, of which bridge repair is only one example. 
The other public policy issue related to the subsidization of professional sport 
franchises is whether the benefits promised by local government leaders are realized.  
This issue also received attention from the federal government, and the House Committee 
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on Oversight and Government Reform held hearings on this issue in May of 2007 (United 
States House of Representatives, 2007a).  Many cities view the presence of a professional 
sport franchise as an important element of a larger community development and urban 
growth strategy, but often the team’s presence inhibits development and growth.  Kearns 
and Paddison (2000) identified a number of factors that have created challenges for 
modern cities, including interurban competition, a shift from a welfare to development 
model, and efforts to develop the local distinctive attributes in order to attract business 
and tourism.  The increased competition for sports teams and the emphasis cities place on 
attracting a team are consistent with these challenges.  Stadium supporters argue that a 
professional sport team is a public good, conferring benefits to the community as a 
whole, not only to private team owners.  However, a public good is characterized by two 
significant characteristics—nonrivalness and nonexclusion (Head, 1962; Musgrave, 
1959).  Nonrivalness is a property of the good in which additional individuals are able to 
enjoy the good without detracting from the utility of others.   Additionally, in the case of 
a pure public good, it is impossible or inefficient to exclude individuals from 
consumption once it has been supplied to some members of the community.  Stadium 
supporters claim that as public goods, professional sport teams and facilities would be 
undersupplied in the absence of government subsidy, to the detriment of the community. 
However, when the two characteristics of public goods (i.e., nonrivalness and 
nonexclusion) are applied to professional sport teams, it is clear that sport facilities do not 
demonstrate public good characteristics.  A sport facility is a rival good because an 
individual’s purchase of a ticket to a game does prevent another individual from 
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purchasing that ticket.  Also, the competition between cities for sport franchises 
illustrates the rivalrous nature of teams, as multiple cities are not able to simultaneously 
host the same team.  In addition, sport facilities are exclusive.  The initial purpose of 
enclosing the places where sports were played was to allow team owners to collect 
money from game attendees, and consequently, to exclude those who were not willing to 
pay.   
Despite these obvious characteristics of professional sport teams and facilities, 
supporters of public subsidization legitimize the claim that sport teams are public goods 
by emphasizing the benefits that accrue to the host community (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 
2000; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997).  Initially, supporters of public subsidization emphasized 
the economic benefits of hosting a team.  Specifically, communities claim that hosting a 
team will create jobs, increase tax revenues, and catalyze proximate development (Baade 
& Dye, 1998; Eckstein & Delaney, 2002; Rosentraub, 1996).  Claims related to the 
economic impact of sport teams and the facilities in which they play have been almost 
universally disproved (Coates, 2007; Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000), and so the focus has 
shifted to indirect and intangible social benefits, such as “community self-esteem” or 
“community collective conscience” (Eckstein & Delaney, 2002).  It is difficult to 
estimate the value of these intangible benefits, yet recent studies have used the contingent 
valuation method (CVM) to determine local residents’ willingness to pay for a sports 
team in their community (Johnson & Whitehead, 2000; Johnson, Groothuis & Whitehead, 
2001).  CVM uses questionnaires to determine the willingness of respondents to pay for 
hypothetical projects, such as sport stadiums.  CVM research is fundamentally flawed, as 
 5 
respondents are likely to overstate the extent to which they value projects that already 
exist (Portney, 1994).  Further, even if sport teams exhibit some characteristics of a 
public good the value of these benefits has not been shown to be greater than the costs to 
the public (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000).  Opponents of public subsidization of sport 
stadia consider this subsidization a form of corporate welfare.  In fact, a primary 
argument against subsidization is that team owners are typically millionaires or 
billionaires with access to well-developed capital markets (Crompton, 2001; Kalich, 
1998; Keating, 1999; Rosentraub, 1996).  If team owners desire a new facility for their 
team, they have the resources to undertake such a project on their own.   
In spite of this, cities have made the attraction and retention of professional sport 
franchises a policy priority and have shown a willingness to pay for the right to host a 
team.  Nearly all of the largest cities in the United States host at least one team in either 
the National Football League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), Major 
League Baseball (MLB), or National Hockey League (NHL).  Several American cities 
host teams in more than one professional league, and New York and Chicago host 
multiple teams in the same leagues.  Of the 25 largest cities in the United States, only 3 
lack a major-league professional sport franchise, but even these cities have minor league 
teams, which underscores the emphasis these cities place on hosting a professional sport 
team.   
The primary means through which a city can secure a sports franchise is the 
provision of a facility for the team (Euchner, 1993; Shropshire, 1995).  Between 1990 
and 2006, 82 major-league professional sport facilities in the United States were either 
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newly constructed or substantially renovated (Crompton, 2005).  With few exceptions 
(e.g., Minneapolis’s Target Center, Milwaukee’s Bradley Center, Boston’s Fleet Center), 
these sport facilities were financed through some form of public-private cooperation.  
The most common form of public-private cooperation applied to sport facilities is a joint 
venture in which both the government and the team retain formal independence and the 
scope of the project and commitment of resources is well-defined (Schaeffer & 
Loveridge, 2001).  The average construction cost for an individual facility is currently 
over $250 million, and estimates of the total public subsidy for all stadium construction 
during this period range from $12 billion to $15 billion (Humphreys, 2006; Long, 2006).  
While government contributions to facility construction are substantial, the above 
estimates only consider construction costs.  When the total financial incentive packages 
offered by cities (and not just construction subsidies) are considered, the actual cost to the 
public is much higher.  Local governments may offer some or all of the following 
inducements which increase the cost to the public:  favorable lease agreements, direct 
cash payments, land and infrastructure improvements, and foregone tax receipts 
(Alexander, Kern, & Neill, 2000; Baade, 2003; Kalich, 1998; Long, 2006; Quirk & Fort, 
1999; Weiner, 2004).   
Team owners have come to expect that local governments will provide at least 
part of the funding for a stadium project, but this was not always the case.  Prior to the 
1950s, sport stadiums were almost exclusively funded by private sources (Crompton, 
2005).  Of the 30 professional sport facility projects in the United States between 1887 
and 1948, 25 (83%) were funded completely by private sources.  The exceptions to the 
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private financing rule were the construction and renovation of Los Angeles Coliseum, 
Soldier Field, Municipal Stadium, and War Memorial Stadium (Keating, 1999).  The Los 
Angeles Coliseum was constructed for the primary purpose of securing the rights to host 
the 1924 Olympic Games, a move which was expected to boost the faltering Los Angeles 
tourist trade.  While the Los Angeles bid for the 1924 Games was unsuccessful, the city 
won the right to host the 1932 Olympic Games, defeating Cleveland and Chicago, which 
had also constructed sport facilities on the public dime in the hopes of hosting the 
Olympic Games and reaping the associated economic and tourism benefits.   
Supporters of the LA Coliseum legitimized public subsidization by claiming that 
hosting the Olympic Games would boost the Los Angeles economy, but this argument 
was not embraced by residents.  In 1920, voters defeated a referendum which would have 
provided funding for the Coliseum.  Yet the Los Angeles Community Development 
Authority (CDA) was able to secure public financing in spite of the voters’ defeat of this 
measure (Riess, 1981).  Opponents decried public funding of the Coliseum as an 
irresponsible use of taxpayer monies, and they also objected that the primary beneficiary 
of the Coliseum was the University of Southern California, a wealthy private institution. 
These same arguments against public subsidization of sport facilities have been raised 
time and time again, as cities, counties and states have continued to provide public 
funding for private sport stadiums and arenas.   
By the 1960s, the public sector accepted increasing responsibility for sport facility 
projects.  By 1984, state and/or local governments provided 93% of sport facility costs, 
primarily through general obligation (GO) or revenue bonds (Crompton, 2005).  At this 
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peak of public financing, the United States Congress recognized the burden that sport 
facility construction placed on the federal government as well as local governments, and 
it enacted legislative remedies meant to discourage high levels of public investment 
(Shapiro, Fried, & Rosentraub, 1999).  Prior to 1984, cities were able to use tax-exempt 
municipal bonds (i.e., GO or revenue bonds) to finance stadium construction, effectively 
creating federal subsidies to cities engaged in stadium construction.  The first legislative 
maneuver to slow this practice was passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which 
prohibited the use of tax-exempt bonds to finance the construction of luxury boxes in 
sport stadiums.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 further restricted the use of municipal 
bonds for stadium construction.  Specifically, under the Tax Reform Act, bonds would be 
considered private activity bonds, and therefore not tax-exempt if either of the following 
conditions were met: (1) “more than 10% of the proceeds of the issue are to be used for 
any private business use or (2) if the payment on the principal of, or the interest on, more 
than 10% of the proceeds of such issue is… directly or indirectly secured by any interest 
in (1) property used or to be used for a private business use, or (2) payments in respect to 
such property” (PL 86-107).  The first provision, commonly known as the business use 
test, was intended to reserve the tax exemption for projects from which the public (and 
not a sport team) was the primary beneficiary.  Because a sport team is, almost without 
exception, the primary tenant and beneficiary of the facility, it is unlikely that a bond 
issued for sport facility construction would be eligible to use tax-exempt bonds under the 
first condition.  However, the second provision, known as the private payment test, 
allows local governments to issue tax-exempt bonds for sport facility construction as long 
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as no more than 10% of the debt service comes from private sources.  The private 
payment provision prohibits the use of facility-generated revenues (e.g., luxury suites, 
club seats, ticket sales, parking, naming rights, concessions) to pay back the bonds issued 
for facility construction. 
The rationale behind this legislation, and federal involvement in this issue, was to 
eliminate federal financial support for professional stadiums (Zimmerman, 2007).   The 
Joint Council on Taxation (1990) noted the following concerns with regard to tax-exempt 
bonds being used for private activities.  First, the bonds represent an “inefficient 
allocation of capital.”  Such bonds also “increase the cost of financing traditional 
governmental activities” thereby contributing to “mounting [federal] revenue losses” (p. 
12).  By restricting the public sector’s ability to issue tax-exempt bonds for facility 
construction, conventional wisdom suggests that cities, counties, and states would stop 
(or at least substantially reduce) the public subsidization of sport teams.  But the 
restriction hasn’t discouraged subsidies; it has passed the costs on to taxpayers. 
Further, the elimination of federal subsidies was intended to reduce local officials’ 
willingness to use public monies to benefit private sport team owners.  Without federal 
subsidies in the form of tax-exempt municipal bonds, local governments would face 
increased costs, as tax-exempt bonds have a lower interest rate (2% on average) than 
taxable bonds (Crompton, 2005).  Consequently, these provisions could add millions of 
dollars to the total project cost.  The private payment restriction was intended to 
discourage subsidies by requiring cities to either issue taxable bonds, or issue tax-exempt 
bonds that would be paid back by general taxpayers via sales taxes, hotel-motel taxes, 
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property taxes, car rental taxes, and sin taxes (rather than directly taxing those residents 
or visitors who benefited from the presence of the stadium).   
Public funding initiatives are often subject to voter approval, usually in the form 
of a referendum (Brown & Paul, 2002). Urban regimes and local growth coalitions 
contribute their considerable resources to stadium referenda efforts, and stadium 
advocates typically outspend opponents by 10 to 1 (Eckstein & Delaney, 2002).  Thus, 
although stadium opponents have become more organized and vocal in recent years 
(Brown & Paul, 2001), we continue to see sport facility referenda passed.  Ultimately 
neither the substantial evidence against the economic benefits of a sports team, nor the 
difficulty in quantifying social benefits has deterred pro-stadium groups from claiming 
these benefits in public information campaigns designed to sway voters.  Additionally, 
supporters often have access to key decision-makers and are able to link sports 
propositions to broader development goals, which can increase the likelihood of passing a 
referendum.  The results of recent stadium initiatives show that voter approval can no 
longer be taken for granted.  Yet, even if an initiative is defeated by the public, city 
governments often pursue other options to provide subsidies that do not require voter 
approval. 
While the cost of the facility is typically shared between public and private 
sectors, the same is not true of the facility’s revenues.  The new breed of stadiums are 
designed to include premium seating options and varied advertising and sponsorship 
opportunities.  The revenues derived from these stadium enhancements are captured 
almost exclusively by team owners.  Whereas team owners are required to share some 
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revenues (e.g., ticket sales, media rights) at the league level, these rules do not apply to 
new revenues (e.g., naming rights, sponsorship).  Poitras and Hadley (2006) estimate that 
with additional revenues of $50,000 per luxury box and $1000 per club seat, the total 
gain from premium seating in a new stadium is $5 million per season.  Likewise, stadium 
naming rights have topped $10 million per year, with the recent agreement between 
Reliant Energy and the NFL’s Houston Texans.  Team owners capture these revenues in 
their entirety, rarely sharing any of the proceeds with the host communities which 
provided the financial incentives to attract the team. 
The nature and growth of financial inducements offered by communities to teams 
is a result of the teams’ strong bargaining position.  The number of professional sport 
franchises, particularly major league franchises, is limited and tightly controlled by sport 
leagues. While the supply of teams is limited, there are a potentially unlimited number of 
communities who wish to host teams (and reap the associated benefits).  Therefore, 
communities that want to host a team must offer team owners an incentive package that is 
more attractive than the incentives offered by other communities.  An increase in the 
supply of teams would create a more balanced environment for negotiations between 
team owners and potential hosts (Baade & Sanderson, 1997; Chapin, 2002; Rosentraub, 
1999; Rosentraub & Swindell, 2002), but the current negotiating environment favors 
team owners, the same people who are responsible for decisions about major league 
expansion.  Thus, cities that want to host professional sport teams will continue to use 
financial incentives to compete against other cities who are also interested in hosting a 
team.   
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 In summary, local and state governments subsidize professional sport facilities in 
order to attract or retain teams, in spite of efforts by the federal government to dissuade 
this practice and mounting evidence that host communities rarely realize the benefits that 
are promised.  The subsidization of sport teams requires state and local governments to 
determine public priorities and make decisions about the allocation of public funds.  
When public funds are spent to attract or retain a professional team, these funds are 
unavailable for other public projects, such as education, recreation, infrastructure 
improvements, or other projects that could benefit a larger number of residents.   
Once a team has selected its home and a financing package is approved, cities 
rarely implement tactics necessary to realize these benefits, and teams are not made to 
deliver on their promises.  However, this does not mean that teams are unable to deliver 
promised benefits to the cities in which they play.  Professional sport teams introduce 
unique assets to the community which can be leveraged to deliver the benefits that host 
communities expect.  Therefore, in order to maximize the benefits of their investment in a 
sports team, host communities need to identify the specific assets that exist, the ways in 
which such assets can be used, and the individuals and organizations in the community 
that possess the knowledge and resources to leverage these assets.  By strategically 
leveraging the presence of a professional sports team, city leaders can better meet urban 
challenges and justify the presence of the team and the subsidies provided to them.  This 
is especially important, as it is unlikely that there will be a change in the current practice 
of providing financial incentives to professional sport teams.  The challenge facing city 
leaders and the team’s management is how to deliver on the promised benefits so that the 
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team is viewed as a valuable addition to the community and the city’s residents believe 
that the resources devoted to the team’s attraction were well-spent. 
Therefore, the purpose of this research is to examine community expectations 
related to hosting a professional sports team and compare these expectations to the 
community’s perceptions and experiences of hosting a team.  Specifically, this research 
explores the following research questions: 
1. What is the relationship between outcomes that are expected and those that are 
realized or actively pursued by cities that host professional sport teams? 
2. What factors enable and inhibit the use of a team to accomplish community 
development goals? 
In exploring the answers to these questions, my intent is to contribute to the 
understanding of the experience of hosting a professional sport team and how 
communities can act to best realize desired community development goals.               
THESIS OUTLINE 
This project is designed in two complementary studies which correspond to the 
research questions listed above.  The following chapter provides an overview of the site 
of the case study, including the cultural, demographic, and historical context of the city as 
well as a summary of the city’s efforts to attract a professional affiliated minor-league 
baseball team.  The first study (which constitutes Chapter 3) uses a qualitative approach 
including document and media analysis, participant observation, and stakeholder 
interviews, to map the expectations of the community regarding the presence of a 
professional sports team in the community and compare these expectations to the 
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achieved outcomes during the team’s first three years of play.  The second study (which 
is contained in Chapter 4) is an action research study that provides insight into what 
outcomes can be achieved when a community organization attempts to leverage the team 
to address community social issues.  The final chapter (Chapter 5) provides an integrated 
discussion of the two studies and concludes with implications for future research, theory, 
and practice. 
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Chapter 2:  Research Strategy and Setting 
 In order to address the research questions identified in the previous chapter, an 
intensive case study strategy was employed.  This chapter provides a discussion of the 
research strategy and an overview of the selected site for this project -- Corpus Christi, 
Texas.  The first section of this chapter provides the rationale behind adopting a case 
study strategy to research the questions previously posed.  The second section details the 
demographic, economic, and social characteristics of Corpus Christi.  Finally, the third 
section of this chapter outlines the efforts of Corpus Christi to attract the double-A 
affiliate of the Houston Astros, the Corpus Christi Hooks Baseball Club (the Hooks).   
This chapter provides the context for the two research studies that were conducted 
in Corpus Christi – the first examines the expectations and experience of hosting a team, 
and the second explores what happens when efforts are made to leverage a team to 
enhance the social welfare of the community.  The relevant literature, method, and results 
of these 2 individual studies are discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.           
CASE STUDY AS RESEARCH STRATEGY     
The public subsidization of sport teams has received a great deal of attention in 
various academic fields, including urban economics, public affairs, sociology, and sport 
management. Although different aspects of this issue have been addressed, much of the 
research has focused on either the processes through which a community can secure a 
team (e.g., Rosentraub, 1995; Friedman & Mason, 2001; Danielson, 1997) or the 
outcomes the community experiences once the team is secured (see Coates, 2007).  The 
current research project extends the extant literature by examining what host 
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communities do (or fail to do) to leverage the presence of a sports team for community 
benefit.  Because little is known about how communities act to maximize the benefit of 
sport teams, this research utilized an exploratory case study strategy.   
According to Yin (1998), the advantage to using a case study strategy is that it 
allows the researcher to examine the phenomenon of interest in its real life context, as 
opposed to experiments, which exclude contextual factors from consideration.  Yin points 
to two instances in which case study research is particularly appropriate: (1) when the 
research questions are descriptive (i.e., what happened) or exploratory (i.e., how or why 
something happened), and (2) when the researcher needs to get in depth information 
about a situation.  The research questions in this case meet both of these conditions.  
Further, case studies depict “events, processes, or perspectives…and often build an 
explanation for those events or outcomes” (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, p. 104).  The 
purpose of this research is theory development rather than hypothesis testing, and the 
case study strategy supports this aim by allowing the researcher to become familiar with 
the phenomenon of interest and identify and refine concepts and relationships (Becker, 
1968; Gersick, 1988; Merriam, 1998).   
For this research, a single case study approach was used.  The research setting is 
Corpus Christi, Texas, and this research examines Corpus Christi’s experience of 
attracting and hosting an affiliated minor-league baseball team.                      
RESEARCH SETTING PROFILE 
Corpus Christi, Texas, is the eighth largest city in the state of Texas and is located 
on the Gulf of Mexico, approximately halfway between Houston and the US/Mexico 
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border.  The city prides itself on its natural beauty, and its location on the Corpus Christi 
Bay inspired the city’s nickname, the Sparkling City by the Sea.  In 2003, Corpus Christi 
received national recognition from the National Civic League as an “All-American City,” 
yet it is plagued by problems common to many large cities, including economic 
development and smart growth, education, and retention of the workforce.  The following 
section provides a profile of the demographic, economic, and social characteristics of the 
city.  The sources for the data are the United States Census Bureau’s 2003 American 
Community Survey and POLICOM’s Economic Analysis of Corpus Christi completed in 
2007. 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS.  Corpus Christi is the eighth 
largest city in Texas with an estimated population of 279,000.  The median age is 33.5 
years, with 29% of the population under the age of 18 and 11% of the population 65 years 
and older.  The Hispanic population in Corpus Christi increased from 54.3% of 
respondents to the 2000 Census identifying themselves as Hispanic or Latino to 60% in 
2003.  Not surprisingly, 36% of individuals speak Spanish at home, and 29% of those 
individuals that speak Spanish reported that they did not speak English “very well.”   In 
2003, families made up 73% of households in Corpus Christi, which includes both 
married couple families (51%) and other families (22%).  The population in Corpus 
Christi is fairly stable, with 76% of individuals living in the same residence in 2003 as 
they did in the previous year.  Nineteen percent moved to Corpus Christi from elsewhere 
in Nueces County, 2% moved from another county in Texas, and 2% moved to Corpus 
Christi from out-of-state.  Twenty-one percent of individuals aged 25 or older did not 
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complete high school, and 12% of individuals 16 to 19 years old were dropouts (i.e., not 
enrolled in school and had not graduated from high school).  College enrollment in 
Corpus Christi is 19,000, and is driven primarily by Texas A&M – Corpus Christi and 
Del Mar College.  
ECONOMIC HEALTH OF THE REGION.  Corpus Christi has struggled economically 
over the last few decades.  The Port of Corpus Christi is a dominant force in the 
economic health of the region.  The Port is the sixth largest port in the United States and 
its operations primarily involve agricultural and petrochemical products, although the 
Port has expanded into tourism and recreation projects in recent years.  The local 
economy is largely influenced by the United States military.  Corpus Christi is home to 
the Corpus Christi Air Depot and the Corpus Christi Naval Air Station, which employ a 
combined 6,200 residents.  However, the Naval Air Station was included in the 2005 
Department of Defense Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC), which means that 
several residents will lose their jobs or be relocated over the next several years.  In 
POLICOM’s rankings of the 361 metropolitan areas, the Corpus Christi Metropolitan 
Area was determined to be below average in terms of its economic strength (i.e., the long 
term tendency of an area to grow in size and quality).  While this ranking is based on the 
economy of the entire metropolitan area, the city of Corpus Christi accounts for 69% of 
the population, and it is estimated that 75% of all jobs in the metropolitan area are located 
within the Corpus Christi city limits.   
 The Corpus Christi Regional Economic Development Corporation (CCREDC) 
targeted the following primary industries believed to provide the wage structure needed 
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for economic growth:  extraction (support for oil and gas activities), electric power 
generation, petrochemical, fabrication, electronic retailing, water transport, warehousing, 
knowledge-based businesses, professional services, and enterprise management.  The 
primary targets are industries that complement the region’s existing industries and take 
advantage of the region’s natural and geographic resources.  In addition, the CCREDC 
has identified emerging sectors (e.g., energy technologies and development, 
nanotechnology, coastal marine research) as attractive industries worthy of attention and 
attraction.  However, recent city budgets show that there is far less fiscal support for 
attraction of these types of industry than for the attraction of professional sport teams.    
 An additional measure of the economic health of a community is total personal 
income (TPI).  TPI is composed of three parts:  earned income, passive income, and 
government transfers.  Earned income includes the amount of work earned by an 
individual through active work (e.g., wages, salaries).  Passive income includes money 
earned from investments, interest, and private retirement plans.  Government transfers 
include payments from government entitlement programs (e.g., Social Security, 
Medicaid, Medicare, AFDC, unemployment, veterans’ benefits).   High levels of 
government transfer programs can suggest a distressed local economy, as residents are 
more dependent on entitlements than earned or passive income.  Conversely, high levels 
of passive income suggest a relatively affluent population. In 2003, the TPI of the Corpus 
Christi MSA was $10.4 billion, with 67.1% earned income, 14.5% passive income, and 
18.3% government transfers.  The percentage of government transfers has consistently 
increased each decade since 1973, when the Corpus Christi MSA had a level of 
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government transfers (9.2%) lower than the national average (10.2%).  In general, an 
economy is considered strong if greater than 70% of TPI comes from earned income and 
less than 11% from government transfers.   
POLITICAL AND COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP. Corpus Christi has a City Council – 
City Manager form of government.  The Council comprises the Mayor, 5 district Council 
members, and 3 at-large Council members, each of whom is elected to a 2-year term.   
The Council serves as the legislative body for the city, while the City Manager 
administers its policies and services.  In 2002, Corpus Christi voters defeated an initiative 
that would have given more power to the mayor, thus, much of the day-to-day 
governance of the city is left to the city manager.   
 In 2000, a group of community leaders formed Forward Corpus Christi.  This 
group consists of many of the power brokers in the community, and they are focused on 
promoting economic growth and improving the quality of life for Corpus Christi 
residents.  Forward Corpus Christi has been influential in the passage of 8 bond and sales 
tax initiatives to help attract new businesses, improve facilities, create affordable housing 
opportunities and provide increased family entertainment options.                                  
RATIONALE FOR SITE SELECTION 
When using a case study, the selection of an appropriate site is crucial to success 
in understanding the phenomenon at issue (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1995).  Corpus 
Christi was chosen as the research setting for 3 reasons.  First, Corpus Christi has made 
the attraction of sport entertainment properties a public policy priority.  Corpus Christi 
hosted 8 minor league baseball teams during the 20th century, but prior to the Hooks, no 
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team survived more than 4 seasons.  None of these failed teams received significant 
public subsidization, and the last team ceased operations in 1995.  While the Hooks and 
the subsidization of Whataburger Field are the subject of this research, the city has also 
successfully attracted a minor-league hockey team, which began play in 1997, and an 
Arena Football (afl2) team, which began play in 2006.   This inventory of current sport 
properties in the city underscores the city’s recent success in its sport development 
efforts, which comes after nearly a century of failed professional sport teams.    In each 
case, the city’s efforts to secure a team have been based on city leaders’ expectation that 
the presence of a professional sport team provides important benefits to the city.   
Second, Corpus Christi has limited its sport attraction targets to minor league 
teams.  With only a few exceptions (e.g., Johnson, 1998; Coulson, 1994), research has 
focused on the experience of communities that subsidized major league teams.  This is in 
spite of the fact that many cities – particularly smaller cities – stand a far better chance of 
attracting a minor league than a major league franchise.  Some of the benefits and 
challenges of hosting a team are similar for minor and major league teams, yet the 
positive impacts (particularly economic impacts) are likely to be significantly smaller for 
communities that host exclusively minor league teams (Johnson, 1993; Rosentraub & 
Swindell, 1991).  Consequently, communities that host minor league teams must work 
harder to leverage their teams if they hope to make their investment in professional sport 
worthwhile.  Also, the growth in popularity of minor league sports and a less tightly 
controlled supply of teams suggests that the experience of a city with a minor league 
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sport presence will have broader application to cities involved in professional sport team 
attraction.   
Finally, Corpus Christi was selected as the site for this research because of its 
previous record of spending on public projects.  Public funding of sport facilities has 
become commonplace in American cities in recent years (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000; 
Rappaport & Wilkerson, 2001; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997).  However, prior to 2000, Corpus 
Christi had not held a bond election for any purpose in 14 years.  The city’s long 
reluctance to fund public improvements makes its choice to publicly fund sport facilities 
especially significant.  The lack of public improvements during the 1980s and 1990s 
resulted in failing infrastructure, education, and other public services, and draws the 
city’s decision to build sport facilities in stark contrast.  Corpus Christi’s first bond 
election for sport entertainment subsidization took place in 2000, when the owners of the 
IceRays and city leaders wanted to secure funding for a state-of-the-art arena to replace 
the team’s previous home, Memorial Coliseum, a multi-purpose arena built in 1953.  City 
leaders believed that the arena was a visible project supported by voters, and they used 
the arena project to anchor a more comprehensive bond election.  The arena measure 
successfully passed, as did 4 other measures which provided money for repairs to the 
seawall, street repairs, public health and safety, and parks and recreation and museum 
improvements. The arena opened as the American Bank Center in 2004 and was 
instrumental in the attraction of additional sport teams by the city.  The existence of the 
new arena enabled the city to attract an Arena Football League team in 2006, which 
shares the facility with the hockey team and Texas A&M Corpus Christi athletics.  More 
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importantly, the success of the arena bond issue in 2000 gave city leaders hope that voters 
would approve future bond issues for sport facilities, and it encouraged city leaders to 
explore opportunities for bringing baseball back to the city.  These efforts are the topic of 
this research.                                                                                                              
CORPUS CHRISTI HOOKS TIMELINE 
 Table 2.1 outlines the major events that led to the attraction of a minor league 
baseball team in Corpus Christi and the major events that followed once the team was 
secured.   
Date Event 
May 29, 2002 Hall of Fame pitcher Nolan Ryan signs a memorandum of 
understanding announcing his intention to bring minor-league 
baseball to Corpus Christi 
July 9, 2002 City Council votes unanimously to put a 1/8 cent sales tax increase 
to pay for the stadium’s construction 
November 5, 2002 Corpus Christi voters approve the bond issue and sales tax 
increase, 55%, or 32,666 votes to 45%, or 26,433 
December 9, 2002 Reid Ryan (son of Nolan Ryan) says his plan is to bring a Class 
AAA team to Round Rock and move the Express’ Class AA 
Houston Astros affiliate to Corpus Christi in 2005 
October 23, 2003 The Ryans reach an agreement to purchase the Edmonton Trappers 
of the Pacific Coast League and move them to Round Rock.  The 
Class AA team will be moved to Corpus Christi.  Express 
executive JJ Gottsch is named president. 
March 1, 2004 Whataburger signs a 15-year contract for naming rights for the 
stadium 
April 8, 2004 The team announces its name will be the Corpus Christi Hooks.  
Merchandise goes on sale at area Circle K stores. 
February 24, 2005 The Hooks begin their first spring training in Kissimmee, Florida 
April 3, 2005 The Hooks play their first game in a 7-5 exhibition game in Round 
Rock 
April 17, 2005 The Hooks lose their home opener before a sold-out crowd at 
Whataburger Field 
September 3, 2005 The Hooks finish their inaugural season with a 64-76 win-loss 
record, ranking next to last in the Texas League 
April 12, 2006 The Hooks open their 2nd season at home. 
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June 11, 2006 Pitching legend Roger Clemens starts for the Corpus Christi Hooks 
while on a rehab assignment from the Houston Astros 
September 15, 2006 The Hooks win the Texas League championship at Whataburger 
Field in front of 8,394 fans 
April 5, 2007 The Hooks open their 3rd season at Wichita, Kansas 
June 26, 2007 Whataburger Field hosts the 71st Texas League All-Star Game 
September 5, 2007 The Hooks end their 3rd season with a 67-73 win-loss record, 
finishing 3rd in their division of 4 teams 
  
This chapter provides a rationale for using a case study approach and describes 
Corpus Christi, which is the setting for the 2 studies that follow.  The first study examines 
how the city’s expectations about hosting a professional sports team compares with the 
outcomes experienced once the team began play and is discussed fully in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3:  Expectations and Outcomes of Hosting a Professional Sport 
Franchise  
The first chapter discussed the policy issues related to public investment in sport.  
In spite of the policy issues identified, cities, counties, and states believe that the varied 
benefits that accrue to host communities make public investment worthwhile.  
Consequently, local governments continue to provide these subsidies to team owners.  If 
a city has realistic expectations about the presence of a sports team, and these 
expectations are fully met, a public policy problem does not exist.  However, this is rarely 
the case.  Typically, supporters of public investment in sport make exaggerated claims 
about potential benefits (Baade, 1996; Baade, 1994; Whitson & Horne, 2006), while they 
ignore project cost overruns and other potential problems associated with the team’s 
presence (Eisinger, 2000; Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2005; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997; 
Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000).  Thus, residents and leaders may approve funding based on 
misinformation and unrealistic expectations. 
The purpose of the study discussed in this chapter is to understand how Corpus 
Christi’s expectations about hosting a professional sport team compare to the actual 
outcomes experienced by the city as host to the Corpus Christi Hooks, an affiliated minor 
league baseball team.  The city’s expectations of the presence of a team are compared 
with its public policy priorities, and the degree to which the community actively sought 
specific outcomes is examined.  This chapter proceeds in four sections.  The first section 
reviews the literature related to public investment in sport, with specific attention being 
paid to the costs and benefits of hosting a team.  The second section details the research 
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method and data analysis used in this study.  The third section presents the findings of 
this study and is followed by the final section, which provides a discussion of the 
findings.                                                                               
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide an overview of the costs and 
benefits of public subsidization of professional sport within a welfare economics 
framework.  As noted in the first chapter, communities have invested between $12 and 
$15 billion in professional sport facilities over the last 2 decades (Humphreys, 2006; 
Long, 2006).  Although the public’s percentage share of facility costs is decreasing, the 
total public investment in sport facilities is increasing (Crompton, 2005), which results in 
an increased burden on local residents.  The argument advanced by stadium supporters is 
that the benefits of hosting a team are greater than the cost to the community (Danielson, 
1997 ; Euchner, 1993; Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000).  The conceptual bases for this 
argument are the fundamental assumptions of welfare economics and their practical 
application to public policy decision making through cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  Thus, 
this section begins with a brief overview of welfare economics and then continues with 
the identification and evaluation of claims related to the costs and benefits of public 
investment in sport.   
Welfare economics is a normative branch of economics that focuses on how a 
government can use its limited resources to maximize social welfare  (Just, Hueth, & 
Schmitz, 2004).   Government officials are entrusted with the stewardship of public 
funds, and welfare economics provides guidance as to what policies and projects they 
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should pursue in order to maximize the well-being of the residents whom they govern. To 
begin this discussion, I briefly discuss the concept of optimality, the fundamental 
assumption that underlies the field of welfare economics and serves as a guide for 
decision making.  
 The primary assumption of welfare economics concerns the optimal use of 
resources to increase social welfare (Arrow, 1962; Ng, 2003; Stiglitz, 1988).  According 
to the Pareto criterion, welfare is enhanced when a change is made that makes at least one 
individual better off without making anyone else worse off  (Femia, 2005).    Thus, from 
a policy perspective, any policy that makes even one person worse off should not be 
adopted.  Unfortunately, it is rarely the case that a government program or project does 
not have some negative impacts.  Thus, when using the Pareto criterion as a guide, major 
policy changes are rarely adopted, as it is difficult to create change without negatively 
affecting someone (Zerbe & Bellas, 2007).   
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion, or potential Pareto improvement (PPI), is an 
improvement from the pure Pareto criterion and is more relevant to public policy decision 
making (Just, Hueth, & Schmitz, 2004).  According to the PPI, a change can be 
undertaken if the “winners” would be able to compensate the “losers” and still be better 
off, and the “losers” are unable to bribe the “winners” to prevent the change (Ng, 2004).  
Thus, the PPI provides the rationale for using cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in public 
policy decision making (Stavins, Wagner & Wagner, 2002).  In CBA, benefits are valued 
based on individuals’ willingness to pay and costs are valued by the amount necessary to 
compensate losers.  The goal is to maximize the difference between benefits and costs. In 
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the public policy realm, all benefits and costs (e.g., private and social, direct and indirect, 
tangible and intangible) must be considered (Harlow & Windsor, 1988; Zerbe & Bellas, 
2007), and a policy is adopted only if the total benefits are greater than the total costs.  As 
long as this is the case, the beneficiaries could theoretically compensate the losers, 
although the PPI does not actually require this compensation to take place. 
A CBA approach to public policy is not without its critics. Primarily, critics argue 
that CBA ignores issues of equity, and while CBA might suggest an efficient outcome, it 
could place an undue burden on the poor (Brent, 2007; Layard & Glaister, 1994; Prest & 
Turvey, 1965).  CBA can be manipulated to show large net benefits (Grunwald, 2000), 
which supports Marglin’s (1967) assertion that CBA can function as “window dressing 
for projects whose plans have already been formulated with little if any reference to 
economic criteria” (p. 18).  As noted by Portney (2002), “some criticize [CBA] on the 
grounds that it supposedly enshrines the free market and discourages government 
intervention.  However, [CBA] exists precisely because economists recognize that free 
markets sometimes allocate resources inefficiently.” 
Although measuring total costs and benefits for any project is inherently 
complicated, estimates of costs and benefits are widely cited by policymakers, the media, 
and others (CRS, 2005).  Since 1981, federal cabinet departments and independent 
federal agencies have been required to prepare CBA before issuing “major” or 
“economically significant” rules (CRS, 2005).   
If subsidization of sport projects is the fiscally responsible strategy that supporters 
claim, then the tenets of welfare economics can be applied through CBA.  However, 
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comprehensive CBA has been conducted of professional sport projects only in rare 
instances (Christian, 1995; Rosentraub & Swindell, 1991).  Further, there is a gulf 
between prospective analyses of a sport project’s benefits commissioned by supporters 
and the empirical studies conducted by the academic community.  Thus, the following 
section reviews empirical evidence from the economic, public affairs, planning, and 
sociology literatures provide the foundation for further investigation of the degree to 
which communities realize net benefits from hosting a sports team.   
SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC SUBSIDIZATION 
EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME EFFECTS.  Supporters of stadium projects have long 
emphasized the economic benefits of hosting a team to garner public support (e.g., Noll 
& Zimbalist, 1997; Rosentraub, 1999; Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000).  The emphasis on 
economic benefits is consistent with local governments’ responsibility for locally-based 
economic development, which is the process by which government and community 
organizations create partnerships and use their existing resources to create new jobs and 
economic activity (Blakely, 2001).  During the 1980’s, local governments viewed major 
manufacturing projects as economic development tools and they provided them with 
public funds based on their ability to drive economic growth in an industrial economy 
(Bartik, 1991).  As the economy shifted from a manufacturing to a service focus, 
entertainment projects -- particularly professional sport projects -- have replaced 
manufacturing projects as the targets of public subsidies.  Similar to earlier subsidization 
of manufacturing projects, the stated purpose of subsidizing sport facilities is to drive 
economic growth and increase economic activity. 
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Supporters claim that economic benefits (e.g., job creation, higher wages, 
increased tax revenues) are realized through the construction and operation of the 
stadium, as well as through development that is enabled by the presence of a team (Cagan 
& deMause, 1998; Danielson, 1997; Rosentraub, 1995).  The construction of a new 
stadium creates jobs in the construction sector, which benefits the host city if the team 
prioritizes local residents in their hiring (Clinton & Bates, 2000).  The operation of a new 
stadium also creates jobs, although they are for the most part, temporary, seasonal and 
low paying jobs (Bachelor, 1998; Miller, 2002; Utt, 1998).  But the economic benefits of 
the team are not limited to job creation in the construction and operation of the stadium.  
Sport teams and events attract fans to the area, and the fans, in turn, spend money in 
hotels, restaurants, bars, and local stores.  If these fans are tourists (i.e., non-locals), this 
spending represents a net increase in economic activity that will benefit local businesses.  
The success of local businesses will revitalize the area around the stadium, thereby 
creating additional jobs, increasing wages, and increasing tax revenues collected by the 
city (Johnson, 1995). 
In spite of continued claims of such economic benefits, the overwhelming 
majority of research has failed to find a positive, significant effect of a professional sports 
team or facility on local income and employment (Baade, 1996; Baade & Dye, 1990; 
Baade & Sanderson, 1997; Baim, 1992;  Coates & Humphreys, 2003; Noll & Zimbalist, 
1997; Rosentraub, Swindell, Przybylski, & Mullins 1994).  There is also little support for 
claims related to substantial increases in tax collections attributable to the presence of the 
team (Rappaport & Wilkinson, 2001).  Because the professional sport industry represents 
 31 
such a small part of a metropolitan economy, it isn’t surprising that academic research 
has failed to find a significant positive economic impact (Baade & Dye, 1996).  For 
example, supporters projected that the NFL’s Baltimore Ravens would contribute an 
additional $125 million to the Baltimore economy (Hamilton & Kahn, 1997).  Even this 
inflated and biased estimate represents a mere 0.2% of the cumulative economic activity 
in the city (Hamilton & Kahn, 1997). Likewise, professional sports accounted for less 
than 1% of services income in Chicago – a city with five professional sports teams 
(Baade, 1996).  Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) note that a baseball team in a mid-sized 
city like St. Louis accounts for 0.3% of local economic activity, while a baseball team in 
a large city like New York accounts for only 0.03% of economic activity.  At best, the 
economic activity created by a sport team is similar to that of a department or grocery 
store, hardly a prescription for substantial economic growth.  Or, as noted by Nelson 
(2002), the “total economic activity associated with major league sports is less than the 
error term in estimates of economic productivity” (p. 255)   
 Nevertheless, econometric techniques are commonly used to determine the impact 
of a new sport team or sport facility on employment and earnings.  Using time series and 
panel data, these studies adopt a retrospective approach, which can be contrasted with the 
prospective analyses conducted or commissioned by stadium supporters.  Overall, the 
results of independent studies are discouraging to those who consider professional sport 
facilities as engines of economic growth.  Using employment and earnings as proxies for 
economic development, researchers have found that stadiums have either a negligible or 
negative impact (e.g., Baade, 1996; Baade & Dye, 1990; Baade & Sanderson, 1997; 
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Baim, 1992;  Coates & Humphreys, 2003; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997; Rosentraub, Swindell, 
Przybylski, & Mullins 1994).   
Baade and Sanderson (1997) examined host cities’ share of total state 
employment in the amusements and recreation sector (SIC 79) and the commercial sports 
subsector (SIC 794).  The advantage of using the host city’s share of total state 
employment is that it allows the researcher to control for macroeconomic trends and 
fluctuations in the business cycle.  If there is an economic slowdown due to 
macroeconomic factors, one would expect the downturn have a uniform effect across the 
state.  Thus, the city’s share of total economic activity in the state would be expected to 
remain the same.  If the presence of a sports team impacts the host city’s economy, one 
would expect a change in the host city’s share of employment (relative to non-host areas 
of the state) in sectors that are related to professional sports.  The results of Baade and 
Sanderson (1997) do little to illuminate the economic benefits.  They found significant 
effects in 9 cities that hosted new stadiums or new teams – a significant positive effect in 
4 host cities and a significant negative effect in 5 host cities.  Further, when positive 
effects were detected, the team was responsible for creating only approximately 200 jobs 
– an insignificant degree of job creation in an urban economy.  This independent analysis 
is especially telling when it is compared to the job estimates publicized by privately 
commissioned economic impact analyses.  In 10 cities studied by Rappaport & Wilkinson 
(2001), supporters generated job creation estimates ranging from 1,264 for a new stadium 
for the NFL’s Seattle Seahawks to 4,474 for a new stadium for MLB’s Cincinnati Reds. 
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Coates and Humphreys (2000) extended the sector-based approach and examined 
the impact of a professional sports presence on the wages in the retail and services 
sectors.  Specifically, they looked at the relationship between the presence of a team and 
wages earned by workers in the following economic sectors – hotels (major group 70), 
amusement and recreation services (major group 79) and eating and drinking places 
(major group 58).  This work builds on previous work (e.g., Baade, 1996; Baade & 
Sanderson, 1997) by testing the claims of stadium supporters that the presence of a sport 
facility creates additional spending in the area near the stadium.  If the team and new 
facility attract tourists and prompt additional spending in the area (as supporters claim), 
then we would expect to see a positive effect on area hotels and retail.  Coates and 
Humphreys (2003) found a positive effect on earnings per employee in the amusements 
and recreation sector, but these gains were offset by employment and earnings losses in 
other sectors, resulting in a net negative impact on the local economy. 
These findings can be explained if professional sport events are considered as a 
substitute for other forms of entertainment available in the city.  Instead of creating a net 
increase in economic activity, a professional sports team is more likely to realign leisure 
spending within the community (Baade, 1994, 1996; Hartzell & Marcouiller, 1999; 
Santo, 2005).  Individuals substitute spending at professional sport events for other 
discretionary entertainment spending.  So, while there is little argument that a new 
facility will hire new workers for stadium operations, and that visitors to the facility will 
spend money in and around the facility, this economic activity does not necessarily 
constitute an increase in jobs or spending.  Rather, changes in employment and spending 
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attributable to a sport facility are substitutes for employment and spending that would be 
occur in the absence of the team.  A professional sporting event is a substitute for a wide 
array of entertainment options.  In the absence of a team, individuals would instead go to 
a movie theater, a restaurant, or spend their money on some other form of entertainment.  
This spending in and around a professional sport facility may consequently create new 
jobs in these areas, but they likely come at the cost of jobs in other areas of the city 
(Chapin, 2004; Depken, 1995).  Spending on non-sport entertainment options may be 
more economically desirable, as Coates and Humphreys (2001) found that personal 
income actually increased during recent labor strikes in the NFL and NBA, although by a 
small percentage (0.17% and 0.38 respectively).  This finding suggests that spending at 
the local movie theater or local restaurants may have a greater impact because the money 
is kept within the community, whereas many professional sport owners and players do 
not live in the community where their team plays (Baade & Matheson, 2007).   
We see a similar outcome when we look at the impact of the construction of a 
sports facility.  Supporters claim that sport projects create new construction employment.  
While construction impacts have received far less attention in the literature than operation 
impacts, empirical research has failed to find a positive net impact in the construction 
sector.  Miller (2002) examined the impact of construction of two professional sport 
facilities in Saint Louis – the Trans World Dome for the NFL’s Saint Louis Rams and the 
Kiel Center for the NHL’s Saint Louis Blues.  Miller found no evidence to suggest these 
projects created a net increase in construction jobs in the St. Louis MSA during the 
construction period.  Instead, the construction jobs created by the sport projects were 
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substitutes for construction that would have occurred in the absence of the sport projects.   
Thus, the impact of stadium construction echoes that of stadium operations – empirical 
evidence does not support the claim that cities realize positive net economic benefits. 
The near unanimity of findings that professional sport teams and facilities fail to 
create significant economic benefits has prompted some researchers to declare the issue 
settled (Baade, 1998; Coates, 2007).  However, two lines of argument have emerged that 
allow for the possibility that public subsidization of sport can be justified.  The first group 
of studies critiques the findings of the consensus literature as outdated and explores 
whether stadium location and context influence the degree and/or location of economic 
impact.  The second argument is an extension of the consensus literature and suggests 
that although subsidization may not be justified on economic grounds, intangible, social, 
and quality of life benefits may be sufficient to justify public subsidization.  Each of these 
arguments is discussed in turn below.   
STADIUM LOCATION AND CONTEXT.  Chema (1996) notes that sport venues’ 
“value as catalysts for economic development (job growth and the creation of wealth) 
depends upon where they are located and how they are integrated into a metropolitan 
area’s growth strategy” (p. 19).  Baltimore’s Camden Yards ushered in a new era of 
stadium design and location, and most sport facilities built since the 1990’s are located in 
urban areas.  This is a significant change from the previous era of stadium construction 
(Crompton, 1995). 
Newsome and Comer (2000) investigated the changing location patterns of sport 
facilities and found that there has been an increase in the number of professional sport 
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facilities in the central city across all four major leagues.  Over ¾ of MLB, NBA, and 
NHL facilities are located in the central city (i.e., non-suburban), with most NBA and 
NHL facilities located downtown (63.1% and 65.4% respectively).   
It makes sense intuitively that stadium location would make a difference in the 
degree of economic impact, as a stadium located in a lively downtown area seems more 
likely to spur ancillary spending than a stadium located in a suburban setting surrounded 
by parking lots (Baade, 2000; Porter, 1998; Robertson, 1995), and recent research 
provides some empirical support for this notion.  Nelson (2001) proposed that a MSA’s 
share of regional income would rise when major league teams play in the central business 
district (CBD), but fall when they are located outside of the CBD.  Time series analysis 
found a significant negative relationship between host city’s share of regional income and 
stadium location outside the CBD. Nelson (2001) also found that when more teams are 
located outside of the CBD, there is a greater loss in the host city’s share of regional 
income, which suggests the existence of  agglomeration effects.  Nelson (2002) extended 
his research by considering three potential stadium locations – downtown, elsewhere in 
the central city, and the suburbs.  His study confirmed his earlier finding that 
metropolitan economies benefit the most when major league teams play in the central city 
(and conversely, economies do worse when sport facilities are located in the suburbs).   
 Santo (2005) also hypothesized that stadium location could make a difference in 
economic impact, and he recast earlier econometric analyses using a more recent data set, 
which included a majority of stadiums located in the central city.  He found a significant 
positive relationship between sports-related variables (i.e., new teams and/or new 
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stadiums) and regional income share for 8 host cities, and the results of pooled regression 
analysis demonstrate a significant positive relationship between the presence of a new 
baseball stadium and regional income share.   
If stadium location does impact the economic benefits that accrue to a host city, 
and if many of the current stadiums are located in urban settings, then sport facilities 
might be effective tools for central city and downtown revitalization.  Baltimore, 
Indianapolis, and Cleveland are widely regarded as cities that have successfully used 
professional sport development to revitalize and redevelop their central cities (Baade, 
1996; Danielson, 1997; Gratton & Henry, 2001; Hamilton & Kahn, 1997; Rosentraub, et 
al, 1995).  Cleveland’s Gateway Park project (which includes an MLB stadium, an NBA 
arena, and a special events plaza) is the anchor for a downtown entertainment district, and 
the project prompted a physical renewal of the area through new commercial, hotel, and 
residential development (Austrian & Rosentraub, 1997; Chapin, 2004).  Similarly, 
Baltimore’s Camden Yards resulted in the successful redevelopment of existing buildings 
(Chapin, 2004).   
In each of these cases, there is an excitement and vitality that attracts tourists and 
locals to downtown areas, whether the revitalization appears to be a direct result of the 
construction of sport facilities or sport projects complement revitalization efforts that 
were already underway.  Of course, even these successful cases did not fully deliver on 
promised economic benefits (Chapin, 2004, 2006).  However, there is evidence that cities 
with aggressive downtown sport development strategies may fare better than their peers.  
Austrian and Rosentraub (2002) compared 4 cities that host major league sport teams: 
 38 
Cleveland, Indianapolis, Cincinnati, and Columbus.  Cleveland and Indianapolis (i.e., the 
cities with a cogent sport strategy) experienced greater success than Cincinnati and 
Columbus in terms of maintaining economic vitality in their downtown areas, and a 
“sports and hospitality concentration did help focus economic attention and political 
support for the maintenance of a downtown presence for employers in both Cleveland 
and Indianapolis” (p. 506).  
Research that focuses on the context and location of sport facilities in 
revitalization efforts suggests that while it is short-sighted to view a sport facility as the 
key to central city revitalization, there is at least the potential for these impacts.   
INTANGIBLE BENEFITS.  Claims of central city revitalization fail to fully explain why 
so many cities continue to subsidize professional sport projects.  Thus, the final argument 
in support of public subsidization depends on the creation of intangible, social, and 
quality of life benefits that a sport team can create.   If these benefits are valued by the 
residents of the host city and create total net benefits for the community (meeting the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion), then the decision to invest in professional sports is consistent 
with the welfare economics framework previously discussed.  In fact, most academics 
who criticize the economic rationale for public subsidization refrain from declaring 
subsidization bad public policy, and they instead suggest that the conversation should 
instead focus on identifying and valuing these intangible benefits (Baade & Dye, 1988; 
Coates, 2007; Crompton, 2005). 
Chief among these intangible benefits is image creation and enhancement, which 
can help the city achieve other desired ends.  The presence of a professional sports team 
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confers status as “major league” or “world class” to the host city.  It can create an image 
where there wasn’t one, as illustrated by the case of Indianapolis, which was transformed 
from Noplace or Naptown to Sports City (Rosentraub, et al., 1995).  Or it can enhance the 
image of a city that has a negative image, as in the case of Cleveland, once known as the 
“Mistake on the Lake” and now the home to a thriving entertainment district around its 
sports stadia (Schimmel, 2000).  Eisinger (2000) claims that leaders who emphasize 
image benefits to legitimize public spending on sport projects offer their constituents “not 
the best basic services that have long been core municipal responsibilities, but rather the 
thin sustenance of bread and circuses.”  However, image benefits are not necessarily an 
end in themselves, but instead can lead to positive economic gains from external sources.  
The primary external audiences to which enhance image is communicated are potential 
employers and potential tourists.   
The enhancement of a city’s image and its promotion to external publics is important 
as a means to further economic development goals and make the city competitive for 
investment (Bradley, Hall, & Harrison, 2002; Jessop, 1998; Kavaratzis, 2004; Paddison, 
1993).  Specifically, stadium supporters claim that the team’s presence will impact firm 
location decisions and attract new business and industry to the community.  According to 
this argument, executives prefer to locate in cities that have an established reputation as 
“major league” or “world class.”  However, sport teams and the facilities in which they 
play are only one of a number of residential amenities than communities can offer 
residents.  Residential amenities are defined as “place-specific goods or services that 
enter the utility functions of residents directly” (Gottlieb, 1995).  These amenities make a 
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location an attractive place for workers, suggesting that employers in areas high in such 
amenities would be able to attract workers at lower wage.  Thus, because attractive 
residential amenities may substitute for some measure of wage compensation, residential 
amenities can both attract a quality workforce and employers, thereby making the 
creation and maintenance of amenities a popular economic development strategy 
(Robertson, 1995).   
Some decision makers have publicly stated that a city’s sports status is among 
their considerations (Noll & Zimbalist, 1997), although these claims are largely 
anecdotal. Yet, professional sport teams may be able to influence location decisions of 
specific types of firms.  Cohen (2000) found that major league sports teams were among 
the location priorities for corporate headquarter siting decisions, along with accessible 
international air travel, availability of professional support services and office space, a 
diverse professional employee base, attractive housing for executives, affordable housing 
for managers and support staff, and a strong educational system for employee’s children 
and adult continuing education.  She notes that a professional sport facility is a 
“hallmark” for headquarter cities because of the high degree of in-person contact that 
takes place in the operations of a corporate headquarters.  Luxury suites are attractive and 
private places for business meetings.  Additionally, cultural amenities like professional 
sport teams are more likely to influence the location of service, rather than manufacturing 
activities (Calzonetti & Allison, 2001).   
On the other hand, professional sport teams are less likely to attract members of 
the creative class (e.g., scientists, engineers, poets, architects) than smaller scale 
 41 
amenities such as nightclubs (Florida, 2002).   This assertion has empirical proof, as a 
study of technology sector workers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, showed only marginal 
interest in a region with professional sports, with less than 1% specifically mentioning 
local sports teams as an advantage of the Pittsburgh region (Hansen, Ban, & Huggins, 
2003). While it is unclear the degree to which cultural amenities may play a part in firm 
location decisions, key non-amenity factors must first be determined to be favorable 
(Calzonetti & Allison, 2001).  Still, a professional sports presence may create a 
competitive advantage for host cities, if other factors are equal.   
The second external audience that may be affected by a city’s enhanced image is 
tourists.  In order to attract visitors, many cities are creating “tourist bubbles” – creating 
an image of their downtowns as safe, hospitable areas with activity. As cities compete 
with each other to attract visitors, sport facilities have become an important element of 
tourist bubbles (Fainstein & Stokes, 1999; Judd, 2003; Newman, 2002).   
Image benefits may also impact the internal audience of local residents, and again, 
these benefits may lead to an economic impact.  Coates and Humphreys (2002b) found 
that winning the Super Bowl resulted in a per capita increase in income in the victor’s 
city, and they suggested that when a sports team has a major victory, local residents’ 
pride increases, thereby making them happier and more productive.  
In addition to image benefits, stadium supporters claim that the presence of a 
sport team provides fans with a point of connection or link to other residents.  The event 
of a game provides fans with a social outlet, whether it is a gathering to watch a game, or 
discussion of the event after the fact.   Research regarding the power of a sport team to 
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bring a community together is inconclusive.  Smith and Ingham (2003) found little 
support for the power of sport to foster community.   Still, a more ethnographic approach 
has revealed that fan interactions at the ballpark can create at least a temporary sense of 
communitas (Trujillo & Krizek, 1994).  This phenomenon is not limited to individuals 
who attend live games, as a similar effect has been observed among individuals who view 
sport events together at sports bars (Eastman & Land, 1997).  Further, there is empirical 
evidence that sport spectatorship can serve an integrative function at a number of 
ecological levels, including community and metropolitan levels (Wann, Melnick, Russell 
& Pease, 2001). 
 Oldenberg (1989) noted the disappearance of the “third place” in America and its 
effect on civil society.  According to Oldenberg, the third place is a public gathering 
place distinct from home or work that provides opportunities for sociability and 
connection.  Professional sport has the potential to fill that void, and it has been 
suggested that sport spectatorship can create opportunities for sociability (Melnick, 
1993).   
There is also the possibility that when appropriately leveraged, sport spectatorship 
can develop social capital.  While Blackshaw and Long (2005) believe that sport, like any 
leisure activity, has an intrinsic value as a point of connection for people, and this 
connection is an end in itself, the concept of social capital views this relationship as a 
means to an end.  Social capital has received increased attention in the United States with 
its application to the level of civic participation in a community.  Putnam (2000) claims 
that the level of social capital in a community corresponds to the level of participation in 
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voluntary membership associations, and these associations have declined dramatically 
during the last several decades.  While membership in sport participation groups is 
considered to have a positive effect on social welfare and civil society (Jarvie, 2003), 
passive spectatorship is thought to have the opposite effect (Putnam, 2000).  
Unfortunately, membership in sport groups has shown a slight but significant decrease 
since the 1980s (Rotolo, 1999).  Americans are more likely to enjoy sports as spectators 
or through new media than as participants.  However, in relation to social capital, it can 
be argued that the benefit derived from sport teams and clubs comes not from the 
activities of the club, but from the setting that provides a point of connection among 
individuals.  If this is the case, the loss to civil society as Americans become spectators 
instead of participants can be mitigated through the creation of points of connection for 
spectators.  From a social capital perspective, a group of fans watching a game in a public 
gathering space would be preferable to an individual watching a game in the privacy of 
their home.  
The difficulty in claiming these intangible benefits is that they are difficult to 
quantify.  In light of this, researchers have begun to apply the contingent valuation 
method (CVM) to professional sport facility projects. Using CVM, Johnson and 
Whitehead (2000) found that residents’ annual willingness to pay for both a minor league 
baseball stadium and a new basketball arena for the University of Kentucky was 
insufficient to justify the size of subsidy necessary for the facilities.  Similarly, in their 
study of Pittsburgh area residents’ willingness to pay to purchase the NHL’s Pittsburgh 
Penguins (thereby guaranteeing the team’s continued presence in the city), Johnson and 
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Whitehead found the team to be worth between $23.49 and $65.97 million.  This amount 
is far below the franchise value of the least valuable NHL franchise, the Washington 
Capitals, which were valued in 2007 at $127 million (Forbes, 2007).  Santo (2007) used 
CVM to determine whether residents of Portland, Oregon, would be willing to subsidize 
construction of a facility in order to lure a major-league baseball team.  Again, the local 
residents would be unwilling to provide a $235 million subsidy – the estimated amount of 
local contribution to the project.   
If intangible benefits exist, then local residents and businesses should be willing 
to pay higher prices for property or accept lower wages in return.  There is not conclusive 
evidence that this is the case.  Using hedonic rent and wage equations, Carlino and 
Coulson (2004) found that the presence of an NFL team increased property values in the 
central city by 8%, which suggests that residents are willing to pay higher rents in order 
to live in cities that host NFL teams.  In a study of residential property near Washington, 
DC’s FedEx Field, Tu (2003) found that residential properties near the stadium were sold 
at a discount compared to similar properties farther away.  However, the price differential 
between properties near the stadium and properties farther away was reduced after the 
stadium was completed, suggesting that the stadium had a positive impact on residential 
property values.  Homes near the stadium sold at a discount when compared with homes 
farther away from the stadium, but the discount became smaller after stadium 
construction began.   
On the other hand, research suggests that property values reflect the additional tax 
burden to residents when cities or counties choose to publicly subsidize professional sport 
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projects.  Following the announcement of a possible return of the Dallas Cowboys to 
Dallas, property values increased in the city of Dallas, but decreased in the rest of Dallas 
County (which would bear the responsibility for funding the stadium).  When Dallas’s 
plans to host the Cowboys’ stadium fell through, it was announced that the Cowboys 
would move to neighboring Arlington, Texas.  After this announcement, property values 
in Arlington declined by approximately 1.5%, roughly the cost to residents for financing 
the facility (Dehring, Depken, and Ward, 2007).   
The impact on non-residential property is also equivocal.  Davies (2006) 
conducted a comparison of the cities of Manchester and Cardiff, looking at the impacts of 
new stadiums on commercial leisure and retail properties.  She found that in both cities, 
stadiums had a positive effect on commercial leisure property values, with increases of 
12% in Cardiff and 8% in Manchester.  However, while a new stadium resulted in an 
increase in retail property values in Manchester, Cardiff experienced a reduction in retail 
property values.  This decrease is explained in part by shoppers who avoided the area 
around the stadium on game days because of increased traffic and congestions.
BRIDGING THE EXPECTATIONS GAP THROUGH LEVERAGE 
There is no definitive answer to whether the benefits of hosting a sports team 
exceed the cost to the host community.  What is clear, however, is that local leaders 
expect specific benefits and they communicate these expectations to local residents in 
order to secure funding for professional sport projects.  While there are no direct 
comparisons of cities’ expectations and their results, in general, the costs and benefits 
claimed by supporters are not consistent with the empirical findings. Communities 
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continue to subsidize sport projects, in spite of the lack of convincing evidence that they 
will get what is promised by advocacy studies and public information campaigns.    
The key to bridging the gap between what is expected and what is realized is a 
shift from an emphasis on the impact of hosting professional sport teams to an emphasis 
on how communities can leverage professional sport teams.  The evidence suggests that 
benefits do not materialize simply because a professional sport team is present.  Thus, it 
is important to understand what benefits are possible and the tactics a community can 
implement to increase the likelihood of a community realizing these benefits.  Sparvero 
and Chalip (2007) developed a model of the opportunities for leverage in 3 key areas – 
economic development, place marketing, and social welfare.  This provides the 
conceptual framework for considering what benefits can possibly accrue to host 
communities. 
Within each of these categories of opportunities, specific goals are identified.  The 
opportunities related to economic development include using the presence of the sport 
team to stabilize the workforce by using local labor and introducing first-timers to the 
workforce.  A sport team may also enhance the local tax base by taxing athlete incomes, 
creating opportunities for spending that increase sales tax revenues, and developing the 
area adjacent to the stadium in a way that increases property values (and consequently, 
property tax revenues). 
There are also opportunities to affect place marketing of the host community 
through the hosting of a professional sports team.  The team can be incorporated into 
efforts to make the city more attractive to businesses interested in relocation, tourists, and 
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residents.  Additionally, the team can be used to build the city’s brand and create desired 
associations for the city. 
Finally, the presence of a sport team can enhance social welfare of the host 
community.  There are opportunities to build community by creating opportunities for 
socialization around the team, both in and outside the team’s facility.  There is also an 
opportunity to address social issues in the community through cause marketing 
campaigns. 
This model provides guidance as to what is possible, but in order to make a 
convincing argument that communities should engage in strategic leveraging activities, it 
is important to determine the extent to which host communities realize the benefits that 
they expect.  Again, if the host’s expectations are consistent with its outcomes, then the 
argument for leverage is weakened, as voters and city leaders have approved funding 
with an accurate picture of the effects of hosting a professional sports team.  However, as 
extant research suggests, communities invest in professional sport, but they rarely get the 
variety or degree of benefits expected.  This research project is meant to (1) provide a 
better understanding of the gap that exists between a host community’s expectations and 
its outcomes; and (2) provide elaboration of Sparvero and Chalip’s model through an 
intensive case study to improve understanding of the conditions under which strategic 
leverage is undertaken and successful.                                                                
METHOD 
In this study, Corpus Christi’s experience of attracting and hosting a professional 
sports team was studied using qualitative methods including document and media 
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analysis, participant observation, and interviews.  Miles and Huberman (1994) note the 
following strengths of using qualitative data:  (1) the data focus on “naturally occurring, 
ordinary events in natural settings;” (2) the data are collected close to the situation; and 
(3) the data provide “thick description” of the phenomenon of interest.  Additionally, 
qualitative data is typically collected over a sustained period of time, which makes it 
particularly useful for studying process-related questions, and therefore appropriate for 
this research.  In the current research, qualitative methods allowed for an in-depth 
understanding and description of the context in which key decisions were made, the 
expectations about the benefits associated with hosting a team, and the city’s experience 
before and after the commencement of play of the Corpus Christi Hooks.               
DATA COLLECTION  
The first part of this study maps expectations before and after the Hooks began 
play.  In order to ensure the validity of the study, triangulation occurred through the use 
of multiple data sources.  The purpose of using multiple methods is to counteract the 
threats of validity present in each individual method (Fielding & Fielding, 1986).  Data 
were obtained through analysis of primary documents (e.g., newspapers, government 
documents), in-depth interviews with stakeholders, and participant observation. 
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES.  Corpus Christi has one major daily newspaper, the 
Corpus Christi Caller-Times.  The Caller-Times is one of the largest newspapers in the 
state and an important periodical for Corpus Christi, Nueces County, and much of South 
Texas.  The Caller-Times has a print circulation of 71,000 (Sunday) and 51,000 (daily).  
According to its 2007 United States Postal Service Statement of Ownership, 
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Management, and Circulation (PS Form 3526), the Caller-Times had the seventh largest 
circulation in the state, behind the Houston Chronicle, the Dallas Morning News, the San 
Antonio Express-News, the Fort Worth Star Telegram, the Austin American Statesman, 
and the El Paso Times.  The paper also has an internet component, www.caller.com.  
Caller.com has more than 225,000 registered users and averages 4.2 million page views 
per month.  Given the Caller-Times prominence as the source for news in the Coastal 
Bend area, it was identified as the primary source for media analysis.   
 The first mention of efforts to attract professional affiliated baseball to Corpus 
Christi appeared in print in May 2002, which marks the beginning of the period of 
observation.  Issues of the Caller-Times are archived in the newsbank database, an online 
database that allows users to search specific newspapers.  The following search terms 
were developed to conduct a search of newspaper content during the initial period of 
recruiting a team:  minor league, baseball, stadium, ballpark, and Nolan Ryan (a Hall of 
Fame pitcher, former Houston Astro, and owner of the team).  When the ballpark’s name 
was officially announced, the name – Whataburger Field – was added to the search.  
Likewise, when the team’s name, the Corpus Christi Hooks, was announced, the team 
name was added to the search.   
In addition to the search of the Caller-Times, the newspaper search was expanded 
to include regional news sources. Major papers from Texas and the Southwestern United 
States were searched in an effort to determine how the presence of the Hooks impacted 
the image of Corpus Christi beyond its borders.  The LEXIS-NEXIS database was 
searched using the terms “Hooks” and “Whataburger Field.”   
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PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.  Public documents were also examined.  These documents 
include minutes of city council meetings, position papers, reports from strategic planning 
meetings, and other documents.  Many of these documents were available through the 
city of Corpus Christi’s website, although some were obtained under the Freedom of 
Information Act.  This media and document analysis serves an important function in 
addition to providing information on the context and expectations related to hosting the 
Hooks.  Data from this analysis was used to identify potential interview subjects and 
topics for discussion. 
STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS.  In selecting interview subjects, I used purposive 
sampling, a process in which subjects are selected because of some specific characteristic 
(Patton, 1990).  In this case, subjects were selected because they were members of one of 
the following stakeholder groups in sport stadium issues identified by Friedman and 
Mason (1994):  members of the sports industry (e.g., team owners, team management, 
league officials), government actors (city and county officials, competing cities) , the 
local business community (e.g., Regional Economic Development Corporation, the Port 
of Corpus Christi, competing entertainment options, sponsoring companies, media), local 
citizens (e.g., sports fans, general public/non-fans) , and advocacy groups (neighborhood 
groups, stadium supporter and opponent groups).  An initial list of interviewees 
representing each of these groups was compiled from existing contacts in Corpus Christi 
and the Hooks and through public information retrieved from the internet (e.g., City 
Council members, head of the Economic Development Corporation).  In addition, while 
reviewing relevant media and public documents, I noted any additional stakeholders.  
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Finally, at the conclusion of each interview, I used a snowball approach and asked the 
subject whether there was anyone else to whom they felt that I should speak.  Potential 
subjects were contacted by telephone or email, and I briefly explained the purpose of my 
research.  I contacted 23 individuals and completed interviews with 16.  Two individuals 
did not see the relevance of their opinions to my research, and they declined to participate 
as a result.  One individual expressed an initial interest, but failed to respond to specific 
scheduling requests.  Four subjects did not respond to my initial contacts. Still, at least 
one representative from each of the groups listed above was successfully interviewed.  A 
list of interview subjects by group is included in B.  
Using a semi-structured interview format, interviewees were asked about their 
expectations regarding the Hooks, their experience since the Hooks began play, their 
attitudes toward the Hooks and what role, if any, they played in bringing the Hooks to 
Corpus Christi.  The initial themes of interest are identified in the interview schedule, 
which is attached as Appendix C.  The purpose of the data collection was to ensure that 
all major themes of interest were addressed in the interview.  The semi-structured format 
also allowed me to pursue topics introduced by the interviewee.  Any substantive new 
topics that emerged during interviews were added to the interview schedule for 
subsequent interviews. 
 At the beginning of the interview, the purpose of the research project was 
explained and I asked for permission to record the interview. Each respondent agreed to 
have their comments audiotaped.  I explained that while the subject’s name would not be 
directly associated with their comments, I could not assure confidentiality, as their unique 
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position in the community could allow for identification based on their comments.   
The interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, with most of the interviews 
lasting between 45 and 60 minutes.  At the conclusion of all interviews, I made notes of 
my impressions during the interview.  Also, the interviews were transcribed, and 
although the subjects were asked if they wished to review the final transcription, none of 
the subjects elected to do so.                                                                                       
DATA ANALYSIS 
 Data analysis and data collection proceeded simultaneously, using a grounded 
theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  During an initial review of media, public 
documents, interviews, and field notes, a list of major categories and subcategories was 
created.  The central questions in the interview schedule also contributed to the coding of 
interview content, as the questions were developed around certain expected themes.  
Codes were transformed into categorical labels through which emerging patterns were 
identified (Berg, 2001).  Document coding focused primarily on manifest content, but 
interviews and participant observation allowed for analysis of latent meanings (Holsti, 
1969).  Through this analysis, the frequency of specific themes was noted, but the intent 
was not to produce a quantitative analysis.  Instead, frequency was interpreted as an 
indicator of the importance and/or salience of issues of interest.                         
RESULTS 
 In this section, I discuss the major themes that emerged from data analysis.  From 
the data analysis, 4 categories of benefits emerged:  economic development, community 
self-esteem/image, leisure/entertainment, and social welfare.  Each of these benefit 
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categories and subcategories is discussed below.  These categories constitute various 
components of the community’s welfare, and thus, there is some degree of overlap 
between categories.  For example, image benefits that accrue to Corpus Christi as a result 
of hosting the team might in turn result in increased tourism, which could generate 
economic benefits for the community.  Likewise, improved social welfare could improve 
residents’ feelings about their community.  So, while the categories I identified are 
heuristically useful for discussing the expectations and outcomes, they are part of a larger 
picture of the condition of the community.                                                  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS 
 The most popular arguments in support of Corpus Christi’s efforts to attract a 
minor-league baseball team were related to the team’s expected impact on economic 
growth and development.  This finding is in conflict with research that suggests that 
economic legitimations for public investment in sport have lost their relevance because 
sport projects consistently fail to deliver promised economic benefits to their host 
communities (Delaney & Eckstein, 2003).  In the case of Corpus Christi, economic 
arguments were advanced by economic development officials in the community, 
embraced by city leaders, and accepted by most citizens.   
The economic-based legitimation for public subsidization is particularly important 
in this case, as Corpus Christi taxpayers assumed financial responsibility for the entire 
cost of the project, including construction of the ballpark and necessary infrastructure 
improvements.  This was the only financing proposal that was ever considered – either in 
initial talks with the team or in negotiations among city leaders.  This in itself is 
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somewhat unique, as the trend in facility investment is toward a decreasing percentage of 
public funds being devoted to construction (Crompton, 2005).  Not only did the city 
provide 100% of the funding for the project, but it also chose a tax instrument that would 
cause local residents to bear the costs directly.  In many cases where public subsidies are 
provided to sport teams, attempts are made to pass the cost of debt service on to visitors 
via an increase in hotel/motel or rental car taxes.  The rationale for this method of 
financing is that these visitors would not be able to vote on the bond issue, and thus 
voters could pass a referendum to authorize spending without a significant impact on 
their personal finances.   
Corpus Christi is also an unusual case because the funding for the ballpark was 
tied to local economic development policy.  Unlike many other cities that have relied on 
empty claims of economic development, the head of the Regional Economic 
Development Corporation (CCREDC) took an active role in the team attraction process 
and explicitly linked the ballpark proposal to a broader economic development proposal. 
The CCREDC is a non-profit organization responsible for “creating, managing, and 
supervising programs and activities that promote, assist, and enhance economic 
development within the city of Corpus Christi” 
(http://www.ccredc.com/about_ccredc.cfm).  The head of the CCREDC saw the ballpark 
issue as a chance to pass the economic development sales tax increase that had failed in 
previous bond elections. 
  Under the Texas Development Corporation Act of 1979, cities of less than 
500,000 can impose a sales tax (known as a 4A sales tax), the proceeds from which can 
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be used for economic development.  The 4A sales tax can be used for the following 
specific economic development projects: manufacturing and industrial facilities, research 
and development facilities, recycling facilities, distribution centers, small warehouse 
facilities and distribution centers, military facilities, primary job training facilities, 
corporate headquarter facilities, job training classes, career centers, telephone call 
centers, business infrastructure, airport facilities, and operation of commuter rail, light 
rail or commuter buses.  A 4A sales tax increase required voter approval, and it would 
provide funding to support existing employers in the community and allow the CCREDC 
to offer financial incentives to convince potential employers to relocate.  The CCREDC’s 
active involvement reinforced the message advanced by Forward Corpus Christi and 
other supporters that the ballpark was an economic development project.   
The most popular economic legitimation was related to the benefit of increased 
tourism, although promises of downtown revitalization, and job creation also emerged.  
Like the broader economic development argument, these three specific subcategories of 
economic development were consistent with the community’s stated priorities.   
TOURISM EXPECTATIONS AND RATIONALE.  Tourism plays a significant role in 
the economy of Corpus Christi, which is the 6th most popular tourist destination in the 
state.  According to a recent study, an estimated 7 million visitors spent 16 million days 
in the area in 2006, injecting $964.4 million into the local economy.  Over 12,000 jobs in 
the city are directly related to tourism, making tourism the second largest private 
employment sector in Corpus Christi (Lee, 2007).  These statistics demonstrate that 
Corpus Christi was a popular tourist destination before the arrival of the Hooks, and city 
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leaders and residents believed that the addition of the Hooks would have two effects on 
tourism:  first, the presence of the team (and its facility) would help the city reach new 
sport tourism markets, thereby increasing the number of visitors on a state, regional, and 
national level; and second, the presence of the team would be an attractive addition to the 
city’s existing tourism offerings that would prompt visitors to extend their stay and 
increase spending.  If the city was successful in these efforts, it would realize associated 
economic benefits most immediately in the form of increased sales tax revenues from 
visitor spending.  A significant increase in tourism could also potentially have 
employment and income effects due to increased demand for entertainment/tourism 
services. 
Local tourism officials recognized the potential draw of the team and 
Whataburger Field, as evidenced by the following prediction by one of the city’s tourism 
officials: 
With the Harbor Bridge as its backdrop, Whataburger Field stands to draw 
baseball fans to Corpus Christi who in the past may have opted for other 
destinations where they could combine their love of baseball with other leisure 
time activities.  Diehard fans of visiting clubs will travel to see their teams play 
and baseball fanatics will come down to see the new stadium and enjoy America’s 
pastime.  Whataburger Field will become the centerpiece of the CVB’s plans to 
promote the Corpus Christi area to sporting organizations looking for a place to 
hold tournaments. (CVB employee, Caller Times front section) 
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This assessment highlights two specific sport tourism markets that could be 
impacted by successful attraction of the team.  First, a professional baseball team in 
Corpus Christi could draw baseball fans to the team’s games, and second, the facility 
upon which the attraction of the team relied would allow the city to attract other sport 
events.  In terms of attracting professional baseball fans, the Hooks and Whataburger 
Field were expected to draw two specific sport tourism targets to Corpus Christi – fans of 
other Texas League teams and fans of the Houston Astros (the Hooks’ parent team). 
Corpus Christi tourism officials expected that Texas League fans would be 
willing to travel to see their teams play.  The Texas League includes 8 teams from 4 
states (Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma).  The San Antonio Missions are a 
natural geographic rival for the Hooks, as San Antonio is an approximately 2 hour drive 
from Corpus Christi.  Also, San Antonio is the top designated market area (DMA) for 
Corpus Christi tourism, with San Antonio residents making up 26% of all visitors to 
Corpus Christi.  Therefore, it was reasonable to expect that dedicated fans of the San 
Antonio missions might make the trip to Corpus Christi to watch their team.  Tourism 
officials also believed that the Hooks could draw fans of the Frisco Roughriders.  
Although Frisco is located farther away than San Antonio, the Roughriders have 
tremendous fan support, ranking 14th in all minor league attendance in 2007 and 1st in 
Texas League attendance, with an average of 8263 fans per game.  Additionally, Frisco is 
part of the Dallas/Fort Worth MSA, which is the 3rd most popular DMA for Corpus 
Christi tourism.   
The second target for tourism was fans of the Houston Astros club.  In 
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professional baseball, each MLB club has several affiliated teams.  Triple-A teams are 
one step removed from the major leagues, and double-A teams are two steps removed.  
The Hooks are uniquely positioned to draw fans of their parent club, the Houston Astros, 
because of the geographic location of the Astros’ affiliates.  The Astros are located 220 
miles from Corpus Christi, and the team’s triple-A franchise is located in Round Rock, 
235 miles from Corpus Christi. The geographic proximity of these clubs allows fans to 
see three games at three different levels of play – all in the same state.  One city official 
acknowledged this concentration of Astros support, noting: 
[Corpus Christi] is a very special place because it has die-hard baseball fans; 
they’re Astros fans.  I think the big benefit is the triangle that’s created between 
Houston, Round Rock, and Corpus Christi, with Astros fans coming to Round 
Rock and Corpus.  I think you’re going to see a lot of folks that are interested in 
the whole organization going down on the farm. (GOVERNMENT 1, interview)  
There are some obstacles that could prevent Corpus Christi from deriving 
economic benefits from these sport tourism markets.  First, if the new team was 
successful in drawing professional baseball fans to the city, they would likely come from 
neighboring areas, as described above.  While the proximity to major DMAs makes travel 
to Corpus Christi possible, individuals (from San Antonio, in particular) could make the 
trip to and from Corpus Christi in one day.  In the case of these day-trippers, the 
economic impact of tourism would be minimal.  However, Corpus Christi is already an 
established tourist destination in the state with a variety of attractions that could entice 
these visitors to extend their stay.  An additional argument against the economic benefit 
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of these sport tourists is that tourists often plan trips to take advantage of attractions not 
available near their homes.  Texas hosts two major-league teams, 1 triple-A team, 4 
double-A teams, and a number of single-A and independent teams.  Thus, a baseball fan 
in Texas does not have far to travel to see professional baseball.   
In addition to drawing fans to the Hooks games, tourism officials believed that 
Whataburger Field would transform Corpus Christi into an attractive host site for local, 
regional, and national baseball events.  The concurrent development of other sport 
facilities in Corpus Christi (e.g., the American Bank Center and TAMU-CC’s athletic 
facilities) and Whataburger Field was expected to make Corpus Christi competitive for 
multi-sport events.   
While the presence of the team has the potential to attract these sport tourism 
markets, the expected benefits were not limited to sport tourists.  Rather, the team and the 
facility were commonly viewed as an addition to the city’s existing tourist assets.  Corpus 
Christi is already an established and popular tourist destination, and a ballgame was an 
activity that would encourage visitors to spend more money during their stay, or to 
extend their stay for an additional night.  This was especially important, as there was a 
sense among residents and city leaders that Corpus Christi offered little for visitors to do 
at night.  This perception was reflected in the following comments by Hooks’ owner Reid 
Ryan:  
When people in Austin, Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio want to go to the 
beach, they all come to Corpus.  We’re going to give those people something to 
do at night.  All they can really do now is go see a movie, but they could do that at 
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home.  Baseball will give them something else to do when they’re done with their 
day at the beach. (Caller Times, front section) 
It was also important that the ballpark offered a safe entertainment option for 
tourists.  There are several restaurants and a few nightclubs in downtown Corpus Christi, 
but amidst the abandoned buildings and vagrants, visitors and residents alike had 
concerns about the safety of the city after dark.  One local community leader remarked 
that the abandoned buildings and homeless population downtown, “creates an 
uncomfortable feeling down here, but during the day it is pretty safe.  But at night you 
need to travel with a companion or two” (BUSINESS 1, interview).  There is a strong 
police presence downtown at night, which improves security, but because the unsafe 
condition of the downtown is what necessitated the enhanced policy presence, it is not 
very attractive to tourists.  In contrast, the ballpark provides a nighttime entertainment 
option that is isolated from the heart of downtown and its security concerns.   
TOURISM OUTCOMES.  According to a 2006 survey, only 2% of visitors reported 
attending a sporting event.  The survey did not specifically isolate attendance at Hooks’ 
games (versus other professional, college, or other sporting events).  Yet, even if we 
generously estimate that all 2% of visitors did attend Hooks games or sport events as 
Whataburger Field, this still represents a small tourism impact.  The most popular major 
activities for visitors continue to be related to nature (e.g., beach/waterfront, eco-travel, 
camping, national/state parks), with 43% of visitors engaging in such activities.  Cultural 
events were also significantly more popular than sporting events, with 13% of visitors 
attending museum or art exhibits, 9% visiting festivals or craft fairs, and 8% visiting 
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historic sites.  These data are not surprising, as the Padre Island National Seashore, the 
Texas State Aquarium, and the USS Lexington are among the most popular tourist 
attractions in the state (Office of Texas Economic Development and Tourism, 2007).  
Further, 8% of visitors reported participating in night life activities, which contradicts 
stadium supporters’ claims and residents’ beliefs that there were not nighttime activities 
available for visitors.   
 Overall, Corpus Christi has experienced substantial growth in the tourism sector.  
The Corpus Christi CVB reported a 32% increase in total room nights during fiscal year 
2006-07.  Of course, as the economic impact data above suggests, it is unlikely that much 
of this increase is attributable to the team, but rather to the CVB’s increased focus on 
nature tourism and increased convention business enabled by the construction of the 
American Bank Center. 
 With that said, there were some opportunities created to promote tourism, 
although the community did not capitalize on all of these opportunities.  These 
opportunities and specific strategies and tactics employed to reach new tourism markets 
and enhance the tourism landscape are discussed below. 
First, a change in the Texas League schedule created additional opportunities to 
drive tourism from other Texas League teams to Corpus Christi.  The Texas League 
changed the scheduling format before the Hooks’ inaugural season, in part to nurture 
natural rivalries like the “I-37 Series” between the Hooks and the Missions.  The Texas 
League is divided into two divisions, with all 4 Texas teams in the South division and the 
4 non-Texas teams in the North division.  When the Astros’ double-A team played in 
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Round Rock, team officials complained that there weren’t enough games, or enough 
timely games, against their natural rivals, like the Missions.  In response, the league has 
reduced the number of inter-division games played during the 140-game season.  In their 
first two seasons, the Hooks played each team in the North division 14 times, and in 
2007, the league reduced this number to 12.  As a result, the Hooks opened their 
inaugural season against the Missions, and they have played each of their intrastate rivals 
at least 28 times each year, creating 14 opportunities annually for fans of each Texas club 
to visit Corpus Christi.   
Although the changes in scheduling create more opportunities for fans of visiting 
teams to travel to Corpus Christi, neither the team nor the CVB has developed any 
coherent strategies to target these potential tourism markets.  Fans of the San Antonio 
Missions are the most likely group to travel to Corpus Christi because of San Antonio’s 
geographic proximity.  Also, the Missions have an organized group of boosters that 
support the team.  When the Astros’ double-A team played in Round Rock, the Missions 
Booster Club organized several bus trips to see the Missions play the Express.  The 
Booster Club had over 50 people make these trips, but they have not planned similar trips 
to Whataburger Field and Corpus Christi.  Individual members have made the trip, 
although they typically go down and back in the same day, which confirms the concern 
identified above that fans that made the trip would likely be daytrippers (and unlikely to 
generate much economic impact).   
Likewise, neither the team nor the city has targeted fans within the Astros’ 
system.  The CVBs in Houston, Round Rock, and Corpus Christi all individually promote 
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their own baseball teams, but there is no coordination among these tourism officials to 
promote sport tourism among the 3 cities.  Similarly, the individual teams have done little 
to encourage fans of one team to visit the other teams in the system. This does not mean 
that individual fans have not traveled to take advantage of the opportunity to see the 3 
clubs in the Astros’ system.  On Opening Day of the 2005 season, I spoke with one man 
that made the trip from Austin to see the team.  He told me that he and his son made the 
trip initially because they had grown to know and love the players while they were in 
Round Rock, and they wanted to see them start the new season.  They had already 
attended the home openers for the Astros and the Round Rock Express, and they planned 
to continue this tradition as long as the 3 teams remained in their current locations in 
Texas.  This provides anecdotal evidence that there is interest among fans in traveling to 
games within the Astros’ system, but the teams and their host cities have not taken action 
to encourage or enable travel among the 3 Astros’ clubs.   
If increased tourism among fans of the Texas League or the Houston Astros 
occurred, it was not attributable to specific strategies or tactics implemented by Corpus 
Christi.  However, Corpus Christi has been successful in developing a two-pronged sport 
event strategy.  This strategy includes bidding for traveling events as well as developing 
annual events to be held at the ballpark.  The city’s successful event bidding strategy is 
due in large part to the active involvement of the team with the CVB.  The president of 
the Hooks sits on the CVB’s Board of Directors, and both parties agree that having a 
representative from the team on the CVB Board aids in communication between the two 
organizations.  Further, the CVB identified the attraction of sport events as a top priority, 
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and in response, the CVB created a permanent sales position based in Austin, the home to 
several organizations that plan statewide sport events (e.g., University Interscholastic 
League, the Texas Amateur Athletic Federation).  The city’s emphasis on the attraction of 
sport events was successful because it was consistent with the team’s approach to using 
the facility.  The team recognizes that Whataburger Field is only used 20% of the year for 
Hooks games, and as a result, it needs to host events to be able to be financially 
successful.   
Often, supporters of public investment in sport projects promise that a new 
facility will allow the city to attract championships or other marquis events in the sport 
league.  Corpus Christi was no exception, as the city hosted the Texas League All-Star 
Game in 2007, 3 years earlier than the Hooks’ ownership group predicted.  While 
individual games may not have had the tourism impact that the community hoped for, the 
Texas League All-Star Game is a marquis event that does have the power to attract 
visitors.  In particular, the game drew executives from all levels of baseball, many of 
whom were impressed by the quality of the ballpark.  In addition to the tourism driven by 
the All-Star Game, the team created opportunities for local businesses to participate in 
game-related activities.  The Executive Surf Club, a restaurant in the heart of downtown, 
hosted a pre-game celebration, and Brewster’s Ice House, a restaurant across from the 
ballpark, hosted a post-game event.  Both events featured Texas League All-Stars and 
were open to the public and actively promoted by the team.  When I purchased my tickets 
to the game, the ticket seller told me about these events and gave me instructions about 
how to buy my ticket for them.  The events were also featured on the team’s webpage and 
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included in print, television, and radio promotion of the event.   
Corpus Christi has also successfully bid for 2 other major events – the 2009 
Southland Conference baseball championship and the 2012 and 2013 Texas Amateur 
Athletic Federation (TAAF) Games.  Corpus Christi’s bid for the Southland Conference 
championship was successful because of Whataburger Field.  The athletic director of 
TAMUCC approached the Hooks about the possibility of bidding for the event, and the 
team determined that the Southland Conference tournament was consistent with the types 
of events it wanted to host.  Whataburger Field is not the home field for Texas A&M – 
Corpus Christi, although they do play a few games there each year, but the city would not 
have won the bid using the university’s home field.  The commissioner acknowledged the 
importance that Whataburger Field played in their decision, commenting, “It’s a feather 
in our caps to be able to play in that type of facility” (Caller Times sports section).  The 
commissioner was already familiar with the facility.  In 2005, when TAMUCC had 
applied for acceptance into the Southland Conference, the commissioner was feted at the 
ballpark during his visit.   
The other major event Corpus Christi will host in the near future is the Texas 
Amateur Athletic Federation (TAAF) Games of Texas.  The TAAF Games are expected 
to draw over 20,000 participants and up to 30,000 spectators. Whataburger Field and the 
American Bank Center arena will provide substantial support for the event, which is 
expected to generate an economic impact of over $7 million.  Quality facilities played a 
key role in the city’s successful bid for the event, and tourism officials expect that 
spectators and participants of the TAAF Games will take advantage of the city’s unique 
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tourism opportunities while in town.   
In addition to these periodic events, the Hooks host an annual college baseball 
tournament, the Whataburger College Classic.  This is a 4 team baseball tournament that 
has drawn nationally ranked college baseball programs including Texas Tech, Rice, 
Texas Christian, and Arizona State.  When the team was in Round Rock, it held a similar 
tournament, but the tournament has been much more successful in Corpus Christi.  A 
team official attributes the success of the tournament at Whataburger Field to the novelty 
of seeing nationally-ranked programs in Corpus Christi. 
The team has worked closely with various organizations in the city to attract 
events.  Yet, there have been few attempts to cross-leverage the team to promote other 
tourist activities, drive tourism, or encourage increased spending.  In its inaugural season, 
the team worked closely to co-brand and cross-promote programs with other tourist 
attractions.  For example, the Hooks collaborated with the Corpus Christi Museum of 
Science and History to develop a baseball-themed exhibit, and they sponsored the Harbor 
Playhouse’s production of Damn Yankees, a baseball-themed musical.  This cross-
promotion created benefits for all parties.  Because the team was new to town, it was 
important to establish a relationship and reputation in the community, and the Museum 
and the Playhouse benefited from the excitement created by the team’s inaugural season.  
However, since that time, there have been no systematic attempts to cross-promote area 
attractions, either by the CVB or by individual attractions.   
DOWNTOWN/BAYFRONT REDEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS AND RATIONALE. The 
development of the downtown and bayfront has consistently been identified by city 
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leaders as a priority for the city.  The issue of development around the ballpark was 
another commonly claimed benefit of attracting the team.  When choosing a location for 
the ballpark, the Ryan family selected a waterfront location on property owned by the 
Port of Corpus Christi with the enthusiastic backing of the Port.  The Port's roots are in 
the petrochemical industry, but they have made a concerted effort in recent years to 
diversify into tourism. To this end, the Port had already developed land for the Solomon 
P. Ortiz Center, which doubles as a conference center and cruise ship terminal.  Any 
development in the area – including the ballpark and development associated with the 
ballpark -- would complement recent Port projects, and the Chairman of the Port 
described the baseball stadium as “one component of an overall waterfront 
transformation” (BUSINESS 2, interview).  This vision was echoed by a government 
official who said:   
I think we all recognize the value of this facility to the redevelopment of the port 
area.  Part of the port’s vision is to diversify their facilities and to advance that 
area as a premier area for our community.  It will really complement what we’re 
already doing with the arena and convention center.  It’s going to be a huge plus 
in that whole area. (Caller Times front section) 
Representatives from the Port, the Hooks, the Chamber of Commerce, and the 
CCREDC all predicted that the ballpark would serve as a catalyst for development in the 
area around the ballpark.  The location of Whataburger Field was selected in large part 
because of the existing “tourist nucleus” in the downtown and Port area and is shown in 
Appendix A.  In addition to the USS Lexington and the Texas State Aquarium mentioned 
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previously, Whataburger Field is near the Old Concrete Street Amphitheater, which is an 
outdoor concert venue, and the American Bank Center, which functions as a basketball 
and ice hockey venue and is adjacent to the Convention Center.  The Corpus Christi 
Museum of Science and History, the South Texas Institute for the Arts, and the Asian 
Cultures Museum are also located within a few miles of the ballpark.  Finally, the Harbor 
Playhouse completes the inventory of tourist attractions in the immediate vicinity.  
Whataburger Field is also located on the edge of downtown, near various restaurants and 
hotels.   
Specifically, supporters of the stadium project envisioned commercial and 
residential development around the stadium, with spillover projects in the heart of 
downtown.  These two categories of development are discussed below. 
For the most part, the expectations related to commercial development in the area 
were vague.  The ballpark was expected to generate spillover commercial development, 
particularly in the form of businesses related to entertainment and tourism.  The 
development of restaurants, retail, and hotels would provide opportunities for tourists, 
and consequently, could increase the amount of economic activity generated by visitors.  
Additionally, supporters hoped that the creation of an entertainment district would attract 
local residents to the downtown area.  Development of downtown and the waterfront 
have long been priorities of city leaders, and the ballpark was seen as the catalyst to spark 
interest in development.  One economic development official noted, “I think you’ll see a 
real keen interest in bringing retail close to the area.  People like to be around stadiums” 
(BUSINESS 3, interview).  Port officials adopted the view that additional development 
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depended on creating activity.  The ballpark was a visible and popular project that had the 
potential to draw traffic to the area, which would ideally then encourage additional 
development.   However, real estate developers did not fully support the claims made by 
city and team leaders. A noted local developer forecast bad news – particularly for 
commercial development in the area.  In 2005, he declared that the average lease rates in 
Corpus Christi didn’t warrant any new construction in the commercial real estate market.  
Two major commercial properties in downtown had fallen victim to the stagnant 
downtown market, with one building that cost $45 million to build in 1983 being sold in 
2004 for $18 million and another commercial building being foreclosed on, also in 2004.  
Thus, the positive expectations about downtown and waterfront development were not 
reflected in the real estate market before the ballpark was completed. 
Much like the expectations expressed related to commercial development, the 
predictions about residential development before the Hooks began play were vague.  City 
leaders thought that the presence of the ballpark would encourage developers to build 
residential properties downtown and would encourage movement to the downtown area.  
In particular, leaders stressed the importance of residential development to the overall 
revitalization of downtown Corpus Christi.  Before the ballpark was constructed, most of 
the new residential development occurred on the city’s Southside.  Fifty-seven percent of 
the city’s single family residential construction permits were for homes in that section of 
town.  Supporters of the ballpark hoped that the presence of the ballpark, and the 
commercial development that was expected to occur in conjunction with it, would 
redirect residential development to downtown.  The commercial and residential 
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development would be mutually reinforcing, and the importance and potential for 
residential development was explained in the following comments by one community 
leader: 
 We need to take advantage of our location on the bayfront and encourage people 
to come down here.  The area lends itself to residential development.  That’s what 
every downtown needs.  Having people coming and going.  Residential places get 
put in, the spinoff’s going to drive retail.  People will move in if the prices are 
affordable – young professionals, empty nesters.  They can go out and have a 
coffee, walk over to the seawall and have a glass of wine.  Once the residential 
development happens, there will be people who want to connect with the things 
on the core. (BUSINESS 1, interview) 
A consultant to the city believed that the best options for the area around the 
ballpark were mixed-use development that included urban-style housing, noting, “It’s 
about creating urban neighborhoods” (Caller Times local section).  A city planning 
official echoed these thoughts by stating that residential development downtown would 
be the start of a revitalization of the city’s urban identity.  “This is the beginning of where 
it is going.  It’s the future of downtown” (GOVERNMENT 2, interview). 
 Local leaders agreed about the importance of residential development downtown, 
but they disagreed about the impact of the ballpark on such development.  While 
government officials and team representatives attributed future development to the 
ballpark, real estate professionals were more pragmatic.  One local real estate developer 
expressed concern that retail businesses couldn’t survive around the stadium without a 
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stable residential community downtown.  Further, while the stadium couldn’t hurt 
residential development, it wouldn’t necessarily help.  In fact, the opening of the 
American Bank Center, which is located closer to the heart of downtown than the 
ballpark would be, had not prompted any residential development.  An additional 
criticism of predicted residential development was related to the existing development in 
the area.  As one elected official remarked, “not many people want to live in an area 
that’s sandwiched between a highway, a port, and several oil refineries” 
(GOVERNMENT 4, interview). 
 An alternative argument in support of residential development associated with the 
ballpark focused on the potential for the ballpark to revitalize the residential 
neighborhoods on the Northside – a location closer to the proposed ballpark’s location 
than the larger downtown area.  One resident categorized the Ryans’ investment as 
follows:   
Here we have someone who is offering to bring not only a minor-league baseball 
team to Corpus Christi, but also a beautiful ballpark to one of the most 
deteriorating parts of the city.  Have you all who are opposed to this location not 
noticed a downtown renaissance going on throughout America and even right 
here in our own hometown?  Or do you even make it downtown?  Isn’t it a good 
thing that someone wants to clean up a neighborhood that sits unused and 
deteriorating?  (Caller Times, Letters to the Editor) 
Thus, the potential to transform blighted residences on the Northside to more attractive 
upscale housing was identified as a benefit of the ballpark’s construction and location.  
 72 
DOWNTOWN/BAYFRONT REDEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES.  At the conclusion of the 
Hooks' third year of operation in Corpus Christi, and five years after efforts to attract a 
team began the area on the Northside around Whataburger Field remains largely 
undeveloped.  The area includes 3 major entertainment venues – Whataburger Field, the 
American Bank Center and Concrete Street Amphitheater.  The American Bank Center 
and Old Concrete Street Amphitheater were built before the ballpark, so this development 
cannot be attributed to Whataburger Field.  The area immediately surrounding 
Whataburger Field has not changed, other than the transformation of some tracts of 
undeveloped land into parking lots.   
One notable exception and perceived success story  is Brewster Street Ice House, 
a restaurant located across the street from Whataburger Field that can accommodate up to 
1000 patrons.  Brewster Street has incorporated a baseball theme, with menu items 
named for ballplayers associated with the Hooks (e.g., the Grand Slam Nolan Ryan 
Burger, the “Brooks Kieschnick”), but the ballpark has a minimal direct impact on the 
restaurant.  Brewster Street was consistently mentioned by interviewees as “proof” of 
development around the ballpark.  Yet, it is doubtful that the presence of the team is 
directly or solely responsible for Brewster Street’s existence or success.  The land was 
owned by a local businessman, who also owns Concrete Street Amphitheater, and he 
viewed Brewster Street as a complement to his own entertainment venue.   
Brewster Street sees a small increase in business before Hooks' games, but a 
waitress mentioned that a lot of people want the experience of having a hot dog and beer 
at the ballpark, instead of having dinner beforehand.  Business was particularly slow 
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during the school year, but they hoped for larger crowds during the summer.  Instead of 
drawing large crowds in conjunction with Hooks’ games, the restaurant relied on a 
regular lunch crowd and evening crowds that came to see live music acts Thursday 
through Saturday nights.  People who work at the ballpark occasionally walk over for 
lunch, but their clientele consists primarily of Port employees and professionals who 
work downtown.  It experiences a far greater impact from hosting local and regional 
bands.  I visited Brewster Street for lunch the day after a concert by Wade Bowen and 
Randy Rogers, 2 popular Texas country music artists.    The concert attracted over 800 
attendees, with 400 tickets sold in advance, and the wait staff noted that it was their 
biggest night in tips.   
Other than Brewster Street, there has been no significant residential or 
commercial development in the Port area, despite the Port’s request for proposals (RFP) 
for development of 5.43 acres of land between the Ortiz International Center and the 
ballpark.  Port officials anticipated mixed-use development, noting “there’s plenty of 
activity going on in the area to spark some interest.” The RFP was sent to 75 state and 
local companies, and six companies (two local, three from Texas, and one from out of 
state) attended a conference to learn more about the site.  Only 3 companies submitted 
proposals and the Port selected an Austin-based company to develop the land.  However, 
the Port and the development company were unable to reach an agreement, and the 
project was put on hold in 2003 until a new developer could be found.  Still, this 
represents an improvement on the Port’s previous efforts to develop the area.  In 1997, 
the Port had also issued an RFP for development of the land, and they did not receive any 
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proposals. 
Nothing was done with the land until 2007.  At that time, the City Council 
approved $8.95 million in incentives to a local company to develop the Cotton Yard at 
the Port of Corpus Christi, a mixed-use project near Whataburger Field.  A San Antonio 
based development company, also expressed interest in developing 3 acres of Port land 
near the ballpark.  The presence of the ballpark and arena sparked their interest in the 
location, yet development depends on the outcome of a feasibility study.  The principal of 
the company stated, “We need to look at market demands, utility locations, and 
developments around the city, particularly downtown, so we don’t develop in a vacuum” 
(Caller Times, front section).  His comments illustrate the catch-22 associated with 
developing the land near the ballpark – in order to attract development, there needs to be 
development in the area.  The ballpark draws attention to the area, but it appears to be 
insufficient to encourage development on its own.  Even the Cotton Yard project was 
pursued only after the city provided additional financial incentives to developers. 
A major obstacle to redevelopment efforts was the need for infrastructure 
improvements.  While the waterfront location of the ballpark is geographically close to 
the downtown area, it is separated by a highway and lacks any pedestrian connection to 
downtown.  Developers have realized the importance of this linkage, and a key challenge 
of the Cotton Yard project is identifying ways to connect with venues such as 
Whataburger Field, the American Bank Center, and the heart of downtown through 
landscaping and the creation of pedestrian friendly routes.  A physical link from the 
ballpark to downtown would also benefit other downtown entertainment attractions.  The 
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city has attempted to brand the area as the SEA district – sports, entertainment, and arts – 
but without a physical connection, spillover benefits between attractions will be difficult 
to realize.   
While planners and developers understand the need for this physical connection, 
the city has been reluctant to make the necessary financial investments to make this a 
reality.  Within two months of the announcement that Nolan Ryan was trying to bring a 
team to Corpus Christi, the Regional Transportation Authority announced plans for an 
integrated streetcar system that would link major attractions, such as the ballpark and the 
arena, with scenic areas and restaurants in downtown.  However, when the City Council 
refused to provide funding for the project, it was abandoned.  The Port also began the 
development of a water taxi to provide access to attractions on the waterfront.   
Accessible transportation would ideally encourage additional spending and boost overall 
economic impact, whereas without transportation, people drive to an event and return 
home without experiencing the city’s other attractions.  The water taxi operated with 
limited success during the team’s first two years, but service was stopped in 2007 
because of low ridership.  
There has been some progress made in residential development in the downtown 
area.  Four major apartment projects have been completed in recent years.  The largest 
residential project is the 158-unit Bluff Apartments, which was completed in late 2006.  
The Buena Vista development includes 7 stories of luxury condominiums with 84 units 
priced between $300,000 and $500,000.  The renovation of the Plaza Building created 
another 24 apartments that rent for approximately $1 per square foot.  Finally, the Ryan 
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family has been involved with renovation of the Atlantic Mobil building, a residential 
project of 36 luxury lofts.  The Atlantic Lofts were originally slated to be completed in 
late 2006, but are now set to finish construction of 2 model units in August of 2008.  All 
four of these projects have had difficulty attracting residents, as the majority of 
residential development continues to occur on the Southside, where more than half of the 
city’s retail space is located.   
While little progress has been made in development near the Port, current 
residents are already experiencing negative impacts on.  Northside residents and business 
establishments had been slowly disappearing through the years, changing the face of the 
city’s historically black area.  In 2005, Coles Special Emphasis School was closed, a 
move to which Northside residents objected.  One Northside resident noted: 
Coles was the last straw.  It’s a historical place.  They are tearing [the Northside] 
down slowly.  They say closing Coles was for the better, but it’s not.  It’s better 
for the economy, it’s better for the tourism.  We have a right to be here, just as 
much as that baseball field.  Every event that they have, we have to listen because 
we’re neighbors.  We’ve got kids that would like to go, but we can’t afford it 
(Caller Times, front section). 
Likewise, proposed infrastructure improvements would further disrupt the historic 
Northside community. A representative from a neighborhood association expressed his 
concerns about a proposal to move the Harbor Bridge:  “We’re going to lose more people 
from the community…Nobody’s against progress, but it’s a shame that the Northside has 
to bear the brunt of the effect” (CITIZENS 1, interview).  The African American 
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community feels marginalized, and one local leader explained that city leaders viewed 
the Northside neighborhood as “just an annoyance they have to contend with” (Caller 
Times front section). 
An additional unanticipated effect of the expected revitalization of downtown has 
been the speculative increase in property values.  Downtown is littered with vacant and 
neglected buildings, but many downtown property owners have priced their buildings far 
above their appraised values, making it difficult to find buyers.  One city official notes 
that the additions of the American Bank Center and Whataburger Field have increased 
attention to the area and given developers the confidence to proceed with new projects.  
However, it is difficult for developers to find affordable properties to develop because 
property owners have inflated asking prices in anticipation of development.  The 
appearance of the downtown area suffers because current property owners have little 
incentive to upgrade their own properties because their property taxes are low.   
JOB CREATION EXPECTATIONS AND RATIONALE.  City leaders agree that one of 
the keys to economic growth in Corpus Christi is the creation of new jobs, and the 
ballpark was expected to support the efforts of city leaders to create new jobs in the 
entertainment sector and also to attract primary employers to the city.  The expectations 
of city leaders in Corpus Christi were consistent with the typical claims made by stadium 
supporters in order to secure funding and support for sport projects.  Supporters in 
Corpus Christi believed that the ballpark would create new jobs through the operation 
and construction of the ballpark.  In addition, increased employment in the entertainment 
and service sectors were expected once commercial and residential development in the 
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downtown areas were underway.  However, efforts to attract a team and build a sport 
facility in Corpus Christi were explicitly linked to a broader economic development and 
job creation program through the structure of the referendum.   
First, it is useful to examine the city’s previous attempt to secure funding for job 
creation and employment programs.  In 2000, community leaders included an economic 
development proposition in the bond election, which was anchored by a proposition for 
construction of a new downtown arena.  Five of six propositions in this bond election 
were approved by the voters; the only proposition that was defeated was the economic 
development proposition.  Given the success of the arena proposal, officials at the 
CCREDC believed that the ballpark proposal offered another opportunity to get voter 
authorization to fund economic development projects.  To improve the chances of 
gaining voter approval for economic development projects in the 2002 bond election, the 
head of the CCREDC explicitly tied support for the ballpark to a broader economic 
development package.  Specifically, the CCREDC proposed a 1/8 cent increase in the 
sales tax.  The sales tax increase would raise approximately $4 million per year, of which 
about half would be used for the debt service on the ballpark and the remainder of the tax 
revenues would be used for other economic development projects (e.g., worker training, 
relocation incentives).  
Economic development officials believed that the popularity of the ballpark issue 
could be used to secure funding for economic development projects that was defeated 
two years before.  From the outset, supporters of efforts to attract the team had two 
distinct advantages over their opponents.  First, the pro-stadium group was able to use the 
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star power of Nolan Ryan and other baseball celebrities to generate support for the 
initiative. Individuals from all sectors of the community and on both sides of the issue 
noted the role that Ryan played in the success of the initiative.  One Council member 
remarked, “Everybody loves baseball, and everybody loves Nolan Ryan” 
(GOVERNMENT 5, interview).   
A team official also echoed the importance of Nolan Ryan, remarking: 
When we talk about Nolan Ryan’s name – I don’t think there’s a bigger name in 
the state of Texas than Nolan Ryan.  He’s a family man, just a real good guy.  
When his name is associated with something, it gives an instant credibility.  I 
mean, who wouldn’t want to be associated with Nolan Ryan? (SPORTS 3, 
interview) 
Another official attributed the success of the proposal to the active inclusion of 
Nolan Ryan during the lead-up to the election: 
We put a face on our initiative.  Obviously it’s a little easier when Nolan Ryan is 
the head of your group and obviously in the state of Texas – he basically was the 
thing that was able to get us into the city, have the meet and greet and say, “hey – 
these are good guys.” And then we got the people in Corpus Christi excited and 
the city was able to pass the bond issue. (SPORTS 1, interview) 
The stadium supporters’ second advantage was funding. Forward Corpus Christi 
had a substantial funding advantage, as supporters of the ballpark raised nearly $170,000. 
The only source of organized and resourced opposition came from Forward ALL Corpus 
Christi.  The group was created by a city council member who opposed using money for 
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a downtown baseball stadium.  The group’s name referred to the belief of its members 
that the baseball stadium would benefit a select number of individuals, while ignoring the 
needs of the broader community.  Forward ALL Corpus Christi garnered some media 
attention, but it raised only $10,075 to be used to defeat the ballpark proposition.  
Forward ALL Corpus Christi was viewed primarily as a fringe political group being led 
by a politician with a reputation for standing in the way of economic growth.   Thus, 
there was little opposition to Forward Corpus Christi’s efforts to pass Proposition 2. 
When the ballot was finalized, voters first voted on Proposition 2, which 
authorized the adoption of a sales tax for the “promotion and development of new and 
expanded business enterprises at the rate of 1/8 of one percent to be imposed for 15 
years.”  Voters were then able to vote on Proposition 2a, which would direct part of the 
money to the construction of a stadium for an affiliated minor-league baseball team.   
If residents wanted a ballpark, then they would have to approve the broader 
economic development package.  The structure of the referendum served to conflate these 
issues, and in doing so, offered a real opportunity for Corpus Christi to attract primary 
employers to the area.  Passage of Proposition 2 would allow the city to offer financial 
inducements to employers interested in relocation.  This created a situation in which 
voters would go to the polls and approve a financial incentive package for the team in 
order to allow the CCREDC to offer incentives to other potential and existing employers.  
Ultimately, it is difficult to say with certainty whether an economic development bond 
would have passed without its association with the baseball stadium measure.  But if the 
results of the 2000 bond election are used as a guide, its passage without the link to the 
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baseball stadium was at least in doubt.   
In addition to using the baseball stadium project to secure authorization for the 
larger economic development initiative, the baseball team was expected to create jobs 
through the construction and operation of the ballpark.  The head of the CCREDC 
estimated that the team would have 25 to 35 full time employees and an additional 150 to 
250 part time employees.  Additional job creation would depend on any related 
entertainment and/or tourist development in the area.  No estimates were given related to 
jobs created by construction of the stadium.   
JOB CREATION OUTCOMES.  The economic development measure passed in 2002 
allowed the city to support education and skills development by providing grants to 
companies and organizations that provide training, retraining, and education.  The funds 
also are available to develop programs and facilities to assist small and start-up 
companies.  Finally, these funds are available for financial incentive packages to try to 
attract new employers to Corpus Christi.  Prior to the 2002 bond election, economic 
development officials were unable to offer financial incentives to companies interested in 
relocating, and as a result they lost potential employers to both major cities, such as San 
Antonio, and smaller cities, such as McAllen and Harlingen.  The example of Singapore 
Technologies was frequently brought up in efforts to pass Proposition 2.  Singapore 
Technologies was an airplane maintenance manufacturer that would have created 1500 to 
1800 jobs, but like an estimated 15-20 companies each year, they lost interest in Corpus 
Christi because of the city’s lack of incentives. In a recent survey of residents, the 
perceptions of the city’s support of existing businesses and efforts to attract new 
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businesses both showed significant improvement as compared with previous years, which 
the city’s economic development office attributes to the bond issue.   
By 2005, Corpus Christi had already begun to show an improved employment 
climate.  From 2002 to 2005, efforts at the CCREDC resulted in the attraction of 99 
companies to the region, 34,000 new jobs (with a net gain of 10,300 jobs), and $4.7 
billion in new commercial development.  Corpus Christi was named “One of the Top 20 
Cities to do Business in” by Forbes magazine.   
While Corpus is experiencing success in attracting new business and industries, it 
is difficult to determine the role that the Hooks have played – beyond the ballpark’s 
contribution to the passage of Proposition 2.  Most research asserts that the presence of a 
sports team is unlikely to be a key consideration in firm location decisions.  However, 
that does not mean that the team cannot play an important role in influencing decision 
makers at the margins.  That is, when other factors that affect firm location are equal, the 
presence of the team may be a cultural amenity that can tip the scales in favor of Corpus 
Christi.   
The CCREDC’s employer attraction program is built on the premise that “the 
greatest opportunity to impact [place] marketing today is through building close personal 
relationships with site location decision-makers” (BUSINESS 3, interview).  An 
important element of building these relationships is first, convincing decision makers to 
visit Corpus Christi, and second, impressing them while they are in town.  When 
employer attraction efforts are viewed in this way, the team can and does play a role.  
Representatives from the Hooks have been involved with the CCREDC and the Chamber 
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of Commerce and have identified ways to either add value to potential employer visits or 
support the organizations’ events.  For example, in June 2006, the Port of Corpus Christi 
hosted representatives from the Columbian government.  The primary purpose of the visit 
was to discuss business opportunities and free trade, but the guests were also taken on a 
VIP tour of Whataburger Field.  The representatives from Columbia were honored at the 
baseball game that evening, and one of the guests threw out the first pitch. 
In addition, The CCREDC features the ballpark in its executive briefing materials 
that are provided to company decision makers interested in relocation.  The CCREDC’s 
central marketing piece, "Business. Redefined." features a photograph of the ballpark 
among other local amenities and references the ballpark in the text, which reads:   
Over the past decade Corpus Christi has been steadily restoring, renewing and 
reinventing itself.  From a new international airport to major highway and 
infrastructure improvements; from a new 10,000 seat arena to a beautiful 
waterfront baseball park, we're creating a world-class city right on the Texas 
Coast.  
The inclusion of the ballpark (and arena) in the marketing materials gives decision 
makers an idea about the quality of life in the area and the entertainment options 
available.  But more importantly, officials at the CCREDC believe that the completion 
and success of the ballpark support Corpus Christi's image as a "first-class" city in which 
to live, work, and play.  It also presents a "positive, progressive, get things done" image 
of the city that would be attractive to businesses interested in relocation.  An image of the 
ballpark is also included in the CCREDC's regional profile, a 2-page marketing piece that 
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includes information on quality of life, education, demographics, workforce, and 
taxes/incentives.   
 Construction of the ballpark had another indirect impact on the attraction of 
primary employers.  Gulf Compress, a cotton warehouse and storage facility, was 
displaced by the removal of cotton warehouses at the site of the ballpark.  In order to be 
ready for the cotton crop, the new Gulf Compress buildings had to be completed by July 
2004, and thus the construction for a $400 million container terminal, the La Quinta 
International Trade Gateway, was fast-tracked by the Port. Gulf Compress was La 
Quinta’s first tenant. The ability to ship containers of cotton by water provides the city 
with a significant financial advantage to cotton exporters, and the warehousing facilities 
offered at La Quinta allow exporters to store 125,000 cotton bales and ship during the 
off-season. 
Although team officials and economic leaders continue to collaborate to identify 
the best ways to incorporate the team into the city’s broader economic development 
program, the employment results directly attributable to the team should also be 
considered.  With regard to stadium operations, the estimate of 25-30 full time employees 
was not far from the mark.  The team’s professional staff (i.e., not including players) 
includes 13 full-time employees.  In order for the team to have maximum effect on the 
city’s employment, they would need to hire local labor for these positions.  This was not 
the case, as 9 of the 13 full time employees were not residents of Corpus Christi at the 
time that the team moved to town.   The majority of these employees were employed 
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elsewhere in the Astros organization or with other teams in the Texas League.  Likewise, 
much of the initial marketing and branding work was done by a company in Louisville. 
 Design and construction jobs used a mix of local and non-local labor.  The 
ballpark was designed by HKS Architects, a Dallas-based architecture firm and leading 
designer of professional sport facilities.  The construction was a joint venture between 
Hunt Construction, which is based in Indianapolis, and Fulton Coastcon, which is a local 
construction company.  These 3 companies demonstrate 3 different levels of employment 
impact. The involvement of Fulton Coastcon creates the greatest benefit for the 
community, which is important given that it is Corpus Christi residents who provided the 
funding for the project via the sales tax increase.  The design work executed by HKS at 
least has an impact at the regional level.  Finally, the work that is done by Hunt 
Construction would not have any significant impact, as any gains in economic activity 
would leak out of the local economy. 
 Logically, Corpus Christi would reap the greatest benefits if local labor was used.  
However, the use of non-local labor for professional and construction management 
highlights a reality facing minor league teams.  Minor league teams typically play in 
smaller markets, and these markets may lack the skilled workforce or firms that would be 
able to complete a hallmark project like the baseball stadium.  The use of non-locals in 
employment in the ballpark was further complicated by the fact that the stadium was not 
held to the same requirements that typical city projects are held to.  For many city 
projects, particularly expensive ones, the city issues an RFP and interested parties must 
go through a competitive bidding process.  This was not the case for the ballpark.  Even 
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though the city provided the funding, the team owners retained full control of business 
decisions.  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SUMMARY.  In the case of Corpus Christi, economic 
arguments were advanced by economic development officials in the community, 
embraced by city leaders, and accepted by most citizens.  The presence of the team and 
its facility have enabled the city to attract sporting events, but other economic benefits 
directly attributable to the team have been either slow to materialize or nonexistent.  The 
team continues to work with tourism and economic development officials to identify 
ways in which the organizations can support each other, but this collaboration is 
considered secondary to each organization’s primary responsibilities.  The greatest 
impact on economic development associated with the team is its indirect on primary 
employers in the area – construction of Whataburger Field necessitated the speedy 
completion of the Port’s La Quinta Gateway project and the popularity of the baseball 
issue was key to the passage of an economic development initiative that allows the city to 
offer financial inducements to companies interested in relocating.             
COMMUNITY SELF-ESTEEM/IMAGE BENEFITS 
EXPECTATIONS AND RATIONALE.  As described by Eckstein and Delaney (2003), 
community self-esteem has two components.  The first component is related to the 
symbolic importance of how residents view their own community.  The second 
component is oriented toward external audiences and involves how the community is 
viewed by and promoted to outsiders.  City leaders and proponents of attracting the team 
recognized that any efforts to improve community self-esteem – whether by improving 
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residents’ own feelings about Corpus Christi, or by improving its image throughout the 
state and region – would make it easier to accomplish other community goals.  In fact, 
improved community self-esteem would both reinforce and be reinforced by the 
economic development benefits expected by the community that are discussed above.   
 Supporters claimed that efforts to bring affiliated minor league baseball to Corpus 
Christi were symbolic of progress and the city’s new mindset.  In the years prior to the 
Ryans’ announcement that they wanted to bring a team to Corpus Christi, residents had a 
largely negative view of the city, its leadership, and its potential.  The successful 
attraction of the team, along with other development projects, was demonstrative of a 
willingness on the part of residents and leaders to invest in the community. 
 This negative view of the community was not held by all residents, but it was 
palpable and noticed by new residents.  When a new head of the CVB was hired in 2005, 
he described his initial impression of the city as follows:   
I’ve been in Corpus Christi for only a couple of weeks, but here’s my first 
observation:  Corpus Christi has a slight self-esteem problem…While most 
residents I have met are pleased with the direction the community is headed and 
the results achieved over the past several years, others haven’t become believers.  
This vocal segment continues to envy other cities for things they have that we 
don’t.  They say things like, ‘that couldn’t’ happen here’ or suggest that we lack 
in population size or significance as a community (Caller Times editorial page).   
As an individual who was responsible for promoting the city to external groups, this 
“heavy blanket of low self-esteem” was viewed as a significant challenge. 
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 Similarly, when one team official moved to town, he soon noticed that Corpus 
Christi communicated a very different feeling about their city than residents of other 
Texas cities, remarking:.   
If you go to Dallas-Fort Worth, they’re proud to be from Texas, proud to be from 
Dallas-Fort Worth.  If you go to Houston -- proud Texans, proud to be from 
Houston. You go to San Antonio -- proud of Texas, proud to be from San 
Antonio.  You go to Austin.  They’re proud to be from Texas, and they’re just 
over the top, crazy out of their minds, think Austin’s the greatest thing since 
sliced cheese.  And you come here, and you don’t get that.  Yeah, I’m from Texas 
and proud of being a Texan, but you don’t hear people proud to be from Corpus 
(SPORTS 1, interview). 
However, he viewed the presence of the team as a chance to change residents’ feelings 
about their community:  “We just felt that we could bring something to the city for them 
to really be proud of.  A first class facility, and a first class operation with our ties to 
major league baseball” (SPORTS 1, interview). 
 These remarks also highlight the importance of the association with Nolan Ryan 
and with the Houston Astros.  The presence of any professional baseball team wouldn’t 
necessarily have a significant impact on residents’ community self-esteem, but the 
celebrity cache associated with this team was important to the community.  Nolan Ryan 
is one of the best known and most popular personalities in Texas.  Supporters of efforts to 
attract the team emphasized the fact that Nolan Ryan chose Corpus Christi to be the home 
of his team, and this was an endorsement of his commitment to the community.  As one 
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economic development official remarked, “When you’re Nolan Ryan and you’re Reid 
Ryan, you have a choice on where to do business.  To pick Corpus Christi says volumes 
about their commitment to the area” (GOVERNMENT 3, interview).  
In spite of the Ryan family’s commitment, residents were initially reluctant to 
believe that efforts to attract a team would be successful.  Although Nolan Ryan owned a 
ranch in nearby George West and spent time in Corpus Christi with his family, there were 
still residents who felt that he wouldn’t follow through with the promise of bringing an 
affiliated minor-league team to the city.  They felt that once the team owners realized that 
the city was, as one resident described, “a great lumbering colossus stuck in the tar pit of 
negativity,” they would abandon plans and move the team to another city (Caller Times 
Letters to the Editor).  After a spate of letters to the editor were printed in opposition to 
the ballpark, one resident suggested:  
Why don’t they just give the people what they want, nothing.  They can change 
the name of the city to Brigadoon.  No one wants progress.  Now one wants to 
spend a dime.  We are racing to become the next Benavides as fast as we can.  Let 
it happen.  The first thing an investor or developer does in looking at a new city is 
subscribe to that city’s paper.  This paper does a very fair and accurate job of 
reporting on the population’s death wish.  Why stand in the way of the 
populations’ desire to be the city that time forgot? (Caller Times Letters to the 
Editor) 
Similarly, one resident described what he termed the “crabs in a bucket” mentality 
of the community.  When one crab is in a bucket, it will eventually find its way out.  If 
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several crabs are in a bucket, none will get out, as each time one nears the top, the others 
pull it back down.   
 Yet, once the referendum was approved and the team was secured, community 
leaders were hopeful that the project would change residents’ outlook.  One city leader 
described the changes in the community in the following way:   
There’s a significant thing happening in our community now.  As we came out of 
the tremendously tough economic times of the late 1980s – banks failing, 
businesses folding, businesses relocating offices, costing us jobs – people kind of 
got a defeatist attitude.  You get shell-shocked…What’s happening now is sort of 
a precursor of good things to come.  People in Corpus Christi have decided 
they’re not going to be that way anymore. We voted to build an arena and to pass 
the economic sales tax and build a baseball stadium.  To me the people of Corpus 
Christi are saying "We don't want to be stagnant anymore.”  People's attitudes 
have changed to become proactive and to change the outlook for the community 
(BUSINESS 3, interview).    
The second component of community self-esteem concerns the image that a city 
projects to external audiences. Supporters believed that the image of Corpus Christi 
would be enhanced by the successful attraction of an affiliated minor-league team, but it 
was not clear what form this would take.  Supporters felt that this enhanced image would 
make Corpus Christi attractive to tourists, but as noted previously, Corpus Christi was 
already a popular tourist destination in Texas.  There was also a feeling that the presence 
of the team could spark interest among potential employers.  However, again, there were 
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no plans as to how this would occur, other than the vague sense that people would want 
to be in a city that hosts a team. This belief was summarized by a government official 
who remarked, “There’s something about having pro sports that earmarks you as a big 
league city.  A place that people want to go to, people want to be in” (GOVERNMENT 3, 
interview).   Likewise, an economic development official proclaimed, “If you want a 
world class city, you need a minor league team” (BUSINESS 3, interview).  
 In contrast with efforts to attract major league teams, this external component of 
community self-esteem was less the focus than efforts to improve internal self-esteem. 
There are two potential explanations for this.  First, major league sports teams receive 
more national and international exposure than minor league teams.  Therefore, major 
league cities might view their teams more as a marketing tool to attract tourists and 
businesses.  Also, this focus on the internal component of community self-esteem reflects 
the city’s greater need.  The city was already attractive to tourists, but residents’ 
perception of their home was a major concern.    
COMMUNITY SELF-ESTEEM/IMAGE OUTCOMES.  Ultimately, the presence of the 
team impacted the two components of community self-esteem in different ways.  In 
relation to the internal component, the presence of the team seemed to give residents 
pride in the city.  However, in order for the team to enhance the city’s image among 
external audiences, it was not the team’s presence that had an impact, but rather the role 
that the team had in communicating the overall image of Corpus Christi to these 
audiences.  
A columnist for the Caller-Times noted the change in attitude among Corpus Christians 
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after the team began play:   
A recent dinner party I attended proved significantly more entertaining than I had 
expected.  That’s because no one complained about Corpus Christi.  Not a single 
negative word about the city was spoken.  No talk of divisive politics.  No 
criticism of our leaders.  No dreaming aloud about getting out of here some day.  
In fact, these dining companions spoke passionately about loving the laid-back, 
affordable lifestyle Corpus Christi brings.  Traffic is great, the beaches are 
beautiful, and the living is easy (Caller Times editorial page). 
 Long-time residents, in particular, seemed to notice the change brought about by 
the presence of the team.  One resident who had lived in the city since 1961 remarked:   
Over the last 30 years or so, civic pride in this city has seriously waned.  That 
may be changing now.  My family and I attended our first Hooks baseball game 
on April 22 and we were pleased beyond our wildest hopes.  The ballpark venue 
is gorgeous, the fans are raucous and almost overly polite.  There is great pride 
among all in attendance and you can feel it around you (Caller Times Letters to 
the Editor). 
 The improved self-concept has had both symbolic and tangible effects.  On a 
symbolic level, many leaders feel that residents view their city as one of progress, where 
exciting things are made possible by the residents.  An elected official described his 
impressions of the change in the following way:   
I believe after the success of the Whataburger Field and the Hooks baseball team, 
people are starting to come together as a team to make things happen.  Everyone 
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seems to be in the same frame of mind – let’s make it happen, let’s show what we 
can do as a community.  We built the arena; we built the convention center; we 
built the ballpark….Little by little, we are making things happen 
(GOVERNMENT 4, interview). 
Leaders also believe that their record of success on projects like the ballpark 
contributed to the successful passage of a $95 million bond issue in 2004.  
 As residents’ image of Corpus Christi improved, some community leaders noticed 
an improvement in the quality of service provided at entertainment and tourism-related 
businesses.  A team official remarked: 
When I started coming here, staying in the different hotels, eating at different 
restaurants, the level of customer service was absolutely atrocious.  We’re not the 
reason that customer service has gotten better, but we’ve helped because people 
are proud, and they realize you don’t have to go somewhere and get that kind of 
service (SPORTS 1, interview). 
An elected official echoed these sentiments, noting that improved service in shops and 
restaurants has had a contagious effect on the rest of the city. 
 In terms of improving the city’s image among outsiders, Corpus Christi has 
achieved the greatest success in establishing Corpus Christi as a baseball town.  One 
independent measure of this image is reflected in the city’s ranking in the Sporting News’ 
list of the top sport cities in the United States.  Corpus Christi made its debut on the 
Sporting News list in 2001, ranking 227th.  Not surprisingly, this ranking placed Corpus 
Christi behind the larger metropolitan areas in the state – Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston, 
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San Antonio, Austin, and Lubbock, ranked 5, 27, 29, 47, and 90 respectively.  However, 
Corpus Christi also ranked behind much smaller Texas cities, such as Waco, Huntsville, 
San Marcos, Nacogdoches, and Denton.  The Caller Times summed it up in the following 
statement:  “Good news, readers.  You live in a better sports town than Cullowhee, NC.  
Bad news – the people in Prairie View [a Texas town of less than 5000 residents] are 
laughing at us.”  By 2007, Corpus Christi improved its position to 123 in the Sporting 
News.   
The presence of the team and its successful 2006 season played a role in 
improving the city’s ranking, but the team and the city have also implemented specific 
tactics to solidify the city’s image as a sports city.  By hosting statewide and regional 
sport events, Corpus Christi communicates its image as a sports city to the event 
participants and spectators.  In response to the city’s successful event attraction strategy 
as well as the team’s success, the Corpus Christi Hooks have worked to brand the city as 
the “Baseball Capital of South Texas.”  This self-proclaimed title is consistently used by 
the team on their website and in press releases, and is increasingly being used in Corpus 
Christi print and television media. For the most part, however, the team has been the only 
organization that has made efforts to develop and promote this brand. 
City leaders and team officials agree that the community is proud of the team, and 
in particular, their role in financing the stadium.  Residents of Corpus Christi provided 
100% of the funding for the stadium, and city leaders believe that this is actually 
something that increases residents’ pride in the team.  The team has taken an active role 
in both creating a sense of ownership among local residents and in promoting the city to 
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external audiences.  The first strategy employed by the team was to create a strong 
association between the team and the geographical and cultural attributes of the city.  
This began when the team began to consider names for the team.  The team created a 
contest that allowed community members to submit names, and the team received over 
5000 entries.  “Hooks” was selected because the team wanted a name that was concise, 
gave a strong image, and most importantly, something that had a strong link to the area.  
The team recognized that “Corpus Christi” is a long first part, so if broadcasters and fans 
were going to use the full name, the second part had to be short.  The selection of Hooks 
accomplished this.  The logo, which is represented in Figure 3.1, was designed to be 
graphically appealing, but also to communicate something about the city.  The logo 
features the word “Hooks” with the H, K, and S in light blue and the two o’s as silver 
fishing hooks.  The bottom of the fish hooks form “CC.”  Above “Hooks” is “Corpus 
Christi” in the Texas state flag colors of red, white, and blue, with a star.  The dark blue 
represents the ocean and the light blue represents the sky.   
 
Figure 3.1.  Corpus Christi Hooks Baseball Club logo 
There was initially some local resistance to the name, but team officials viewed 
this as a chance to increase publicity for the team.  “I look at the controversy as a positive 
because that means people are looking at Corpus Christi Hooks baseball. Some people 
like [the name] and some people don’t, but everybody talks about it and everybody 
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knows Corpus Christi is getting a baseball team.”  The team name and logo have been 
well received.  In its opening season, the Hooks were the top seller of New Era baseball 
caps among minor league teams, and in each of its first three seasons, the team ranked in 
the top 15 in minor league merchandise sales. 
In addition, the team wanted to incorporate the city’s history into the design of the 
stadium. The ballpark is located on a site previously occupied by old cotton warehouses, 
and the team felt that it was important to incorporate this history into the ballpark.  The 
warehouses were built in 1926 and anchored the local economy early in the 20th century.  
Figure 3.2 shows the external façade of the stadium.  The entrance has the look of an old 
cotton warehouse and the main entry features two large columns designed in the style of 
support beams for cotton warehouse roofs.   
In the right field area, timber from the old cotton warehouses were used to 
construct Kieschnicks’ Corner, a picnic area named for Corpus Christi native and former 
major league pitcher, Brooks Kieschnick.  In the left field, the structures of the 
warehouses were left standing, including the original cotton compresses.     
  
Figure 3.2.  External façade of Whataburger Field featuring cotton warehouse-style 
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support beams. 
The homage to local culture and history is likely to resonate more with local 
residents than with visitors.  However, the team is also aggressive in helping to promote 
the city through the television broadcast of their games.  Many of the special events 
hosted at Whataburger Field, such as high school and college games or the Texas League 
All-Star Game are televised, primarily by Fox Sports Southwest.  Fox Sports Southwest 
reaches between 8 and 10 million subscriber homes in Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and 
Arkansas.  The Hooks purchase the time from Fox Sports Net and use the Fox production 
crews.  However, the team controls the script.  Because minor league games do not have 
well-known stars, there are more opportunities to focus on the location during the game 
broadcast (instead of focusing on the players).  The Hooks show B-roll (video footage 
without narration) with panoramic views of the Bay, the USS Lexington, or other 
appealing images of the city and have interviews with community leaders, such as the 
Executive Director of the CVB.  In addition, the team brings in the broadcasters before 
the game to showcase the city, and they provide them with talking points on what the city 
has to offer.  Because the team works closely with the CVB on promotion during these 
events, one team official characterized these games as “3 hour commercials for the city” 
that serve to “elevate [the team], elevate the stadium, and elevate the city.”  
COMMUNITY SELF-ESTEEM/IMAGE SUMMARY.  The mere presence of the team 
may have been sufficient to improve residents’ perceptions of the city.  The team has 
taken steps to incorporate the city’s geographic, cultural, and historic attributes into the 
team’s name and home, and these efforts may also have improved the impression that 
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residents have of their city.  This improved community self-esteem is credited for an 
improved level of customer service and the success of subsequent bond elections.  The 
team (and the media broadcasts associated with the team’s events) also serves as a 
vehicle to communicate a carefully crafted image to external publics.             
SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS 
EXPECTATIONS AND RATIONALE. Social welfare benefits received little 
attention from the community in the lead-up to the bond election that would authorize 
funding for the stadium.  Supporters focused instead on the other benefits – how the team 
would affect economic development, community self-esteem, and entertainment in the 
community and ignored any potential positive social impacts.  The one exception was the 
idea that the presence of the team would bring the community together.  This expectation 
is consistent with claims in the literature about community cohesiveness and community 
collective conscience and was emphasized in the community.  
 One city official remarked, “The great thing about the Hooks is that everyone can 
afford to go to a game – you can get berm seats for 5 bucks -- and it doesn’t matter who 
you are sitting next to, you’re all there to support the home team” (GOVERNMENT 4, 
interview).  This feeling about the power of baseball to bring people together is well-
illustrated by an advertisement by AT&T in the Hooks’ 2006 Yearbook.  The following 
copy is superimposed over a photograph of Whataburger Field: “Would you ever high-
five a complete stranger at the bank?”  The bottom of the page reads: “Nothing brings 
people together like baseball.  No one keeps them connected like we do.”  
SOCIAL WELFARE OUTCOMES.  The outcomes associated with improved social 
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welfare are mixed.  The same individuals who were actively involved in attracting the 
team were the most enthusiastic about the power of the team to increase community 
cohesiveness.  An elected official noted that the exercise of attracting the team and 
building the stadium had brought local residents together.  He said:  “If you stand 
shoulder to shoulder and hold hands, you can’t point fingers at each other.  And that’s 
what we’re doing – we started holding hands” (GOVERNMENT 4, interview). 
However, not all residents agree.  In fact, the decision by the city to pay for 100% 
of the stadium construction has had the opposite effect.  The major supporters of efforts 
to attract the team were a coalition of community elites, best represented by the group 
Forward Corpus Christi, and there was little involvement of individuals of diverse racial, 
ethnic, or socioeconomic groups.  Instead of bringing the community together and 
soothing tensions among these diverse groups, the funding of the ballpark reinforced the 
idea that the community was being run by a handful of powerful residents – disparagingly 
known as the “One Shoreline Crowd,” after the building that houses the CCREDC, 
banks, lawyers, and real estate development firms.  The decision to spend $32 million on 
the ballpark (when original cost estimates placed the project between $15 and 18 million) 
was perceived by residents as evidence of the misplaced priorities of city leaders, and the 
ballpark has been a lightning rod for dissent.  Whenever major social or infrastructure 
problems emerged in the community, residents reintroduced their criticism of the project, 
reasoning that if the $32 million had not been spent on the ballpark, it could have been 
used to address more pressing community concerns.   
 For example, only one week after residents approved the bond issue, heavy rains 
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in the area stressed the city’s drainage capacity and resulted in flooding and water quality 
issues.  To further complicate the issue, city leaders estimated that it would cost $85 
million to fix the problem, which would likely be raised through an increase in property 
taxes.  When residents objected to another tax increase, one government official 
responded that “all of our money is allocated for other projects.  We don’t have the 
money to fix our drainage” (Caller Times Letters to the Editor).  Further, one City 
Council member noted that “it took a long time for us to get into this mess and it’s going 
to take a long time to get out” (Caller Times front section).  This created more negative 
feelings toward the government, as some residents felt that the city had prioritized the 
ballpark over the city’s drainage, when they knew that there was a problem.    
One resident remarked, “I’d like to see our City Council and our mayor tell us what they 
are going to do.  I want their minds off the baseball stadium and on the water of this 
community” (Caller Times Letters to the Editor) 
The city’s drainage capacity was not an isolated incident.  Residents expressed 
concern that spending on the ballpark had also taken priority over education, street repair 
and other infrastructure issues, and resources and salaries for city workers, including fire 
and police.  The situation was summarized by one resident in the following manner: 
How come we have all this money for the Whataburger Field and there’s no 
money for poor employees?  There’s no money on the budget for this, none for 
that.  But there’s money for the field.  How come?  Everything else is forgotten 
because of the field.  Let’s get real.  This is our money. (Caller Times Letters to 
the Editor). 
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In spite of raising the issue of opportunity cost, the presence of the team has 
created some positive benefits, although most of these benefits are on a small scale.  The 
Hooks management views active involvement in the community as a key element in its 
success – the management can’t fully control the success of the team on the field, but it 
can establish itself as a good neighbor, fully invested in the welfare of the community.  
The team supports external nonprofit and community organizations in three specific ways 
which require various levels of support.  First, the category of involvement that requires 
the lowest level of commitment from the team is ticket giveaways.  The Hooks have a 
streamlined system through which nonprofit organizations can request free tickets for the 
clients served by the nonprofits and/or auction items (e.g., game tickets, merchandise).  
The second way in which the team supports nonprofit organizations is by allowing them 
to use Whataburger Field as the site for various charity fundraising events (e.g. the 
American Heart Association’s Heart Walk, the American Cancer Society’s Relay for 
Life, the March of Dimes’ Walk America).   
Finally, the team has developed long-term and ongoing projects that require a 
more substantial commitment of time and resources from the team.  The team partnered 
with the Corpus Christi Public Libraries, Flint Hills Resources, and the Caller Times to 
develop the “Get Hooked on Reading” program.  The program encourages children in 
grades 1-8 to read during the summer months and rewards program participants with 
tickets and merchandise, as well as a pre-game parade around the Whataburger Field 
track.  The Hooks have branded the program with their mascot, Rusty Hook, and 
vigorously promote the program in the schools and in local media.  Another major 
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community project that the Hooks have created is the Field of Dreams program.  Under 
this program, the team rehabilitates or builds a youth field in the coastal bend area.  In 
2007, the Field of Dreams program aided in the construction of a Miracle League field in 
Corpus Christi.  The Miracle League project provides opportunities for children with 
physical disabilities to play baseball and requires customized fields to prevent injuries 
and accommodate wheelchairs.  The Corpus Christi Rotary approached the Hooks about 
becoming involved in this project, and the team, along with locally-based grocery chain 
H-E-B, has provided the project with significant financial and human resources.  The key 
to these more substantial projects is that the team has worked with community 
organizations and corporate sponsors. 
The team has successfully crafted their image as a responsible corporate citizen, 
as evidenced by a guest columnist for the Caller Times who wrote the following: 
While the Hooks obviously are best known for their games and game-day 
promotions, they have made a solid impact through their community relations 
programs.  Under the direction of Elisa Macias, community relations director, the 
team has contributed to the betterment of the community through a number of 
worthwhile programs.  Personally, I prefer to conduct my business with 
companies that I know are concerned beyond the “bottom line” (Caller Times 
editorial page). 
An elected official echoed these sentiments, remarking: 
[The president] and his wife are involved in a lot of things around the city.  They 
utilize the ballpark for all these different walks, different charity things.  And the 
 103 
ballplayers themselves are looked at as local heroes.  They’re our team, our guys, 
and the organization is real good for the community.  When they’re not playing 
baseball, they’re sponsoring major events, like they sponsor this bicycle ride, the 
marathon, the Ritz [historic theater] renovation (GOVERNMENT 4, interview). 
 There is one important exception to these tactical community relations efforts.  In 
the same way that the ballpark was leveraged to pass an economic development sales tax, 
it was used to pass an affordable housing measure.  One city council member was a vocal 
critic of the decision to subsidize the stadium and threatened to derail the project.  In 
response, the city council agreed to include an affordable housing provision in the 
referendum.  Thus, in conjunction with the ballpark issue, voters authorized $500,000 per 
year to be spent on affordable housing initiatives.  This is a relatively minor amount 
given the size and economics of the community, but the explicit linkage of the ballpark to 
affordable housing has resulted in a more substantial effect than any of the team’s 
community relations efforts. 
SOCIAL WELFARE SUMMARY. The most significant impact on social welfare was 
a result of including an affordable housing measure as part of the economic 
development/ballpark proposal.  Other than that, the community’s expectations related to 
improved social welfare were limited to vague notions of increased community 
cohesiveness.  This has failed to materialize.  In fact, the decision to subsidize the 
stadium served to further divide the community over discussions of the opportunity cost 
of these decisions.  However, the community has reaped some social benefits through the 
team’s aggressive community relations programming and sponsorship of community 
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events.                     
LEISURE/ENTERTAINMENT BENEFITS  
EXPECTATIONS AND RATIONALE.  The final category of benefits created by the 
team was related to the entertainment options and leisure activities available to local 
residents.  Whereas the 3 categories of benefits previously discussed mirror the claims 
made about hosting major league sports teams, the emphasis on entertainment benefits is 
unique to minor league teams.  This is interesting because entertainment benefits are the 
ones over which the team has direct control, and consequently are the most likely to be 
fully realized by the community.  However, as a tool to secure taxpayer dollars, the 
promise of entertainment benefits – even if delivered -- are weaker than the economic, 
image, and social welfare justifications.  If the presence of the team delivers 
entertainment benefits, the most equitable method of financing a facility would be to 
implement a user-pays system, wherein the individuals who attend games (and therefore 
derive the benefit from the team’s presence) are responsible for paying the debt service 
for the city.   
As a result, efforts were made to reframe the relationship between entertainment 
benefits and public subsidization.  One elected official rationalized public investment by 
claiming that the “public subsidizes the building of a ballpark so the public can have 
access for a good price” (GOVERNMENT 1, interview).  In actuality, the team 
recognized the economic condition of the community and developed a pricing strategy 
that would “keep the pricing down so the average family can come out and afford it, and 
come out more than once a year” (SPORTS 1, interview).   So while the link between 
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public subsidization and affordability was not accurate, it provided a rationale for the 
public to pay for the stadium.  From the outset, team officials made it clear that they 
would attempt to duplicate the success they had in Round Rock, from the Hooks’ games, 
to the amenities in the ballpark, to the events the facility would host.  The Corpus Christi 
team would benefit from a management group that operated using a model that “took all 
the good things about minor league baseball and enhanced those and took all the things 
that were not good about minor league baseball and didn’t do those” (SPORTS 1, 
interview).  This is a simple business model, but the team had been extraordinarily 
successful in Round Rock, setting the all-time double-A attendance record in 5 
consecutive seasons, despite varying success on the field.   
In addition to the product at the ballpark, local residents had specific expectations 
related to the minor-league affiliation of the team.  A team official predicted that Corpus 
Christi residents would have the chance to meet the players, coaches, and umpires and 
develop long-lasting relationships with them.  There was an expectation that the players 
would be accessible to the fans and would be integrated into the community.   
Residents also hoped that they would have the opportunity to see major league stars, 
including future major league stars at the beginning of their careers and current major-
league stars from the Astros play on rehabilitation assignments. 
LEISURE/ENTERTAINMENT OUTCOMES.  In terms of delivering quality, 
affordable, family entertainment through Hooks’ games, the team has succeeded.  From 
the beginning, the team has been well-supported by the community.  The team’s first 
workout at Whataburger Field drew over 3000 fans.  A team official remarked, “I’d never 
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seen anything like this.  It was like when people came to watch Mark McGwire take 
batting practice in St. Louis.  But they would leave when he was done.  These people 
stayed around. That was amazing” (Caller Times front section).  In a stadium that has 
5050 fixed seats, the team sold 8,255 tickets on Opening Day.  The team drew more than 
half a million fans in each of its first two years, which was better than team’s optimistic 
prediction of 300,000 in the team’s first year.  In fact, the team had better attendance 
numbers in its second season, which could be explained by the success of the team (they 
won the League Championship) and the appearance of Roger Clemens, a likely Hall of 
Fame pitcher for the Astros.  However, the team averaged over 7000 per game even in its 
third year, when the team struggled on the field.  One local columnist described the 
enthusiasm in the following way:   
Day game, night game – doesn’t matter, people flock to the stadium.  You almost 
get the feeling these guys could schedule a midnight game in a patch of grass 
somewhere in Papalote and the fans would create a traffic jam along 181 trying 
the get there (Caller Times editorial page).   
The team’s success attendance-wise, even while struggling on the field confirms 
the following remarks of a local resident:  “It doesn’t really matter if they are World 
Series class.  It’s just great to have a home team and go out and know the players and get 
all excited” (Caller Times Letters to the Editor).   
 The team’s success as a family entertainment venue is in large part due to the 
amenities in the ballpark.  For example, the ballpark has a grassy area, where families can 
let their children run around.  There is also a children’s play area with family friendly 
 107 
activities including an interactive playground, a rock wall, and basketball court.  The 
team has also delivered on the promise of major stars.  Major-league stars in the Astros 
system that have played at Whataburger Field include Brandon Backe, Jeff Bagwell, and 
Roger Clemens.  The appearance by Roger Clemens in 2006 attracted the club’s largest 
attendance, 9022.  The team’s impact on area entertainment is not limited to Hooks’ 
games.  Whataburger Field hosts approximately 30 additional events each year, including 
high school and collegiate baseball games, concerts and outdoor shows.   
 One unanticipated benefit is that the development of the land, both for the 
ballpark and for parking has prompted the city to develop a permanent festival area near 
the ballpark.  The city hosts two major festivals each year – Bayfest, which is a 3 day 
music celebration on the bay, and Buc Days, which celebrates the arrival of Pirate Jean 
Lafitte in Corpus Christi in 1821.   The Buc Days carnival has already relocated to land 
adjacent to the stadium, and plans for additional development of a dedicated festival are 
in the preliminary planning stages. 
LEISURE/ENTERTAINMENT SUMMARY.  The community’s expectations for the 
entertainment benefits created by the team were fully met, as evidenced by the high 
levels of support from the community.  In addition, development of the stadium has 
prompted interest in developing the surrounding area as a festival area for community 
events, thereby enhancing entertainment options in the area.                          
DISCUSSION 
 This study covers a five-year period in the life of the Corpus Christi community 
and demonstrates that the transformation expected from hosting a professional sports 
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team has – for the most part – failed to materialize.  This study underscores the 
importance of advancing the conversation regarding public subsidization of professional 
sport teams to focus on how the presence of sport teams can be leveraged to create 
community value.  Currently, the dominant situation can be summarized in the following 
way:  city leaders believe that their community can realize benefits from the presence of a 
sport team in the form of economic and intangible benefits; academic research 
consistently finds that communities fail to realize desired benefits; communities ignore 
academic findings and continue the practice of subsidizing professional sport teams.  This 
cycle deters communities and academics from exploring the more important question, 
which is how communities can bridge the gap between their expectations and the actual 
outcomes of hosting a team. 
 The results of this study show that there is indeed a gap between community 
expectations and community outcomes related to hosting a professional sport team.  In 
the cases in which this gap is minimized or nonexistent, individuals and organizations in 
the community have developed targeted strategies to deliver benefits.  This study shows 
that while it is possible for the presence of a sport team to deliver the benefits desired and 
promised by the community, it is not guaranteed.  This finding underscores the 
importance of strategic leverage if communities are to maximize their investment and 
consequently, avoid the public policy problems associated with public subsidization of 
professional sport. 
While the existence of a gap between expectations and outcomes supports the 
need for strategic leverage, this study also deepens our understanding of the process of 
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strategic leverage.  The following process issues are of particular importance – the 
conditions under which the expectations-outcomes gap is minimized and the conditions 
under which strategic leverage is implemented successfully.  
The gap between expectations and outcomes is reduced when the same party is 
responsible for establishing expectations regarding benefits and delivering benefits.  The 
most obvious case of this is related to the entertainment benefits sought by the 
community.  A community’s expectations are influenced by the image of the team’s 
ownership and the promises they made.   The team’s management has complete 
information about the product they will deliver to the community (e.g., stadium design, 
stadium location, events, game operations) and as a result, the promises they make to city 
leaders and the community-at-large should be consistent with their promises.  In the case 
of Corpus Christi, these expectations were also influenced by the ownership group’s prior 
performance.   Hooks’ management was proud of their success in Round Rock, and they 
were able to use the Round Rock example as a tangible example of what residents in 
Corpus Christi could expect.  The Hooks made slight modifications to the Round Rock 
model and provided Corpus Christi with exactly what they had promised – quality, 
affordable family entertainment and the opportunity to see future and current major 
league stars.   
Community expectations about the entertainment benefit of hosting the team were 
consistent with their experience.  However, if a public information campaign to garner 
support for a sport facility referendum was based solely on entertainment benefits, it 
would be unlikely to receive voter approval. Instead, the public’s investment in 
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professional sport projects is legitimized in large part by the broader categories of 
benefits – economic development, community self-esteem, and social welfare.  Of 
course, these categories of benefits do not have the same information symmetries or 
consistency between expectations and outcomes.  This underscores the importance of 
strategic leverage as a community challenge, and not an issue to be addressed solely by 
the sport team.   
When the team acts alone, it is able to deliver a narrow range of benefits.  But if 
the host city desires a wide-range of community-wide benefits – or if they have promised 
voters that the team would create a community transformation -- efforts to leverage the 
team require community-wide planning.   Additionally, even if the team is able to deliver 
a degree of benefits by acting alone, they may be able to increase these benefits if their 
strategies are developed in concert with community leaders and other organizations.  
Community leveraging efforts can be considered as either proactive or reactive, and this 
study provides examples of the success of each class of leveraging efforts.   
Proactive leveraging efforts are those strategies and tactics that are planned in 
advance and put into action by the time the team begins play.  Proactive leveraging 
efforts depend on creating opportunities, and they typically require the cooperation of 
various sectors of the community and involve a substantial amount of planning and the 
contribution of an array of community resources.  In Corpus Christi, the team was 
successful in implementing proactive leveraging strategies to affect the city’s economic 
development and community self-esteem goals.   As mentioned in the results section of 
this study, one of the most significant impacts of the team on the community were a 
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result of linking passage of funding for the ballpark to funding for economic development 
sales tax increase.  The CCREDC viewed the popularity of the ballpark as a opportunity 
to create community change.  However, leveraging the referendum to achieve these goals 
required planning and negotiation.   Similarly, the team approached the facility design, 
facility location, team name, and team logo in a proactive manner.  The team recognized 
the potential to promote the city through these elements.  As a result, the facility’s design 
reflects the area’s economic history as a cotton center.  The ballpark location takes 
advantage of the city’s current economic driver – the Port – providing views of Corpus 
Christi Bay and ship traffic from the seats.  The stadium is also located near area 
attractions.  The land owned by the Port was the only location considered by the team 
because it felt that the Port location provided the greatest opportunity to deliver 
community benefits. 
 The Hooks’ ownership and management group drew on their experience with the 
Round Rock Express to develop the Corpus Christi team.  From the outset, the team had a 
plan to maximize their contribution to the community in a way that would also drive the 
team’s financial success.  The team also had access to the people in the community 
whose contribution of ideas, skills, and resources were necessary to successful leverage. 
Similarly, the CCREDC approached the presence of the team with a larger vision of how 
the team could be used to further the CCREDC’s goals.  
The second category of leveraging efforts is those that are reactive.  Reactive 
leveraging efforts are implemented to take advantage of opportunities that emerge.  
Reactive efforts are not planned for initially, but are implemented in response to the 
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change in the environment created by the presence of the team.  In Corpus Christi, 
reactive efforts were not as successful as proactive leveraging strategies, but they reflect 
an interest and recognition that the presence of the team could create economic, image 
and social welfare benefits.  In the same way that the CCREDC’s efforts to link the 
ballpark to their 4A sales tax were an example of proactive leveraging, the inclusion of 
the affordable housing provision was an example of reactive leveraging.  The affordable 
housing measure was included in reaction to the opposition of one vocal city council 
member.  As proponents of public investment worried that the stadium project could be 
derailed by this council members’ opposition, they included the measure as a form of 
appeasement.   
Other reactive leverage measures include efforts to develop a feasible system of 
transportation among attractions in the tourist nucleus.  Supporters claimed that the 
ballpark would have spillover benefits to area attractions, but the lack of pedestrian routes 
between attractions prevented this benefit from being realized.  In response, the 
downtown management district proposed a historic trolley and the Port expanded water 
taxi service.  However, both of these projects were unsuccessful.  The city council failed 
to provide funding for the proposed trolley, and the water taxi service was cancelled 
because of low ridership.   
The city has been more successful with reactive leverage related to branding.  
Stadium supporters claimed that the presence of the team would encourage development 
and spending in the bayfront tourist nucleus.  While the efforts to provide public 
transportation failed, there is interest in developing a brand for the many tourist 
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attractions in the vicinity of the stadium.  The effort to develop the SEA (sports, 
entertainment, arts) district is still new, but the effort includes individuals with needed 
resources and relationships.  A second effort at branding is the attempt to establish 
Corpus Christi as the “Baseball Capital of South Texas.”  The Hooks are leading this 
effort and are contributing their marketing and media power to the effort. 
The potential benefits to the community from successful leveraging efforts could 
be substantial.  However, a community is more likely to realize marginal changes 
attributable to the team.  For example, the team isn’t necessarily the magnet that draws 
people to the host community, but it can have an impact at the margins.  Through 
aggressive marketing and cross promotion and bundling of activities, tourism officials 
can encourage people to extend their vacations, or spend a night at the ballpark.  
Likewise, it is unlikely that the presence of the team would convince a company to 
relocate on its own.  However, if a host community is competitive with other locations on 
key firm decision factors like education and workforce quality, the presence of the team 
may give a host community an edge.  A major challenge facing host communities is how 
to achieve these marginal changes.  In the case of Corpus Christi, the CVB and CCREDC 
have developed relationships with the team that should help in these efforts, but 
community organizations are still developing their strategies to deliver marginal benefits.   
Bridging the gap between a community’s expectations and the outcomes it 
experiences is not a simple task.  Even if capable leaders in the community have access to 
the resources needed to implement leveraging strategies and have the desire to contribute 
these resources, the creation of community value takes time and successes are not 
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immediately apparent.  This study looked at a 5 year period, and many of the successes 
only began to emerge near the end of the study.  This is particularly true in the case of 
area redevelopment efforts.  Some of the projects that were initially planned were 
cancelled, and many others have finished months or years behind schedule.  As time has 
gone by, the city has come to realized that development will not organically occur 
because of the presence of the team.  However, development of the area is still an 
important public policy priority, so the city offered tax incentives to developers to create 
projects like the Cotton Yard office complex.  Thus, the presence of a sports team should 
not be viewed as a quick fix solution, and the community should realize that additional 
resources may be needed to get a desired result. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that community perceptions of the degree to which 
they have realized benefits may not be accurate.  The city leaders that I interviewed felt 
that the team had exceeded community expectations.  Often, they would point to one 
isolated event or project and proclaim success.  For example, after discussing all the 
expectations related to economic development, social welfare, and place marketing, 
interview subjects would emphasize the team’s on-field success.  Similarly, the one 
business that has opened in the stadium area was held up as proof of the team’s impact.  
In reality, these isolated successes are very different from the changed community 
promised by stadium supporters.  One might suggest that community leaders who were 
instrumental in bringing the team to Corpus Christi would naturally have an interest in 
portraying the project as a success.  While this may partially explain their response, the 
enthusiasm of city leaders was echoed in my casual conversations with residents and in 
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public forums such as the Letters to the Editor section of the newspaper.   
Ultimately, any city that provides public monies to attract or retain a professional 
sports team is going to confront important issues related to the opportunity cost of its 
decision and the ability of the team to deliver promised benefits.  These 2 issues are 
interrelated, as the question of whether public investment in professional sport is the best 
use of taxpayer monies depends on the degree to which desired benefits are delivered.  To 
date, many host communities fail to realize benefits – not because they lack the resources 
or ability to leverage sport teams, but because they lack the motivation.  If the city leaders 
who make the decision to subsidize the team are not held accountable to the delivery of 
benefits, the community’s return on their investment will be minimal.  Further, if 
influential individual across the community do not perceive that there is a way to create 
benefits for their own organization or interests, they will not attempt to leverage the 
presence of the team.   
In summary, this study demonstrates that the presence of a sports team – even one 
with all of the advantages of the Hooks (e.g., association with major-league Hall of 
Famer, beautiful state-of-the-art facility in which to play, League championship) – is 
unlikely to transform the economic health, image, or social welfare of the community 
without active attempts at strategic leverage and coordination among community 
organizations, city leaders, and the team.   If strategic leverage is needed to eliminate the 
expectations-outcomes gap, then the next step is to investigate what happens when 
communities attempt to leverage their sport teams.  This question is addressed in the 
following chapter, which is a qualitative study of the factors that enable and inhibit social 
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leverage of a team. 
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Chapter 4: Social Leverage of Professional Sport Teams: Using Cause 
Marketing to Address Social Issues 
The previous chapter examined how Corpus Christi’s expectations related to 
hosting a professional sports team compared with the outcomes it experienced.  In the 
cases in which expectations were consistent with outcomes, it was because the team 
and/or community leaders were able to devise strategies and tactics to strategically 
leverage the team to address community priorities.  In the study discussed in this chapter, 
I further explore the idea of strategic leverage to identify the factors that enable or inhibit 
leverage of a sports team to address social issues. 
To date, much of the focus on a professional team’s contribution to its community 
has focused on the economic benefits that result from its presence.  However, when 
successfully leveraged, professional sport teams can impact various core issues facing 
cities, including social welfare (Sparvero & Chalip, 2007).  Sport teams are social, as 
well as economic, institutions, and as such, they have the potential to contribute to the 
social welfare of their host communities.  Pressure to contribute in this fashion is 
magnified when public funds are used to construct sport facilities necessary to attract or 
retain a team.  In fact, as demonstrated in the previous study, the dedication of public 
funds to meet the demands of a sport team often raises questions about the opportunity 
cost of such funds and the priorities of government leaders.   Whether these funds would 
be used for social purposes in the absence of the team is debatable, however, if the team 
can be leveraged to address pressing social issues in the community (e.g., education, 
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crime, health), criticism of the team and local officials can be lessened while residents 
enjoy social benefits.  
Major professional sport leagues have, for the most part, recognized and accepted 
their social role, as evidenced by the following comments of David Stern, the 
Commissioner of the National Basketball Association (NBA): 
All corporations have a social responsibility to contribute to the health, 
welfare, and advancement of the communities in which they operate, but 
professional sports leagues carry a special obligation.  The remarkable 
celebrity that NBA players hold empowers them to effect change (“League 
launches NBA Cares, n.d.) 
Bud Selig, the commissioner of Major League Baseball (MLB) echoed Stern’s 
sentiments, describing baseball as “a social institution with enormous social 
responsibility.”  In recent public statements, Selig has specifically mentioned baseball’s 
responsibility to provide education about steroid use. Additionally, he points to the racial 
integration of baseball as evidence of the sport’s success in effecting social change, and 
he attributes baseball’s ability to influence social change to its unique place in American 
culture and history (Haudricort, 2005).   
These comments by Stern and Selig highlight two potential factors which make 
the social leverage of sport teams possible.  First, the professional sport community 
acknowledges and accepts its social responsibility, particularly the responsibility it has to 
its host community.  Second, professional sport teams possess unique assets that allow 
them to impact social welfare in ways that other businesses in the community cannot.  
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Therefore, a significant challenge facing sport teams and the communities that host them 
is how these assets can best be used to address social issues.  In spite of the importance of 
this challenge, communities rarely maximize the social contributions of their teams and 
little is known about the process through which this occurs.  Further, as demonstrated in 
the previous study, the potential for social leverage is largely ignored as community 
expectations about the presence of the team develop. 
Thus, the purpose of this study was to examine the factors which influence social 
leveraging efforts.  Using an action research approach, a cause marketing (CM) program 
between the Corpus Christi Hooks and CCAPWELL, a local community health coalition, 
was developed and implemented.  Evaluation focused on program implementation and 
management, although program effectiveness was also considered.  The results of this 
study were then used to develop a conceptual framework for enhancing social welfare 
through CM.                                                                                                                  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The concept of social leverage is a relatively new approach to creating community 
value. Much of the extant literature related to sport leverage is focused on leveraging 
sport events for economic development.  This study extends the fundamental ideas of 
leverage to new sport properties (i.e., sport teams instead of sport events) and new 
community goals (i.e., social welfare instead of economic development).  This literature 
review focuses on cause marketing (CM) as one specific application of social leverage. 
 Supporters of public subsidization for sport teams and events claim a wide variety 
of benefits will accrue to the host communities (e.g., Noll & Zimbalist, 1997; Rosentraub, 
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1999; Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000).  Researchers almost unanimously agree that host 
communities fail to realize the full range of benefits promised by supporters (Baade, 
1996; Baade & Dye, 1990; Baade & Sanderson, 1997; Baim, 1992;  Coates & 
Humphreys, 2003; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997; Rosentraub, Swindell, Przybylski, & Mullins 
1994; Smith & Ingham, 2003). Yet, this is not because sport properties are incapable of 
delivering these benefits, but rather that communities do not fully understand how to 
strategically leverage the presence of sport teams to create community gains.  The need 
for leverage is increasingly recognized in the case of sport events (Chalip, 2004, 2006; 
Chalip & Costa, 2006; Chalip & Leyns, 2002; Chalip & McGuirty, 2004; O’Brien, 2006; 
O’Brien & Gardiner, 2006) and also has applications to professional sport teams 
(Sparvero & Chalip, 2007).   
It is well-established that firms possess unique resources that can lead to 
competitive advantage (Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001; Daft, 1981; Hoopes, Madsen, 
& Walker, 2003; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1995). Instead of using a firm’s resources to 
create competitive advantage for the organization, the strategic leverage of sport teams is 
primarily concerned with how the team’s resources can be used by the community at-
large to create value, although organizations engaged in strategic leverage may gain an 
advantage in the marketplace through their involvement.  If successfully leveraged, sport 
teams may be able to deliver the benefits that supporters of stadium projects promise and 
residents expect.  In 2007, Ziegler called upon sport managers to be more socially aware, 
and in recent years, there has been a growing interest among researchers in the ways in 
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which sport properties can improve social welfare (Chalip, 2006; Frisby, 2005; Misener 
& Mason, 2006; Sparvero & Chalip, 2007).   
Sport teams may become involved with social issues in a community for two 
primary reasons:  (1) when the public believes that the team’s involvement reflects the 
team’s community conscience, it is good business (King, 2001; Lachowetz & Gladden, 
2002); and (2) the high profile of teams, athletes, and coaches make them desirable 
spokespersons, particularly when there is a social message to be delivered (Brown, Basil, 
& Bocarnea, 2003; Bush, Martin, & Bush, 2004;).  It is not surprising then that 
professional sport leagues have developed comprehensive community programs.  For 
example, in the first year of a new social responsibility initiative, the NBA contributed 
over 200,000 hours of volunteer service and raised more than $32 million (National 
Basketball Association, n.d.).  Likewise, the NFL has a strong history of community 
involvement, including a 32 year partnership with the United Way to encourage 
volunteerism and NFL Charities, a grant making foundation that provides $10 million 
each year to nonprofit organizations (Goodell, n.d.).   Major League Baseball has also 
created successful programs at the league level, such as the Baseball Tomorrow Fund, 
which provides the funds for youth baseball fields and equipment (Major League 
Baseball, n.d.).   Community involvement is not limited to the league, as individual teams 
and athletes have implemented their own community programming targeting education, 
health, and community development (Extejt, 2004; Robinson, 2001). 
Professional sport teams recognize the importance of strategic community 
involvement and have embraced cause marketing (CM) (Babiak & Wolfe, 2006; King, 
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2001; Roy & Graeff, 2003).  CM is “a strategic positioning and marketing tool which 
links a company or brand to a relevant social cause or issue, for mutual benefit” (Pringle 
& Thompson, 2001).  In applying CM to professional sports, Lachowetz & Gladden 
(2002) specify that this relationship is between a “company, sport organization, or athlete 
and a social cause through the use of sports events and programs” (p.315).   These broad 
definitions provide an umbrella for the wide range of activities mentioned above. 
CM has grown dramatically in the last several decades, with recent estimates of 
total global spending exceeding $1 billion annually (Barone, Miyazaki, & Taylor, 2000; 
Hajjat, 2003; Kalligeros, 2005; Strahilevitz, 2003).  CM initiatives can take various 
forms.  Transaction-based CM is the most common form of CM (Daw, 2006).  
Transaction-based CM is consistent with Varadarajan and Menon’s (1988) early 
definition of CM as “the process of formulating and implementing marketing activities 
that are characterized by an offer from the firm to contribute a specified amount to a 
designated cause when customers engage in revenue-providing exchanges that satisfy 
organizational and individual objectives” (p. 59)  American Express is widely credited 
with popularizing this form of CM (File & Prince, 1998; Higgins, 2002; Kalligeros, 
2005).  American Express’s most famous CM initiative was their involvement with the 
Statue of Liberty restoration project in 1983.  The company launched a $4 million 
national advertising campaign that pledged a penny for each credit card purchase and a 
dollar for each new cardholder.  The campaign raised over $1.7 million; card usage 
increased by more than 20%, and new cardholders increased by 45% (Mescon, Tilson, & 
Dismon, 1995).  In this form of CM, companies make a donation to a specific cause for a 
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percentage of each purchase, usually up to a set amount.  Within this type of transaction-
based CM, the magnitude of donation can vary greatly (Strahilevitz, 1999).   
CM is not limited to initiatives that are directly tied to consumer purchases, 
however.  CM activities may include issue promotion and social marketing (Berglind & 
Nagata, 2005; Daw, 2006).  In the case of issue promotion, companies support a cause 
through the contribution of their brand, marketing, and promotional resources to increase 
awareness of a cause.  Issue promotion is not tied directly to sales, although most 
companies demonstrate their commitment by making a donation to the cause.  Similarly, 
a CM campaign may involve social marketing, which is defined as “the use of marketing 
principles and techniques to influence a target audience to voluntarily accept, reject, 
modify, or abandon a behaviour for the benefit of individuals, groups, or society as a 
whole (Kotler, Roberto, & Lee, 2002, p.5).  The focus of social marketing campaigns is 
to change behavior to improve society.  Social marketing campaigns often involve 
multiple levels of partners (e.g., multiple nonprofits, government agencies, several 
corporations) working together to effect change (Daw, 2006).   
Another form of CM involves co-branded events and programs.  Co-branded 
events are events that raise awareness and/or money for the cause while corporate 
partners are actively engaged in the event through promotion, resource contribution, and 
employee support.  Similarly, co-branded programs are programs in which the company 
name is directly tied to the program, which is produced by the nonprofit organization.   
The variety of CM forms allows different levels of involvement for companies.  
Transaction-based CM usually requires the lowest contribution of company assets, and 
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consequently provides a lower opportunity for messaging and long-term financial impact 
(Alexander, 2001; Daw, 2006).  On the other hand, CM that involves social marketing 
and co-branded events or programs require greater commitment from the company.  In 
more comprehensive CM efforts, companies have the greatest opportunity for long-term 
financial benefits, but they consequently require more resources and a deeper level of 
involvement of the company.  While short-term CM initiatives can be effective, a long-
term relationship between the corporate partner and the cause are often more desirable 
from a public relations perspective (Bronn & Vrioni, 2001; Pracejus & Olsen, 2004; 
Varadarajan & Menon, 1988).   
 As part of a company’s marketing function, the primary purpose of CM is to 
improve profitability.  CM may be a part of a company’s broader corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) portfolio, particularly if the company agrees with Milton Friedman 
(1982) that “there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits” (p. 133).  CM is 
distinct from corporate philanthropy that is motivated by altruism (Collins, 1994; File & 
Prince, 1988; Shaw & Post, 1993).  CM is more similar to a company’s sponsorship 
efforts and confers similar benefits (Polonsky & Speed, 2001).  Like sponsorship, 
companies who engage in CM seek increased sales and image enhancement (Cryer & 
Ross, 1996; Drumwright, 1996; File & Prince, 1998; Ptacek & Salazar, 1997; 
Varadarajan & Menon, 1988).  These benefits are not mutually exclusive, as image 
benefits are important primarily for their impact on consumer purchase decisions.   
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There is growing pressure from consumers that companies demonstrate social 
responsibility, and research suggests that consumers will reward such companies through 
patronage (Brown & Dacin, 1997; Murphy, 1997; Tate, 1995).  While the financial 
motives associated with CM may cause some scepticism among consumers (Smith & 
Stodghill, 1994; Webb & Mohr, 1998), many consumers believe that CM is an acceptable 
way to raise money and awareness for social causes (Ross, Patterson, & Stutts, 1992; 
Smith & Alcorn, 1991).  Further, companies can combat consumer scepticism by forging 
long-term partnerships with nonprofit organizations that go beyond transaction-based CM 
(Daw, 2006).   
Professional sport organizations provide companies and nonprofits with a unique 
opportunity to develop CM relationships.  The first form of sport CM positions sport 
teams and sport events as a tool through which other (traditional for-profit) corporations 
can achieve their marketing goals (Lachowetz & Irwin, 2003; Schimmel, Clark, Irwin, & 
Lachowetz, 2007).   Lachowetz & Irwin (2003) used a professional golf event as the 
setting to explore consumer reactions to a well-known brand’s sponsorship of a cause-
related program.  They found that cause-related sport sponsorship programs have the 
potential to positively impact consumer attitudes toward the sponsoring company and 
intention to use the company’s services.   
The second form of sport CM considers the professional sport team as the for-
profit partner.  Local residents expect their professional sports teams and individual 
athletes to support community causes, and this involvement contributes to a positive 
image of the team and drives merchandise and ticket sales (Roy & Graeff, 2003).  So, 
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while sport properties may be motivated to address social issues in part by altruism, there 
is recognition that such activities can also improve an organization’s bottom line by 
generating positive publicity and strengthening their connection to fans (Babiak & Wolfe, 
2006).   Increasing legal troubles and athlete misbehavior on and off the playing field 
have tarnished athlete, team and league reputations in recent years (King, 2001; 
Lapchick, 2003).  The NBA, in particular, has taken a strong stand for social 
responsibility, including a revision of its mission statement to include an emphasis on 
social responsibility and the codification of community service by athletes in the league’s 
collective bargaining agreement.  Yet, when NBA Commissioner David Stern was asked 
about doing business in China, a country with a record of human rights abuses, he 
responded, “At the end of the day I have a responsibility to my owners to make money” 
(McCallum, 2006).  The subtext of this message is that the league will engage in socially 
responsible practices to the extent that they further the league’s profitability. 
CM has the potential to be a win-win situation, creating awareness and revenues 
for the cause while delivering financial and image benefits to the corporate partner.  
However, in order for a CM program to be successful, it is essential that a strategic 
alliance is formed between the corporate and cause partners.  Strategic alliances are 
cooperative relationships formed among two or more partners in which resources of each 
organization are shared in order to create competitive advantage (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, 
Arregle, & Borza, 2000; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002; Jarillo, 1988).  According to 
Varadarajan and Cunningham (1995), strategic alliances are “a manifestation of 
interorganizational cooperative strategies” which “entail the pooling of skills and 
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resources by the alliance partners, in order to achieve one or more goals linked to the 
strategic objectives of the cooperating firms” (p. 282).  Strategic alliances are growing in 
popularity, and it is estimated that top 500 global companies average 60 major strategic 
alliances apiece (Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001). Alliances between nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations are also growing in popularity.  In the 1990’s, spending on corporate – 
nonprofit alliances reached almost $1 billion (Smith & Stodghill, 1994).  CM represents 
one form of strategic alliance that has the potential to reach what Austin (2000) describes 
as an integrative stage of strategic alliances in which “the partners’ missions, people, and 
activities begin to merge into collective action and organizational integration” (p. 71).   
Professional sport teams have the opportunity to enhance social welfare through 
the implementation of CM and an alliance with strategic cause partners.  The following 
study examines Corpus Christi’s efforts to leverage a sports team to address obesity 
prevention in the community.                                                                                         
METHOD 
The aims of this study were twofold:  first, to identify the factors that enable or 
hinder the leverage of professional sport teams to improve social welfare, and second, to 
evaluate the success of the physical activity program that resulted from collaboration 
between the team and a community health coalition.  In order to achieve these aims, a 
case study methodology was used within an action research framework.  This section 
begins with a description of Corpus Christi, Texas, the site of the study.  Then, an 
overview of action research and its appropriateness for this study is provided.  Finally, 
methods of data collection and analysis are described.                                                          
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RESEARCH SETTING 
 A more detailed report of Corpus Christi as the research setting is provided in the 
second chapter of this dissertation.  The information here is meant to provide the context 
for obesity prevention efforts within the community.   
In 2004, the Texas Department of State Health Services conducted the Physical 
Activity and Nutrition Community Survey in Nueces County, which includes Corpus 
Christi.  The survey results highlighted the need for obesity prevention activities, as 47% 
of respondents were not meeting minimum physical activity recommendations and 69% 
of respondents were not eating enough fruits and vegetables.   
Obesity prevention efforts in the community are spearheaded by a local 
community health coalition.  The Coordinated Community Approach to Promote 
Wellness (CCAPWELL) is a coalition whose mission is to reduce the burden of obesity 
and its health related consequences.   CCAPWELL’s membership includes individuals 
from the major hospital systems in the area (e.g., Christus Spohn Health System, Driscoll 
Children’s Health Plan, Driscoll Children’s Hospital), nonprofit health advocacy 
organizations (e.g., American Cancer Society, American Diabetes Association, American 
Heart Association), public education (e.g., Corpus Christi ISD, Flour Bluff ISD, Texas 
A&M University – Corpus Christi), city  and county governmental agencies (e.g.,  
Corpus Christi Parks and Recreation, Nueces Country Cooperative Extension), and 
individual medical providers..  Their most visible accomplishment is the annual 
Children’s Nutrition and Activity Expo, which CCAPWELL has hosted each year since 
2003.   
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In 2004, CCAPWELL joined with the Corpus Christi Parks and Recreation 
Department to launch CC In Motion, a continuous campaign to develop, implement, and 
promote activities to support healthy lifestyles among community residents.  CC In 
Motion is supported in part by the Nutrition and Physical Activity Program to Prevent 
Obesity and Other Chronic Diseases (NPAO), which is based on a partnership between 
the Centers for Disease Control and state health departments.  Through a competitive 
bidding process, Corpus Christi was selected as the urban obesity prevention 
demonstration site for the state of Texas.  The Texas Department of State Health Services 
(DSHS) contracted with a research team from the University of Texas to provide 
technical assistance to CCAPWELL and the CC In Motion campaign.  The Corpus 
Christi Parks and Recreation Department is a principal partner in CC In Motion and 
serves as the fiduciary agent for the NPAO grant.   
CC In Motion activities are focused on three main areas of obesity prevention – 
physical activity, nutrition, and breastfeeding.  At the time of this study, the following 
activities were in the implementation or planning phase:  a worksite wellness program for 
three area employers, a church-based intervention which includes the dissemination of 
health tips via church bulletins, and a restaurant initiative to reduce portion sizes.  
However, CCAPWELL is primarily viewed as a distribution channel for information 
related to obesity prevention (i.e., physical activity, nutrition, breastfeeding).  
CCAPWELL also plays an important role in building relationships among those 
individuals and organizations in the community who are working in or impacted by the 
obesity prevention efforts.   
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The first year of the city’s participation in the NPAO grant program coincided 
with the city’s announcement that the double-A affiliate of the Houston Astros had 
selected Corpus Christi as its new home and would begin play in Corpus Christi in April 
2005. Many professional sport teams have successfully implemented CM campaigns to 
accomplish a variety of marketing objectives while raising awareness and/or funds for 
social issues.   Thus, the team was viewed as an attractive potential partner for obesity 
prevention efforts.   
The Hooks are actively involved in the Corpus Christi community.  The Hooks 
have various levels of community involvement, ranging from ongoing programs and 
projects (e.g., the Stripes Diamond at Whataburger Field, “Hooked on Reading” 
program) to one-time donations or player appearances.  Based on the team’s strong 
community orientation and anecdotal evidence of successful sport CM campaigns, I 
spearheaded efforts to develop a partnership between CC In Motion and the Hooks and 
explore ways in which the team could be leveraged to support obesity prevention 
activities through the CC In Motion campaign.                                                                         
ACTION RESEARCH  
I began working with UT’s obesity prevention team in 2004 in a part-time, 
voluntary capacity and joined the research team on a full-time basis in the fall of 2005.  
While the role of the research team was to provide technical assistance and evaluation 
consultation, we recognized that many of the grant initiatives would require our active 
involvement in planning and implementation, particularly in the early stages of the grant.  
Our intention was to provide hands-on assistance in the beginning, and once community 
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members began to reap the rewards from successful programs and develop the capacity to 
sustain them, we would be able to take a less active role in program planning, 
development, and implementation.  
Consistent with the research team’s understanding of its dual role (i.e., as 
participant in community efforts and researcher), I adopted an action research framework 
for this study.  Multiple definitions and applications of action research have surfaced 
since Lewin (1946) introduced the term.  However, these various interpretations agree 
that the purpose of action research is two-fold:  to improve professional practice and to 
make a significant contribution to knowledge.  Additionally, the various interpretations of 
action research agree that the researcher must be actively involved in the situation being 
studied.  In this project, I have adopted the following definition of action research: 
A family of methodologies which pursue outcomes of both action 
(change) and research (understanding) and which alternate between action 
and systematic reflection.  (Dick, 1997) 
The action research cycle consists of four stages:  planning, action, observation, 
and reflection.  This is an iterative process, as the final reflective stage has implications 
for the next action research cycle.    Action research is well-suited for exploratory studies 
and allows for flexibility in the research process (Dick, 2000; Farqhar, 2000). 
While this project has applications for improved practice for community 
organizations and professional sport organizations alike, it also contributes to the state of 
research in sport management.  As the sport management community recognizes the 
value of actionable knowledge and the importance of bridging the gap between theory 
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and practice, action research has become increasingly relevant to the field.  Acceptance 
of action research within the field of sport management is evidenced by the recent growth 
of action research studies (Frisby, 2005, 1997; Green, 1997). 
The most compelling reason for the use of action research in this case is that the 
researcher in positivist social science research is, by design, removed from the process.  
My active involvement in the project provided me with insight that would have been 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve otherwise.  As a member of the UT research team, I 
had observed numerous occasions in which members of the coalition provided glowing 
reports of coalition activities that were later determined to be exaggerated (at best) or 
untruthful (at worst).  Therefore, based on my previous experience with the community, 
survey or interview data were not expected to necessarily provide accurate data.  Further, 
while traditional research designs have been used to study the motivation of organizations 
to participate in CM programs and consumer attitudes toward CM partners, these same 
approaches were considered to be less effective in exploring process-related questions. 
I was the guiding force behind CCAPWELL’s efforts to partner with the Hooks.  
Members of CCAPWELL were interested in working with the team, but they lacked the 
capacity and knowledge to forge a CM partnership with the team.  My role was 
complicated because I was independent of either organization.  CCAPWELL viewed me 
as an advisor to the project, and the team viewed me as a representative of CCAPWELL.  
Efforts to forge a partnership were further complicated, as neither the team nor 
CCAPWELL had the resources to develop the program.  As a result, I did most of the 
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planning and management of the program, and provided updates to both CCAPWELL 
and the Hooks. 
In my absence, it is unlikely that a partnership would not have been formed.  Yet, 
this does not mean that the parties were not invested in the project.  Rather, the 
CCAPWELL membership was energized by the potential partnership, but individual 
members did not want to invest resources in a project that was not perceived as delivering 
benefits to their own organization.  Generally, CCAPWELL members were involved in 
the coalition because the coalition’s activities enhanced their work in their own 
organizations.  If an individual CCAPWELL member was able to create a relationship 
with the team, it would be more attractive for the individual to do this outside of the 
scope of the coalition.  In fact, one CCAPWELL member had built a relationship with the 
team, and the Hooks were involved with various programs and projects of this member’s 
organization.  However, in the early stages of planning, this CCAPWELL member did 
not provide assistance in building a relationship between CCAPWELL and the team. 
At the same time, the top levels of the Hooks’ management were invested in the 
program.  Yet, after our initial meeting, responsibility for the program was delegated to a 
more junior staff member who lacked their enthusiasm and did not conceive this program 
as an important part of her daily operations.  As a result, my role was similar to that of a 
marriage broker – bringing together the team and the coalition in a partnership to benefit 
both parties and doing the hands-on work that the member organizations did not have the 
time or energy for.                                                                                                                           
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
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 Data collection took place over an 18-month span, from the initial meeting with 
the team in January of 2006 through the completion of the program in June of 2007.  
Multiple data sources were important to allow for triangulation of data and to increase 
analytical rigor.  McNiff (2007) defines triangulation as “cross-checking the existence of 
certain phenomena and the variety of individual accounts by gathering data from a 
number of informants and a number of sources and subsequently comparing and 
contrasting one account with another in order to produce as full and balanced a study as 
possible” (p.32).   
FIELD NOTES.  I used a range of data sources over the course of the study.  From 
the beginning of my involvement with the project, I kept field notes to document critical 
incidents over the course of the project.  In conjunction with my field notes, I kept a 
journal in which I commented on the data I collected.  My journal was focused on 2 
elements:  action and reflection.  The action notes focused on what occurred, and the 
reflection notes were my attempts to analyze the action and consider what I learned from 
an event.  In keeping the diary, I also recorded questions that I had, which I could then 
follow up with additional data collection.  Through these sources, I recorded information 
and impressions from meetings with CCAPWELL, the team, and the research team from 
UT, as well as information from the weekly program meetings.   
INTERVIEWS.  Two types of interviews were conducted for this project.  First, I 
conducted formal interviews with representatives from the Hooks. In the case of the team 
president, the questions related to the CM project were integrated into the interview 
conducted for the study described in Chapter 3.  The second type of interview conducted 
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was a focus group interview with the participants in the program.  In both cases, 
purposive sampling was used.  In the first group of interviews, subjects were selected 
because they were employees of the team with involvement in the team’s community 
relations or general management functions.  Using a semi-structured interview format, 
the interviewees were asked about the team’s philosophy regarding community 
involvement.  In the second group, the participants were selected because they 
successfully completed the program supported by the team.  The participants were asked 
about the impacts of the program in which they participated.  They were also asked about 
their motivation for participating in the program and the importance of the team’s 
involvement with the program.  The interviews with team officials lasted between 20 and 
60 minutes. The focus group lasted 90 minutes.  Both types of interviews were 
audiotaped and transcribed.   
MEDIA AND PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.  The final category of data for this study was 
media and public documents.  Documents examined include materials published by the 
team, including press releases obtained from the team’s website, team programs, and the 
team’s yearbook.   The print edition of the local newspaper, the Corpus Christi Caller 
Times, was used as sources for local media.  From the program’s launch until its 
completion, I read the Caller Times on a daily basis.  I was interested in 2 major types of 
stories.  First, I paid attention to any stories related to community-wide obesity efforts 
and other noteworthy health issues.  Second, I made note of any stories related to the 
team (outside of game reports).  These reports were primarily related to the team’s 
community relations activities.   
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DATA ANALYSIS.  Data analysis and data collection proceeded simultaneously and 
was guided by my field notes.  My field notes were coded to represent general themes 
that emerged.  These themes, taken in concert with media and public documents, 
provided direction for interview questions.   The data were sorted according to these 
themes and I analyzed these themes to identify associations and patterns.  Because the 
study was an action research project, the data collection and analysis had to fulfill 2 
purposes.  First, in an effort to improve professional practice, data were collected and 
analyzed to create a CM partnership between the team and CCAPWELL.  Second, data 
were collected and analyzed on the process of developing the program to further 
understanding of social leveraging efforts from a researcher’s perspective.        
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 This section provides a discussion of efforts to forge a CM partnership between 
CCAPWELL and the Hooks.  The development of the Hooks-CC In Motion 
collaboration can be considered in three stages – partnership exploration, program 
development, and program implementation.  Initially, a broad-based CM program was 
envisioned which required the contribution and activation of a wide array of team and 
coalition assets.  This vision was presented in an exploratory meeting held between the 
team and CCAPWELL.  In this meeting, the team instead proposed a program with a 
more narrow focus.  The program proposed by the team incorporated some, but not all, of 
the program components originally presented and required the contribution of limited 
resources from the team.  In the final stage, the project proposed by the team was 
implemented, and the team’s commitment and contribution of assets was further reduced.  
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PARTNERSHIP EXPLORATION 
The purpose of this initial stage was to persuade the Hooks that a partnership with 
CCAPWELL would benefit the team and to secure their involvement.  In this stage, we 
were specifically focused on identifying partnership goals and benefits, the assets of each 
partner that would enable desired benefits, and tactics which would constitute the CM 
program.  
I had worked with the president of the team when he was the Director of 
Marketing for the Round Rock Express and I was planning fundraising events for a 
baseball-themed exhibit at the Texas State History Museum.  I leveraged my relationship 
with the team’s president to gain access.  This pre-existing relationship with the president 
of the team was particularly important, as the Parks and Recreation department had 
attempted to meet with the Hooks previously.  In each case, representatives from the 
Parks and Recreation department were either ignored or relegated to more junior 
employees in the organization.  Prior to the meeting, I spoke with the team president via 
telephone and explained the project and that we were interested in talking with the team 
about opportunities for our organizations to work together.  I was not surprised that the 
team president had not heard of the organization or the CC In Motion campaign, since 
nothing had been done to build the organization or campaign brand.  I briefly explained 
CC In Motion and CCAPWELL in our conversation and emphasized CCAPWELL’s 
membership, which included a wide range of community and health organizations.   
Almost immediately, I recognized that the lack of brand equity in the CC In 
Motion campaign could potentially be a barrier to creating a partnership.  The phone 
 138 
conversation with the president necessitated an effective “elevator speech,” which was 
difficult because of the lack of brand equity as well as the organizational complexity (i.e., 
a coalition of nonprofits, but no nonprofit status on its own).  The president repeatedly 
returned to what he considered the basic question – what did our organization do?  He 
agreed to a meeting, even without fully understanding the organization or campaign. 
In preparation for the meeting, I worked with other members of the research team 
to identify potential benefits that a partnership could deliver for both parties.  I felt that in 
order to convince the Hooks that a CM partnership was worthwhile, we had to 
demonstrate how the partnership could improve the Hooks’ business by directly or 
indirectly increasing team revenues.   
The following benefits were sought by CCAPWELL:  image, increased awareness 
of organization, increased awareness of message, and behavior change consistent with 
their mission.  CCAPWELL had little recognition in the community beyond coalition 
members, and we hoped that CCAPWELL’s association with the team would build 
awareness of the CC In Motion campaign and enhance the image of CCAPWELL.  By 
raising CCAPWELL’s profile, we hoped to also increase the reach of their message.  
Research has shown that the dissemination of messages related to healthy lifestyle 
behaviors can significantly impact behaviors and individual activities (Bauman, et al., 
2001)  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that increased awareness of the CC In Motion 
campaign could increase healthy behaviors among residents.  Increased awareness of CC 
In Motion would also help to increase the salience of the obesity issue in the community.    
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In addition, we conducted an inventory of the coalition and the team’s assets and 
identified opportunities for a partnership.  The potential for a partnership depended on 
finding a fit between CC In Motion’s needs, brand, and assets and those of the Hooks.  
The assets that CCAPWELL/CC In Motion could contribute to the partnership included 
assets of the coalition and assets of individual members of the coalition.  CCAPWELL 
provided a point of contact for numerous nonprofit organizations and could use their 
existing communication network to benefit the partnership.  CCAPWELL and its 
members could also provide in-house expertise to add credibility to any program 
messaging. 
In addition to CCAPWELL’s assets, the Parks and Recreation department agreed 
to contribute their assets to the partnership.  First, the Parks and Recreation department 
developed the CC In Motion brand for their own programs, but allowed it to be used to 
brand programs associated with the obesity prevention grant.  Also, while CCCAPWELL 
does not have a specific defined clientele, the Parks and Recreation department could 
provide the team with access to the families and individuals served by their programs.  
Access to children active in the Parks and Recreation athletics program could be 
especially attractive to the team.  Finally, the Parks and Recreation department could 
offer recognition on their website and in their program guides.   
 The team’s assets are divided among the following categories:  facility/operations 
assets, network-power levers, team/management assets, and media and communications 
inventory.  In order to implement a successful CM campaign that would deliver all 
desired benefits, these assets needed to be coordinated in a coherent fashion. 
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FACILITY AND OPERATIONS ASSETS. In Corpus Christi, the construction of a new 
facility was a precondition to successfully attracting the team, and Whataburger Field is 
the team’s most impressive and visible physical asset.  The facility itself, including the 
stadium’s design and amenities, were assets that could be contributed to the CM 
partnership.  In addition, the team’s operations could further support the partnership.  
The facility was a potential site for CC In Motion activities and events.  
Whataburger Field has hosted annual fundraisers for various community organizations, 
including the American Diabetes Association, the American Heart Association, the 
March of Dimes, and the American Cancer Society.  The potential for hosting events at 
Whataburger Field included CCAPWELL’s existing events.  Whataburger Field could 
also be considered as a location around which new programming and events could be 
created, including special fundraising or promotional events and community health 
events. The team could also support these types of events through the in-kind 
contribution of tickets and/or team merchandise. 
There is a precedent for facility-based physical activity programming within the 
Astros system.  The Hooks’ parent organization, the Houston Astros, have participated in 
the PLAY (Promoting a Lifetime of Activity for Youth) program since its inception in 
2004.  The PLAY program is sponsored by the Professional Baseball Athletic Trainers 
Society (PBATS), the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS) and the 
American Diabetes Association, and was adopted by 10 MLB clubs, including the Astros.  
The Astros’ PLAY program is a 2-hour event, during which students participate in agility 
training and exercises with the team’s trainers and run the bases with a member of the 
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team.  During the program, local nutrition experts and team doctors also speak to the 
children and their families about proper nutrition.   
In addition to serving as the host for events, the design and amenities of 
Whataburger Field provide opportunities for youth sport and physical activity consistent 
with CC In Motion objectives.  Whataburger Field includes the Stripes Diamond, a 
regulation little league field that resulted from a partnership between the team, Stripes 
convenience stores, and Citgo Refining Company.  Stripes Diamond includes a 
completely fenced playing field, covered dugouts, field lighting, LED scoreboard, 
bleachers, concessions and restrooms.  The Stripes Diamond is the cornerstone of the 
Driscoll Children’s Hospital Kids Zone, a comprehensive youth recreation area that also 
includes an interactive playground, a 27’ rock climbing wall, and a SportCourt basketball 
court.  Whataburger Field has successfully hosted youth league baseball games, with 
youth games played before every Hooks’ night game and on as many as 30 other selected 
dates during the Hooks’ regular season.  The facility also offers physical activity 
opportunities to attendees during the games, as the Kids Zone is open during all Hooks’ 
games.   
Game-day operations could also contribute to the CM campaign, and the 
following game elements were identified as opportunities. At the conclusion of every 
game at Whataburger Field, children are invited to come down to the field and run the 
bases.  This activity, as well as the traditional 7th inning stretch and promotional 
giveaways could be enhanced, extended, or modified to link to CC In Motion through the 
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CM campaign.  As with most opportunities, attempts to leverage these game-day 
operations would need to be integrated into a larger CM program. 
 The facility’s concessions are another operations element that could present an 
opportunity for partnership with CC In Motion to promote healthy lifestyles.  In my 
initial meeting with CCAPWELL representatives, the co-chair of the coalition mentioned 
that she had attended a game and noted the lack of healthy options at the concession 
stands.  She suggested that we work with the team to provide healthier choices in the 
ballpark.  Meeting attendees were divided over the feasibility and wisdom of attempting 
to change food offerings at the stadium.  The chair and co-chair of CCAPWELL believed 
this was the ideal place to start, as it had the potential for the greatest impact (i.e., it 
would affect every individual who visited a concessions stand).  Additionally, this effort 
would be consistent with another CC In Motion initiative, which was working with area 
restaurants to provide healthier options to their patrons.   
However, a representative from the Parks and Recreation department and I were 
less enthusiastic, as two prominent providers of these less-than-healthy options were 
closely tied to the Hooks organization.  Whataburger is a locally based fast food chain 
that is a sponsor of the team and the owner of the facility’s naming rights (i.e., 
Whataburger Field).  While Whataburger does offer some healthy choices at their 
individual franchises, the concession stands at Whataburger Field feature a limited menu 
that does not include healthier fare like salads.  A large Whataburger concession stand 
occupies the prime location in the stadium – at the top of the entry stairs, behind home 
plate. In fact, the Whataburger stand is among the first things a visitor sees upon entering 
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the ballpark.  Another concessionaire with ties to the team is the Nolan Ryan Grill, 
featuring Texas-raised beef options.  Nolan Ryan is a partner in the Hooks’ ownership 
group, the father of the team’s CEO and CFO, and the driving force behind the team’s 
move to Corpus Christi.  Nevertheless, we included this as a possibility, along with other 
facility and operations assets. 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT ASSETS.  The organizational and 
management assets include all of the team’s personnel and their expertise, including 
owners, players, front office staff, and mascots.   Professional athletes enjoy a special 
status in our society.  They are often considered role models, and as such have the power 
to influence individual behavior and values (Bush, Martin & Bush, 2004; King, 2001).  
There are anecdotal examples of athletes using their celebrity to draw attention to health 
issues (e.g., Magic Johnson and HIV/AIDS, the NFL’s Jerome Bettis and asthma, Lance 
Armstrong and cancer).  Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that athletes could be 
effective endorsers of health behaviors.  Many players on the Hooks’ roster are Hispanic, 
and a program focused on these players could provide an important point of cultural 
connection for the residents in Corpus Christi, where the majority of the population is 
Hispanic. 
At the minor league level, it is difficult to build a campaign around players, as 
they are typically only a part of the minor league team for a limited time.  Also, minor 
league ballplayers are technically owned by the parent organization, which is focused on 
player development and controls player activities.  This limits the role and involvement 
of players in a CM campaign.  However, the team’s ownership and management group 
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includes former athletes that offer similar celebrity status without the same restrictions on 
their time and activities.   
In addition to the celebrity status of athletes, owners, and even mascots, several 
members of the team’s staff could contribute professional skills to the campaign.  In any 
CM campaign, the team’s marketing and media staff members could assist with message 
development, marketing collateral development, campaign publicity, and special event 
planning.  In the case of a health-related CM campaign, the team’s medical and athletic 
training staff can offer specialized expertise related to nutrition and physical activity, as is 
successfully done in the PLAY program described above. The organizational and 
management assets also include the team name, brand, and logo.   
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS INVENTORY.  The team’s media and 
communications inventory can help to disseminate healthy lifestyle messaging and 
promote CC In Motion and CCAPWELL at the same time.   The team’s in-stadium 
inventory includes print, audio, and video opportunities.  The team publishes a highly 
professionalized, full-color program each season that is sold in the gift shop and by 
vendors at the game.  The team also has a high-resolution color video screen in left field.  
During the course of the game, highlights, player information, promotions, crowd shots, 
and advertisements are broadcast.  The team’s program is financed in large part by 
advertisements, and the video screen time is purchased by advertisers, so the contribution 
of space in these two media would constitute an in-kind contribution from the team.  The 
in-house public address system in the ballpark is also controlled by the team and could be 
used in the CM campaign.  Of course, in-stadium inventory is also a revenue stream for 
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the team, and the use of the inventory for the CM campaign could have significant 
opportunity costs for the team.  If stadium signage is used for the CM campaign, the team 
forgoes any revenue, so depending on the specific medium, the use of in-stadium 
inventory could require a substantial in-kind contribution from the team.   
 The team’s external media includes game broadcasts (radio and television) and 
advertisements (print, radio, and television).  The messaging during television broadcasts 
revolves around promoting the city to external audiences, and consequently, may not be 
well-suited to the CM campaign.  However, the team’s games are also broadcast on local 
radio stations in English and Spanish.  These media may be more suitable for reaching a 
local audience.  The ability to reach the Hispanic community could be especially 
important, as Corpus Christi has a large Hispanic population and Spanish-only speakers 
may not be reached by traditional healthy lifestyle messaging.   
NETWORK POWER LEVERS.  Finally, the team has an established network of 
relationship with power elites in the community, which can be used to develop and 
promote the CM campaign.  Some of the team’s relationships with government and 
community leaders were developed when the city was trying to attract the team.  For 
instance, the city manager’s office, the city council, and the mayor were all actively 
involved with talks with the team before they came to Corpus Christi.  The relationship 
with these government officials has developed over time and could be leveraged to make 
health and wellness a public policy priority.  In addition, the team’s sponsorship activities 
have solidified relationships with area businesses.  These relationships provide 
opportunities for businesses to become involved in the CM campaign, including the 
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contribution of the sponsor’s assets.  Of course, the extent to which sponsors would want 
to become involved depends on their perception of possible benefits.  For example, HEB 
is a regional grocery store chain that is based in Corpus Christi.  A CM campaign built 
around healthy lifestyles could be a natural fit with HEB’s own efforts to promote fruit 
and vegetable consumption and other healthy nutrition practices.  The team’s sponsorship 
network is not limited to those companies that sponsor the team.  The team also sponsors 
various community activities and events, through which the team extends its relationship 
network.  For example, the team has sponsored several events to support Corpus Christi 
PATCH (Positive Action toward Cultural Heritage), a group that is dedicated to the 
restoration of a local theater.  PATCH’s Board of Directors includes leaders from the 
media, local government, and local businesses, and the team’s relationship with these 
individuals is both established or sustained through its involvement. 
The team has established relationships with the community elite in Corpus 
Christi.  As a result, the team can convene these power networks and present 
opportunities for them to get involved with the CM program.  These networks become a 
leverageable asset that can be used to secure additional resources and partners for the CM 
effort.  This convening of community elites can also raise the profile of the CM campaign 
and increase awareness. 
 The partnership exploration stage required a substantial amount of planning 
designed to determine potential benefits to both partners and the assets that each could 
potentially contribute to the partnership.  Based on the unique assets of CCAPWELL/CC 
In Motion and the Hooks, it appeared that there were opportunities to collaborate on a 
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CM program that could deliver desired benefits to each party.  While the team possessed 
a more stable range of assets than CCAPWELL/CC In Motion, it also seemed to have 
other avenues (related to its existing asset base) through which it could realize sought-
after benefits.  In the next stage, we presented the results of the benefits analysis and asset 
audit to the team and established the nature of the partnership.                         
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 
In the first stage, a wide range of options for collaboration were identified.  In the 
program development stage, we secured the team’s involvement and focused on what the 
partnership would look like and what assets each side would contribute in program 
development.  The program eventually agreed upon was much more limited than the 
broad-based CM program envisioned in the previous stage. 
 The meeting that had been arranged with the team was attended by 4 
representatives from the CCAPWELL/CC In Motion and the Hooks’ president, vice-
president and director of community relations.  Our planned approach was to emphasize 
the benefits to the team’s financial bottom line, but this approach was cut short only a 
few minutes into the meeting.  I began to explain potential financial benefits and the team 
president interrupted, declaring, “We don’t need to sell more tickets.”  This changed the 
direction and tone of the meeting.  A comprehensive CM program (i.e., one that went 
beyond transaction-based CM or simple issue promotions) would have the greatest 
opportunity for increasing revenues as well as the greatest opportunities for messaging.  
The team’s stance that they didn’t need to sell more tickets may have been shortsighted, 
as the meeting was conducted after their second season in Corpus Christi.  The team 
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benefited from the excitement of the inaugural season in their first year and they were the 
League Champions in their second year.  The team’s past success was no guarantee of 
future sell-outs.  This position might also have been a result of a lack of understanding 
the opportunities to realize financial gains from the partnership.  Nevertheless, the team 
explicitly stated that they were not seeking a financial benefit.  This changed the direction 
of the meeting and likely affected their level of participation and contribution of 
resources.   
As an organization, the Hooks realized the importance of a healthy lifestyle, but 
they seemed unconvinced that the team could do anything to truly help change the culture 
in Corpus Christi.  This attitude suggested that the team was unaware of the potential 
impact of a comprehensive and strategic sport CM program.  However, the president 
explained that if the team was involved, the greatest chance of success would be on a 
micro – not community – level.  He explained that using culture as an excuse for obesity 
was not sufficient, and that in order to make real progress, programs needed to find ways 
to reach families.  He was particularly interested in creating a program that would reach 
marginalized residents in the city’s poorest neighborhoods.  He mentioned that these 
residents are ignored by most programs, and at the same time, these were the individuals 
with the greatest need for help.  If the team was going to be involved, they wanted to be 
involved with a program that would “be impactful” and “make a difference.”   
In addition to the team’s altruistic goals, they were also interested in a program 
that would “move [the team] beyond the sports page.”  This interest in publicity seems to 
counter the team’s claim that they don’t need to sell more tickets.  The obvious benefit to 
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press coverage is increased awareness and promotion of a positive image of the team.  
Ultimately, either of these benefits could result in additional revenues – whether from 
tickets, merchandise, or sponsorship sales.   
 The president suggested a program in which local tracks would be opened so that 
families could exercise together, and the team offered various forms of support.  The 
team agreed to provide incentive items (e.g., tickets, merchandise) to program 
participants.  However, it seemed that the team offered these incentives because they 
couldn’t see other ways to make an impact, rather than a belief that free tickets would 
encourage families to be healthy. In fact, the president remarked, “Free tickets are great, 
but that’s not going to do the trick.  You can’t just keep giving tickets away to get people 
to be healthy.”    
This negative attitude toward incentives was influenced largely by a request for 
sponsorship the team received from Non Stop, a for-profit company that claims to 
encourage physical activity among children.  Non Stop, who was working with the Parks 
and Recreation department to develop their summer youth programs, wanted the team to 
provide in-kind and cash contributions to the program.  The president of the team was 
strongly against the NonStop model of physical activity promotion, which was based on 
rewarding children with incentives for self-reported physical activity.    
The team agreed to make mascots and front office staff available for special 
appearances related to the program.  Further, to aid in promotion of the program, the team 
offered to help with the media campaign, including both contributing to news stories and 
media contacts.  Finally, the team mentioned the possibility of a direct financial 
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contribution to the program.  The president requested a written proposal outlining the 
program needs, and at this point, he also delegated any decisions to be made related to the 
program on the team’s end to the community relations department.   
 The delegation of the project to the community relations department revealed how 
the team viewed the association.  A true CM program requires strategic implementation 
and management involvement, whereas a community relations program managed by the 
community relations department was more tactical and limited in nature.  The program 
suggested by the team had a much narrower focus (and limited potential for benefits) than 
the initial program we envisioned.  In spite of its limited scope, the walking program 
provided an opportunity to begin building a relationship with the team.  If the program 
was well-executed and successful, we could continue to build the relationship over time 
and expand the partnership between the team and CC In Motion.  Thus, after meeting 
with the team, we moved on to the final stage – program implementation.       
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 
The third and final stage included the implementation of the family walk program 
that was suggested by the team. I consulted with an Austin company that develops 
physical activity programs to create a program consistent with the team’s vision.  This 8-
week program provided family-oriented walks for Corpus Christi residents of all ages.  
Participants met at a local high school once a week.  Program participants were given 
exercise logs each week to record their activity and were given a handout on an physical 
activity or nutrition topic each week.  This program was offered at no cost to participants. 
Volunteers from Texas A&M Corpus Christi served as walk leaders and led the 
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participants in warm-ups and stretching activities.  In the first weeks, individuals met at 
6:00 and participated in structured workouts.  In response to participant input and concern 
about scheduling, the program was altered.  For the remaining weeks, participants could 
arrive any time between 5:00 and 7:00.  Warm-ups and stretching sessions were run 
continuously by volunteers. 
Walking programs can be effective in encouraging physical activity.  For 
example, the Paso del Norte Foundation provided $2.5 million for the “Walk El Paso” 
initiative.  This 5-year program was designed to provide information, inspiration, and 
opportunities for residents of El Paso to adopt walking as a form of exercise.  The 
program included 3 components:  media, special events, and community mobilization.  
Obviously, a program such as Walk El Paso is extremely well-funded and can be 
implemented on a much larger scale than the program in this study.   
However, the program with the Hooks also was developed to use media and 
special appearances.  Although the responsibilities of each partner were clearly identified 
and agreed upon in the program development stage, these were not fully delivered in 
implementation.   
The team initially agreed to use its media contacts to place a story in the Caller-
Times.  No story appeared in the paper, and before the initial launch, I discovered that the 
team had never issued a press release.  The explanation given by my contact at the team 
was that the team was technically the property of the Houston Astros, and so any media 
or publicity had to be cleared through the Astros’ public relations team. The team initially 
offered to handle the publicity, and I felt that the delegation of this task to the team would 
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have two benefits.  First, this would deepen the level of involvement of the team with the 
program and as a result, would increase their commitment to the program and the CC In 
Motion campaign.  I also thought that the team would be able to secure more media 
attention than if a CCAPWELL representative was in charge.  The team is closely 
involved with the local media – the team is on the front page of the sports page almost 
every day from March through September.  Given the level of excitement for the team in 
the community, virtually any event associated with the team is considered newsworthy.  
The team was also slow to give permission to use the team’s name and logo to co-brand 
the program, but eventually we secured the right to use the logo and brand in all program 
publicity and collateral.   
After securing these rights, the program was re-launched, with CCAPWELL/CC 
In Motion taking responsibility for program publicity.  A press release was issued to the 
local news media, and the program was featured on the community events page.  The CC 
In Motion press release described the program as being “supported by the Corpus Christi 
Hooks Baseball Club” – precise language approved by the team.  The press release also 
described the involvement of CCAPWELL and the Parks and Recreation Department.  
When the story appeared in the newspaper, any mention of CCAPWELL and the Parks 
and Recreation department was deleted from the story, and the program was instead 
promoted as a program of the Hooks alone.  In addition to the news story, the program 
was also publicized through flyers in the neighborhood, local churches, and 
CCAPWELL’s email distribution list.   
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The timing of the relaunch was planned to coincide with their major annual event, 
the children’s health expo.  Program information was handed out at the Expo, although 
even then some opportunities for program promotion were missed.  First, CCAPWELL 
did not have anyone in charge of media for the event, and the Expo was not covered by 
local media.  Additionally, in the second stage of program development, the team had 
agreed to make front office staff and the team mascots available for special appearances, 
including an appearance at the Expo.  I had already made arrangements for this, but 
another member of CCAPWELL contacted the team independently to try to get a mascot 
appearance.  This created confusion, and the CCAPWELL member was told that the 
mascots were unavailable for that date.   
In spite of these problems, 26 participants completed the 8 week program.  Each 
week, the program participants received a week’s worth of workouts with information on 
a special physical activity or nutrition topic.  The team donated Hooks’ merchandise, and 
there was a drawing every other week for a door prize.  In addition, each participant who 
completed the program received a pass for 2 free tickets to a Hooks game. 
In the actual execution of the program, neither the team’s assistance with program 
publicity or mascot appearances were contributed.  The extent of the team’s contribution 
in this final stage included the use of their name and logo in program promotion and the 
contribution of incentive items for the participants.                                                        
SUMMARY.  The partnership that was eventually implemented was substantially 
scaled back from the original vision of the program.  At each stage of campaign 
development, fewer of the team’s assets were contributed to the project, and ultimately, 
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the campaign was downgraded to a limited program reflective of common sport team 
efforts at community outreach (i.e., ticket giveaways).  This section provided a 
description of sport team assets available for social leveraging efforts and how the team’s 
assets were contributed at each stage.  The next section examines the extent to which 
each partner realized desired benefits.   
PARTNER BENEFITS REALIZED 
 The team explicitly identified 2 benefits that they sought: non-sport media 
coverage and involvement in a project that would have an impact.  The team received 
some positive publicity in association with the program.  The one story that ran in the 
Caller-Times ignored the involvement of the other program partners, portraying the 
program instead as one created and implemented by the team.  The Hooks’ involvement 
made the program newsworthy, and the active involvement of the team’s media relations 
staff could have created greater media benefits for both parties.  For example, by 
leveraging the team’s media expertise and their relationship with the media, additional 
stories could have been developed and placed in multiple local media outlets.   
 The second benefit sought by the team was involvement in a program that would 
have an impact.  The 8-week program had positive effects on its participants.  During the 
course of the program, several participants had adopted a regular exercise routine that 
met minimum requirements for physical activity.  Eight weeks is a short amount of time 
for participants to realize significant weight loss benefits, but participants did report 
increased energy, improved sleep, and some health benefits.  When one participant began 
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the program, she was engaging in moderate physical activity less than once a week.  
After completing the program, she remarked:     
My doctor was so proud of me!  I lost some weight, my blood pressure is 
down.  He couldn’t believe it.  All that in just a couple of weeks.  But I’ve 
been doing everything I’m supposed to.  [Another participant] won’t let 
me not do it!  She drags me here every week.   [My doctor] wanted to 
know what I had been doing differently, so I told him about this group.  I 
hope we keep going, because now my doctor wants to send more of his 
patients. 
The program had a high retention rate, with 26 of the maximum 36 attendees 
completing the program.  Interestingly, the promise of game tickets to participants was 
not considered an important factor in program completion.  The Hooks tickets were a 
welcome incentive, but most participants felt that the ticket giveaway was not really 
important to their continued participation.  In the focus group, one of the participants 
asked if I was going to share their comments with the team.  She continued,   “I guess we 
should say [the tickets] were very important if they are going to hear about it.  So they’ll 
keep giving tickets.”   
While the Hooks’ involvement was considered only marginally important to 
participation, the team’s involvement did have other important effects.  First, the majority 
of program participants found out about the program through the story in the Caller-
Times.  As mentioned above, the Hooks’ involvement likely played an important part in 
getting press coverage.  So, if the team hadn’t been involved, fewer people would have 
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known about the program.  Additionally, the Hooks have a reputation for running a first-
class operation, and the contribution of their established brand affected participation 
decisions.  One participant described the Hooks’ image in the following way:  
“Everything they do is great, really quality.  I figured this would be too.”  The final 
benefit of involvement of the Hooks was that a safe, high-quality track was used for the 
program and made participants aware of its availability.  Participants mentioned that they 
had tried to exercise at other local schools, but that the tracks were either in disrepair, 
overrun with “tough kids,” or closed to the public.  The track that we used was always 
open to the public, but only one of the participants knew that this was a community 
resource available to them.   
Overall, the Hooks realized desired benefits on a small scale, although they 
missed the opportunity to fully capitalize on their involvement with CCAPWELL/CC In 
Motion.  CCAPWELL/CC In Motion, on the other hand, realized few benefits.  We 
hoped that involvement with the team would raise the profile of the organization in the 
community.  The program participants became familiar with CCAPWELL/CC In Motion, 
but the minimal promotion of the program – particularly through the media – prevented 
any community-wide promotion for the organization and its mission.  One unanticipated 
benefit to CCAPWELL was that the team’s involvement excited members of the 
coalition.  The walking program was a relatively minor element of the CC In Motion 
campaign, but it was consistently mentioned at coalition meetings and likely played a role 
in keeping some members of the coalition engaged. 
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The minimal contribution of team assets at each stage of the program prevented 
both partners from fully realizing the desired benefits.  The program did have a positive 
impact on the program participants, but the program fell far short of the expectations of a 
community-wide impact.   This suggests that successful social leverage of a sport team 
requires the team’s active participation and contribution of assets.  However, as described 
above, the existence of such assets does not guarantee that the team will have the 
motivation or knowledge to contribute these assets to enhance the social welfare of their 
community. The following section discusses factors that affected CCAPWELL’s efforts 
to establish a partnership with the Hooks and leverage the team to improve community 
health.    
FACTORS AFFECTING TEAM INVOLVEMENT 
At the most fundamental level, the team’s motivation to enter into a partnership 
and contribute its assets to the partnership depended on their perception of costs and 
benefits.  It is reasonable to expect that the team would select a level of involvement at 
which the benefits of the partnership was equal to or greater than the costs the team 
would incur.  The team’s perceptions about potential benefits were influenced by 
characteristics of the issue (i.e., obesity prevention and healthy lifestyles), the 
organization (i.e., CCAPWELL/CC In Motion), and the team.  Each of these groups is 
discussed in turn below, with particular attention paid to how each factor influenced team 
perceptions of costs and benefits.   
ISSUE IMPORTANCE AND SALIENCE.  Obesity is commonly viewed as either an 
individual or cultural problem.  In Corpus Christi, a city which is majority-Hispanic, 
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there is a feeling that obesity is a cultural issue.  During stakeholder interviews, one 
government employee suggested that the solution to the obesity problem was simple -- 
people needed to stop eating tortillas.  The attribution of obesity to Hispanic cultural 
practices contradicts existing research.  Baskin, Ard, Franklin, & Allison (2005) found 
that, while Mexican-American women have a higher prevalence of obesity than non-
Hispanic white women, Mexican American men had the lowest prevalence of obesity.  
Further, their research also confirms that while there may be racial or socio-economic 
differences, increased obesity prevalence is observed among all age, gender, and 
race/ethnic groups.    
 The team president recognized that obesity was not a problem of any one ethnic 
group.  He was concerned with the obesity problem in Corpus Christi, noting that most 
Corpus Christi residents were “just really unfit” and that “for [Corpus Christi], diabetes is 
just an absolutely horrendous problem.  Obviously, [there are] cancer issues, heart issues, 
but for us, diabetes is probably the most significant.”  The recognition by the team of the 
importance of obesity prevention activities positively influenced the team’s willingness to 
partner with CCAPWELL to address this issue.  However, the issue’s lack of salience in 
among community elites had a negative effect on the level of team support.  In spite of 
the issue’s importance, it was less salient than other community concerns such as 
education and economic development.  In August 2004, interviews were conducted with 
community stakeholders, and while some of the interviewees viewed obesity as a 
problem, they did not view obesity as an issue that had an immediate impact on them or 
their community roles.  Consequently, they did not view themselves as relevant actors 
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and CCAPWELL had difficulty gaining support from community elites.  CCAPWELL 
has been in existence for several years, yet the coalition struggled to attract highly visible 
or well-connected community leaders.   
Thus, in the planning stage of the program, obesity was an important – but not 
salient – issue which impacted the team’s involvement.  This was illustrated by efforts to 
co-brand the family walking program.  From the beginning, an important objective for 
CCAPWELL was to build brand awareness for the CC In Motion campaign and the 
coalition through its association with the team.    In order to do so, it was important that 
the program be co-branded, using the name and logos of the team and CC In Motion. As 
mentioned previously, I requested the use of the name and logo on several occasions, 
both in written and verbal communications with a member of the Hooks’ staff.  I was put 
off time and time again, as she said that she would have to speak with the public relations 
and media officials for the Astros.  At the time of the initial request, CCAPWELL was 
the major community-wide force behind healthy lifestyle promotion activities, but as the 
program development phase progressed, the obesity issue was garnering elite support and 
becoming more salient.   
On January 31, 2007, a local and well-respected endocrinologist convened a 
meeting of approximately 100 individuals from various community sectors to discuss 
obesity prevention in Corpus Christi.  This event garnered attention from local print and 
broadcast media.  On the morning of January 31, I spoke with the community relations 
director again, and reminded her of our desire to use the Hooks name and logo in our 
promotional materials.  I informed her that a group of 100 community leaders were 
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meeting later that day to discuss action that could be taken to combat obesity, and that 
she could read about it in the morning’s newspaper.  I also mentioned that various local 
media outlets would be covering the day’s event.  Within 15 minutes of our conversation, 
she returned my phone call and granted permission to use the logo on all promotional 
materials and emailed a jpeg file of the official logo to me.  She also granted the use of 
the team name and requested that the following attribution be used:  “Mondays in 
Motion, supported by the Corpus Christi Hooks Baseball Club.”  The timing of this 
decision by the team suggests the importance of the support of community elites. 
The increased salience of obesity prevention was a result of convening 
community elites and linking the issue to more pressing community concerns – 
particularly economic development.  This is demonstrated by the following comments 
from a story from the Corpus Christi Caller-Times in May 2007.  Eighty percent of 
survey respondents identified diabetes as the top health concern of the area, and most of 
these individuals believed that resident lifestyles were to blame.  The endocrinologist 
who convened the January meeting tied obesity prevention to economic development in 
the following way:    
If you have an unhealthy workforce and higher medical costs, you’re 
going to have a hard time attracting business to the area.  Diabetes is just 
one arm of the octopus, with other diseases such as childhood obesity and 
heart disease being other arms…There’s a monster coming after us. 
And in his additional comments: 
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There’s a lot of awareness already.  The next step is to take action.  This 
group has a lot of advantages to getting people mobilized through their 
resources and they’re eager to find a solution…This is about taking the 
information and making things happen. 
It is worth noting that many of the members of CCAPWELL also attended the 
January meeting.  However, in addition to CCAPWELL members, this meeting 
also attracted key decision makers and executives from across the community.  
The interest and commitment of power brokers in the community has helped to 
increase the salience of obesity in the community.  Had this occurred further in 
advance of our program implementation and development, the team may have 
been willing to become more involved. 
ISSUE/CAUSE COMPETITION.  However, even if the cause was considered 
important and salient, and the team wanted to become involved with a community 
organization, CCAPWELL/CC In Motion was not the only organization with which the 
Hooks could choose to partner.  In the same way that nonprofit organizations must 
compete for individual donations, they also compete for strategic partners.  The existence 
of CCAPWELL and its membership rolls (nominal, if not functional) attest to nonprofit 
crowding in the area of obesity-related nonprofits in Corpus Christi. Several well-
established local affiliates of national nonprofit organizations were involved in obesity 
prevention in some capacity.  These groups include the American Diabetes Association, 
the American Cancer Society, and the American Heart Association, among others.  The 
Hooks worked with these groups individually on projects and had a particularly strong 
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relationship with the ADA.  The head of the ADA was also a member of CCAPWELL, 
but she did not want to be involved in efforts to recruit the team for a CCAPWELL/CC In 
Motion CM campaign.  In fact, in the early stages of this project, I was urged to speed up 
efforts with the Hooks because “Diabetes [was] moving in.”  There was a concern that 
the head of the ADA would use her relationship to establish a joint program with the 
team, which would reduce their willingness to work with CCAPWELL/CC In Motion.   
Ideally, the various nonprofit organizations with a link to obesity would recognize 
the potential to create a substantial community-wide impact through the social marketing 
element of a CM campaign.  Each nonprofit has a shared responsibility to the cause 
(obesity prevention and promotion of healthy lifestyles).  Yet each nonprofit also has a 
responsibility to maximize the financial and mission success of its own organization.  
From the initial stage of partnership exploration, CCAPWELL members from individual 
organizations were unwilling to leverage their own relationships with the team to secure 
the team’s commitment.  This unwillingness suggests that the degree of competition 
among nonprofits caused their leaders to view strategic alliances as a zero-sum game.  
That is, if the Hooks partnered with CCAPWELL/CC In Motion, they would be 
unavailable to partner with other nonprofits proprietary events and programs.  In turn, 
members of CCAPWELL believed that if another nonprofit partnered with the team, it 
would jeopardize our program.  If a CM program was designed to develop a deep and 
longstanding relationship with the team that incorporated a social marketing element, the 
CCAPWELL/CC In Motion partnership with team could have flow-on benefits for all 
organizations underneath its umbrella.  However, these organizations did not have a 
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record of collaboration.  Instead, each organization was concerned primarily with 
garnering resources and recognition for their own organization rather than the cause of 
obesity prevention.   
The degree of cause competition makes organizational characteristics especially 
important in the team’s decision of which organization or organizations would deliver the 
greatest benefits for the lowest cost.  Therefore, organizational leadership and brand 
equity were considered. 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP.   CCAPWELL has struggled to establish 
effective leadership and to forge relationships with the power elites in the community.  
Many members of CCAPWELL seem to be engaged with the organization to the extent 
that it furthers the goals and work of their own organizations.  This is logical, as the 
coalition is made up of busy people with busy schedules, and their involvement depends 
on the gains that they can realize individually.  While this orientation is not surprising, it 
has prevented the organization from developing dynamic leaders with a record of getting 
projects done.  Also, the coalition lacks an established board comprised of local business 
and community elites.  Further, the general membership of CCAPWELL does not include 
many individuals who would be able to deliver business-related benefits to the Hooks 
through a CM partnership.   
The team initially rejected the notion of entering a partnership to sell more tickets, 
but later conversations with the team president seemed to contradict this.  He compared 
the team’s involvement to their core business practices in the following way: 
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This whole concept of helping out and becoming part of the community, being a 
good corporate citizen, it’s, you really can’t put a thumb exactly on what your 
return on investment is. It’s like a sign in the outfield.  I put up a sign for --  I 
don’t know, American Bank -- can I tell you exactly how many checking accounts 
they are going to get?  It’s the same for us, helping out different charities.  I can’t 
tell you if that means that somebody’s going to buy 4 season tickets or 
somebody’s going to come to a Thirsty Thursday game, or if somebody says, 
“hey those are good guys; we’re going to be sponsors of them”….but I know it 
helps because of the relationships we have.  Because most of the folks who are 
serving on other boards are people who are sponsors of ours.  So we’re helping 
them.  And so if we ever need help with stuff they can come back and help us.   
It’s good in that way in that everyone is helping each other.  Sometimes it’s a 
little bad because it seems like we’re all recycling each others money. Like it’s 
this vicious circle that’s going on. (SPORTS 1, interview) 
He also noted that weak organizational leadership is one of the most important factors in 
whether the team continues to work with a community organization: 
There’s good ideas, good charities in theory, but it you’ve got a bad executive 
director or a bad board, it just makes it tough.  We end up hitting our heads 
against the wall. You end up trying to help a group and just realize that you’re 
spending way too much time and effort and you spend up your time and energy 
and there’s no result for the end charity.  At the end of the day, it’s like anything 
else, trying to do business with somebody, being a friend with somebody -- it's 
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just relationships, it’s compatibility, how do you work with someone.  Probably 
the most difficult time that we’ve had in trying to work with a charity is if their 
leader, their ED, their board just isn’t functional.  That is quite honestly the 
toughest part. Or the times that don’t work for us. (SPORTS 1, interview) 
The president’s remarks underscore the importance of strong and connected 
organizational leadership.  In the case of an issue like obesity that has links to a wide 
array of nonprofits, CCAPWELL had to compete with established boards and successful 
executive directors of competing organizations. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BRAND EQUITY. Efforts to establish a partnership also suffered 
from CCAPWELL/CC In Motion’s lack of organizational brand equity.  Few people in 
the community were aware of CCAPWELL, and no efforts have been made to build any 
type of brand equity into the organization.  In CM partnerships, weak corporate partners 
often partner with well-known causes to improve their performance (Nowak, 1999).  
However, in this case, the team had the well-established brand, and the cause sought the 
association benefit.  The coalition structure of CCAPWELL further complicated things.  
CCAPWELL’s membership included several strong brands (e.g., Driscoll Hospital, 
American Diabetes Association, American Cancer Society).  Given the high degree of 
cause competition in this issue area, CCAPWELL offered few benefits that individual 
members could not deliver on their own.   
TEAM -- CAUSE CONGRUENCE.  At the league level, professional baseball has 
most aggressively pursued community programs that have a direct link to baseball.  
MLB’s two most prominent programs are the Reviving Baseball in Inner Cities (RBI) 
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program and the Baseball Tomorrow Fund. The RBI program is designed to promote 
baseball among youth who live in underserved, disadvantaged areas.  The Baseball 
Tomorrow Fund is also a promotional program for the sport, as it funds programs, field, 
and equipment purchases for youth baseball programs.  Even MLB’s relationship with 
the Boys and Girls Clubs has a somewhat opportunistic overtone, as Commissioner Selig 
remarked that the partnership was a result of MLB's efforts to solidify its relationship 
with youth (Ahern, 2003).   
 Initially, there seems to be a high level of congruence between professional 
athletes and causes related to physical activity/obesity prevention/healthy lifestyles.  It is 
reasonable to assume that athletes make physical activity and nutrition a priority.  
Therefore, they could be effective spokespeople for messages that promote healthy 
lifestyles.  However, if the cause is viewed as obesity (and not healthy lifestyles), there is 
no perceived link.  The team’s management perceived this as an obesity issue.  So, while 
the team considered obesity an important issue, they were not motivated to participate as 
role models. 
 There are also practical reasons that teams tend to develop community outreach 
initiatives that have a direct link to their particular sport.  When a team’s relationship 
with a cause is based on its core competencies, the value of its assets is amplified.  Two 
of the Hooks current projects are directly related to baseball and allow the team to 
contribute their considerable baseball-specific expertise.  Additionally, when people think 
about the team, they think about baseball.  Involvement with baseball-related projects 
reinforces that link and enhances the team’s image. 
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TEAM STABILITY.  In the case of the Hooks, the team’s success and stability 
affected the extent to which it invested in the campaign.  When the project was initially 
proposed, the team was in the midst of its inaugural season and enjoyed tremendous 
community support.  The team’s season tickets and luxury boxes sold out in a matter of 
hours before they even began play.  In addition to their novelty appeal, the team was also 
successful on the playing field.  Therefore, when the president said, “We don’t need to 
sell more tickets,” he was correct at that time.  The team did not expect their popularity to 
diminish much, and a member of team management used Round Rock as an example:  
For [the Round Rock Express], for the first 5 years, our attendance went up every 
single year.  And I think it’s going to be the same way here…There are still a lot 
of people that this is the first time that they’ve ever been [to Whataburger Field].  
And, so, if it’s the same people coming every night, then I think that you might 
have some of that honeymoon effect.  But if we get people here once, they’re 
going to come back again.  And then you have the tourist factor (SPORTS 3, 
interview). 
The team’s reluctance to forge and support an alliance with CCAPWELL can be 
attributed in part to the organization’s success and stability. 
TEAM KNOWLEDGE & RESOURCES.  The final factor that contributed to the 
team’s participation in the CM program was the team’s knowledge of CM.  Ticket 
giveaways or other one-time tactical community relations programs are common in 
professional sports, but comprehensive CM programs are rarer.  The Hooks are a highly 
successful, professionally run organization, but they did not seem to grasp the full range 
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of benefits they could realized through a comprehensive CM program.  Instead, the team 
president viewed community involvement as a charitable endeavor. In addition, the team 
has limited staff, and the addition of another program that required the involvement of 
different departments and different levels of management could detract from the team’s 
core business, which is the production of baseball games.   
As a result, the team president was reluctant to develop a deep relationship with 
any one organization or cause.  He described the team’s approach in the following way:    
The bad thing is when you are on a smaller local level like we are, it’s just really 
tough to focus on one [cause] and say no to everybody else.  Because societies are 
so fractured and not all of Corpus is on board with American Diabetes 
Association, not all of Corpus is on board with the Cancer Society… It’s kind of 
like politics to us, with charities. We want to be Switzerland.  And we want to be 
everything to everybody and we’ve really been able to stay out of the political.  
Charities are political too, you know. (SPORTS 1, interview) 
When community involvement is viewed as charity, the team has less of an 
incentive to devote substantial time and resources because they see little payoff.  This is 
particularly important if the team views this type of involvement as showing favoritism. 
This view of the team’s decision to partner with CCAPWELL and contribute its 
assets is consistent with the rational actor model described by Allison (1971).  In this 
model, the team’s decision to contribute its assets is a rational choice.  That is, the team 
selects an action that maximizes the strategic goals of the organization.  The team has 
specific goals and objectives that it wants to achieve and various options are available for 
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achieving these goals.  The team evaluates its partnership with CCAPWELL based on the 
expected benefits and costs and as it relates to the team’s strategic goals and makes its 
decision on the degree of its involvement. 
While the rational actor model provides one explanation for the nature of the 
team’s involvement, there are two alternative explanations.  The second model that can 
be used to understand the team’s decision making views the choice as organizational 
output.  The decision to develop a partnership is informed by the team’s existing 
organizational practices.  In this case, the Hooks’ standard response to requests from 
community organizations was to provide free game tickets and merchandise.  Thus, even 
though CCAPWELL requested a different level of involvement from the team, the final 
response was consistent with the team’s standard operating procedures.  Adherence to 
such procedures suggests that the team’s operations today will only be marginally 
different from its operations yesterday.  Thus, it is difficult to convince the team to 
respond to a community request in a way that is substantially different from the team’s 
norms. 
The final model views the action as the result of compromise, conflict, and 
bargaining.  In this model, the decision is influenced by various players and the players’ 
relative influence and power.  Power may be formal or informal.  For example, I had 
some measure of influence with the team’s president because I had successfully worked 
with him on a previous occasion.  This influence was sufficient to arrange a meeting, but 
I lacked the power or bargaining skill and position to secure a high level of involvement 
from the team.   
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Using these 3 models provides some insight into how the team made the decision 
about its role in a partnership with CCAPWELL and can help us to understand their 
decision.  Ultimately, a better understanding of how a team makes its decision about 
involvement in social leveraging efforts can lead to an improved approach by community 
organizations and better success in securing a commitment from the team.  
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 In this study, attempts to fully engage the team in a comprehensive CM 
program to address obesity were only marginally successful.  However, the results 
help to further our understanding of both cause marketing in sport and the process 
of using sport teams to address social issues. 
 Sparvero and Chalip (2007) identified the creation of partnerships between 
teams and organizations that promote social causes as one of the tactics through 
which sport teams could be leveraged to address social issues and enhance social 
welfare in host communities.  In this study, an attempt was made to create such a 
partnership, and the results of this study provide insight into the challenges of 
these efforts.  The normative model of professional sport team leverage provides 
guidance as to what is possible, but an equally important step is to identify the 
results once attempts at strategic leverage are undertaken. 
 So, what was learned from efforts to work with the team?  First, while 
some sport organizations have successfully implemented CM programs and used 
them to drive financial results, not every team has the knowledge of skills to 
implement such a program.  This may be especially true for minor-league teams 
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that operate with limited human and financial resources and often without 
considerable league support.  However, even minor league teams possess unique 
assets that – if appropriately leveraged – can contribute to a CM campaign that 
delivers benefits to the team, the cause partner, and the community-at-large.  In 
the case of Corpus Christi, the CM program failed to deliver these benefits in 
spite of the wide range of assets that could have been contributed. 
 With this in mind, it is useful to examine the challenges of a community 
organization’s efforts to leverage the team.  A major obstacle to the 
implementation of our efforts was how to mobilize the team to take an active role 
(i.e., beyond limited community relations programming).  This study 
demonstrates that there are many factors that affect the level of involvement of 
the team, and that it is insufficient to view a team’s involvement as a dichotomous 
variable (i.e., either the team participated or it did not participate).  Sport teams, 
particularly at the minor league level understand their responsibility to the 
community, and this is amplified when the team plays in a majority-public 
financed stadium.  Therefore, it is unlikely that a team would be entirely non-
responsive to the demands of a community organization.   
However, there are varied levels of commitment and resource 
contribution.  Embley (1993) identifies three types of corporate social policy.  At 
the lowest level is the company that demonstrates social responsibility only in 
times of crisis; at the middle level is the company with a tradition of good works 
in the community and a reputation as a good corporate neighbor, but whose 
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contributions tend to be limited tactical programs; at the highest level is the 
company that is proactive in their social response and has a long-term strategic 
approach to its contribution to community value.  Most companies fall into this 
mid-range of social responsibility, and this research study showed that the team is 
also in this group. 
 Ultimately, the team’s participation was affected by its perceptions of costs and 
benefits.  A partnership with CCAPWELL/CC In Motion posed transaction and 
reputation costs for the organization.  The transaction costs included the contribution of 
staff time to make the program successful.  In the program that was eventually 
implemented, the team’s staff likely spent less than 10 hours on the project.  A more 
comprehensive program would obviously require a more substantial commitment.  The 
team’s perceived transaction costs were increased because the team had not worked with 
the organization previously and therefore, the organization’s leadership was unknown.  
Transaction costs were also increased because the program was not baseball-specific.  If 
the team were able to draw upon its core competencies, the transaction costs would be 
minimized.  Also, because the team has a limited staff to begin with, the contribution of 
human resources has a marginally greater cost to the organization.  At the same time, 
working with CCAPWELL posed potential reputation costs.  Because the organization 
lacked brand equity or recognition in the community, association with an unknown entity 
could actually diminish the team’s brand.   
 The other part of the equation is perceived benefits. The first consideration related 
to benefits is team stability.  Because the team was experiencing such tremendous 
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success, the team did not feel that an expansion of their marketing or community 
outreach efforts through CM was important to their financial success.  Further, if the team 
did want to implement a CM campaign to deliver benefits, the degree of cause 
competition suggests that there were other community organizations that could deliver 
the same benefits without imposing the costs mentioned above. 
 Given the difficulties of mobilizing the team, is it possible to leverage a team to 
enhance social welfare without the team’s active participation?  Further, if the cause 
partner lacks the resources to develop and implement a strategy to enhance social 
welfare, can leveraging efforts be successful?  
The results of this study suggest that the team’s active involvement does not 
merely enhance social leveraging efforts, but is essential to their success.  The greater the 
commitment from the team, the more opportunities for leverage are created, and the 
greater the potential impact.  But the staffs of professional sport teams, especially those at 
the minor league level, are already stretched thin, and efforts to address social issues are 
not likely to be seen as essential components of the team’s business operations.  Of 
course, this is not always the case.  If the team selects the social issues that it wants to 
address and initiates a plan to accomplish this, there will be a greater degree of 
commitment to implement a successful social leveraging strategy.  At the same time, if 
the team is pressured by external forces to improve its position and contribution to the 
community, the team may take a more active role in leveraging efforts.  When the team is 
motivated to address social issues in the community, it can be successful even without a 
cause partner in the community.  Granted, if a sport team is interested in addressing 
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social issues to which they have no connection or experience, joining forces with a 
community cause partner can lend credibility and expertise, thereby increasing the impact 
of the team’s efforts and reducing their costs.   
On the other hand, if a sport team is approached by an external community 
organization and is not fully invested in efforts at social change, it is unlikely that a 
community cause partner can effectively leverage the team.  If we think of social 
leverage as the ways in which the team’s unique assets are used to effect social change, it 
is not surprising that it is difficult to leverage a team without their consent and 
involvement.  The assets of the team (e.g., facility and operations; organization and 
management, media and communications inventory, network power levers) are controlled 
by the team, and in most cases, they require the team’s approval before they can be 
contributed address social issues.  
Additionally, there are different types of community organizations that might 
approach a team in an effort to enhance social welfare.  In this case, a coalition of health-
oriented nonprofits and community organizations acted as the cause partner, but a 
partnership with an individual nonprofit organization might have been more successful.  
In working with a coalition, it is difficult to assign the responsibility for leveraging 
efforts to one individual, especially since any benefits would be shared by the entire 
coalition.  By working with a singular organization, the responsibilities could be clearly 
defined, and more importantly, individuals can be held accountable for completing tasks 
that they were assigned.   
This is not to say that a coalition could not be effective as a cause partner.  
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However, it depends on the perceived role of the coalition and its members.  In this case, 
members viewed the coalition as a resource through which information could be 
exchanged.  The coalition did not have a history of delivering programs, nor did the 
coalition member perceive this as their role.   
With this in mind, it is also important to examine how we define the success of 
social leveraging efforts.  In general, there is an expectation that leveraging efforts are 
successful only if they are broad-based initiatives that will reach a large section of the 
community.  What this study illustrates is that an initiative that falls short of its potential 
can still be considered a success.  While a more comprehensive program was envisioned, 
the program that was implemented was successful in creating behavior change among its 
participants.  So, success can be viewed incrementally, where a small-scale program 
successfully executed can lead to an additional program that may incorporate other team 
assets and have a broader reach.  It is unreasonable to expect a team to contribute 
substantial resources to a program or organization with which it has not previously 
collaborated.  Instead, a project of any size can be considered a stepping stone to building 
a strong relationship and more comprehensive social leveraging programs. 
This study focused on attempts to leverage a sport team to enhance social welfare 
through a CM campaign.  However, this is not the only way in which teams can address 
social issues, and social issues are not the only opportunities for sport team leverage, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter.  The results of the two studies that have been 
discussed are integrated in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 The purpose of this research project was twofold:  (1) to compare the expectations 
and realities of hosting a professional sports team, and (2) to identify factors that enable 
or inhibit efforts by the community to leverage the team.  Taken together, the findings 
from these two studies highlight both the importance of the active engagement of 
communities that host sport teams and the difficulties inherent in the successful 
implementation of strategic leveraging efforts.   
The public subsidization of professional sport projects has become common 
practice among local and state governments.  If sport projects were evaluated based 
solely on their ability to deliver entertainment benefits, it is unlikely that a government 
would choose to spend millions of dollars on these projects.  After all, cities rarely 
subsidize the construction and operation of movie theaters or restaurants.  Further, if 
voters were fully informed and made their decisions about public subsidization of sport 
projects based on the entertainment value of the team, there would not be a public policy 
problem.  However, in Corpus Christi, as in many major league host communities, voters 
do not make their decisions about the subsidization of professional sport teams based on 
expected entertainment benefits.   Instead of viewing sport projects as an additional 
entertainment option for local residents, local governments and supporters of sport 
projects promote additional benefits that will attract capital investment and tourists, 
encourage local economic development, and improve the quality of life in the 
community.  It is the expectation of these benefits that has prompted governments to 
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continue to subsidize professional sport projects, even in the face of a vast academic 
literature that almost unanimously agrees that such benefits are illusory.   
The experience of Corpus Christi is similar to that of many host cities.  While city 
leaders were trying to attract a team, they promised a variety of benefits, which are 
discussed in Chapter Three.  For the most part, these benefits have not materialized.  This 
is not surprising, as there were only isolated attempts by the team, government, and 
community leaders to develop strategies and implement tactics to make these 
expectations a reality.   
City and community leaders adopted a “build it and they will come” attitude 
toward benefits attributable to a sports team.  Supporters of professional sport projects 
invest resources to successfully attract a team and convince voters to authorize the 
necessary financial inducements.  In the case of Corpus Christi, supporters spent more 
than $100,000 on public promotion of the ballot proposition.  Yet, once the team is in 
place, little is done.  Many community leaders do not recognize the importance of their 
continued active involvement in delivering hoped-for benefits to their own organization 
and the community-at-large. 
This research project demonstrates that there is hope for cities to realize benefits, 
if they are willing to work to actively leverage the presence of the team.  For example, 
Corpus Christi has successfully attracted several major sporting events.  The city’s event 
bidding strategy was developed around its new professional sport facilities (including 
Whataburger Field).  However, it is unlikely that the existence of the facilities alone can 
fully explain the city’s success in attracting events.  Rather, several community 
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organizations, including the Parks and Recreation Department, the Convention and 
Visitors Bureau, and Texas A&M – Corpus Christi, worked closely with the professional 
sport teams in the area to develop and implement the event bidding strategy.  Many cities 
across the state have first-class athletic facilities, thus the presence of facilities does not 
necessarily give Corpus Christi a competitive advantage in event bidding.  However, the 
CVB engaged stakeholders across the community and developed a successful event plan 
around the city’s tourism portfolio.  Thus, in this case, the addition of first-class sport 
facilities was necessary, but insufficient to establish Corpus Christi as a host for state and 
national sport events. 
The city’s success in developing a sport event attraction strategy is an exception 
rather than the rule.  The first study identified the gap between the city’s expectations and 
the outcomes it experienced in hosting a team, and served as the foundation of the second 
study, which focused on the process of developing and implementing a leveraging 
strategy to address social issues.  The results of the second study underscored the 
importance of the team’s involvement in leveraging efforts and also identified some of 
the challenges in attempts to leverage a sports team.  The findings of this research project 
do suggest that host communities can help to increase the likelihood of realizing benefits 
if they are able to strategically plan for how a sports team will be integrated into the 
community and if they are able to react to changes in the community -- either those 
directly related to hosting a team (e.g., how to develop the area around the stadium to 
maximize spending) or those that provide new opportunities for the contribution of the 
team’s assets (e.g., emerging social issues).   
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Without a leveraging strategy, cities are unlikely to realize the benefits that 
prompted citizens to approve funding to attract the team.  Even if isolated improvements 
are delivered (e.g., the opening of Brewster Street Ice House in Corpus Christi), there are 
many more opportunities that are missed.  Small successes may be perceived as big wins, 
but in the absence of a leveraging strategy, the city will fail to deliver the maximum level 
of benefits to the community.   
The existence of the gap between expectations and outcomes associated with 
hosting a team underscores the importance of strategic leverage.  Yet, recognition of the 
need for leverage is insufficient to effect change.  The results of the two studies discussed 
in this research project suggest that motivation and knowledge are the critical 
components of strategic sport leverage.  Key stakeholders across the community – and 
not limited to the team’s management -- need to be motivated to contribute their 
resources and work with other organizations and individuals to develop a cohesive 
strategic vision for the community.  This is not easily accomplished, however, as 
stakeholders need to perceive specific benefits for them or their organizations in order to 
commit the time and resources necessary for sport team leverage to be successful.  This is 
especially problematic, since leveraging efforts will ultimately create benefits for the 
community consistent with the host city’s investment (i.e., economic development, 
community self-esteem, and social welfare).  Nevertheless, efforts to leverage a team for 
community development can have individual or organizational benefits.  For example, if 
the city government, the local tourist industry, and local businesses are able to develop 
the land around a professional sport facility, each of these entities will realize benefits 
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while the image and economic activity in the area are improved.  Of course, further 
research is needed to understand how stakeholders are motivated.   
While the motivation of key stakeholders to act is necessary for successful 
leverage, it is insufficient if these stakeholders lack the knowledge of how to take 
advantage of the assets that a professional sport team introduces into the community.  
Therefore, knowledge of how a team’s assets can be linked to economic development, 
community self-esteem, and social welfare is the second key component of the leverage 
of professional sport teams.  The third critical component of strategic leverage is the 
existence of the resources necessary to implement the strategies that are created.  This 
component can be addressed by engaging (and motivating) the stakeholders that have the 
desired resources.  Examples of other cities can aid cities in understanding how a host 
community can leverage their sport teams, but each community needs to identify its 
unique needs as well as the community and team assets that can be contributed to deliver 
benefits consistent with community expectations.  Professional sport teams are quasi-
permanent fixtures in their communities, and as a result, city leaders have the opportunity 
to learn how to create value over time.   
If city leaders, team officials, and community organizations have the motivation 
to engage in strategic leverage, the knowledge to develop a leveraging strategy, and the 
resources to implement the strategy, communities can deliver the benefits promised to 
and expected by their residents.  Ultimately, the purpose of engaging in strategic leverage 
is to achieve benefits consistent with community goals and priorities.  Thus, leverage is 
not an end in itself, but a means to creating value for the host community.   
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In the short term, failure to deliver benefits to the host community may not be 
perceived as a problem.  In fact, a critical analysis of this phenomenon would suggest that 
a professional sports team – especially one in its inaugural season or experiencing 
success on the field – would create a false consciousness among residents.   In this 
framework, residents do not reap benefits from the presence of a professional sports 
team, but they do not care.  They are distracted from this reality by the excitement 
surrounding the team and its product. The provision of this entertainment to placate 
residents or distract from unpopular realities is not unique to the current practices of 
cities.  The Roman poet Juvenal wrote about the prevalence of this practice in ancient 
Rome, noting: 
…whereas [the people] once conferred commands, commissions, legions, 
everything, now [they] curb their ambition and covet earnestly just two things:  
bread and circuses (p. 66). 
“Bread and circuses” may appease residents in the short term, but this cannot be 
expected to continue indefinitely.  In fact, the failure of city leaders to deliver promised 
benefits can eventually lead to cynicism and distrust.  Berman (1997) attributes cynicism 
toward government to 3 factors:  (1) citizens feel that the government abuses its powers 
for individual gain; (2) citizens feel disconnected from government; and (3) residents 
perceive government service delivery as inadequate.  In the case of sport projects, each of 
these factors could potentially play a role in fostering cynicism toward and distrust of 
political leaders.  Politicians emphasize the successful attraction or retention of a team as 
a defining event of their tenure and a key component of the legacy which they leave 
 182 
behind.  Likewise, sport attraction efforts are often spearheaded and funded by 
community elites, which can cause other community members to feel as if their voice 
cannot be heard and their interests not represented.  Finally, if spending on professional 
sport projects causes local government leaders to neglect other community issues, or if 
residents perceive that this spending has caused leaders to neglect other issues, residents 
can become cynical towards their leaders.  For example, when a community is plagued by 
failing schools, outdated infrastructure, and substandard public services, the presence of a 
taxpayer-supported stadium does little to inspire faith in one’s government. 
As residents’ distrust of government grows, their actions may take one of two 
courses.  First, residents may vote to remedy the problems they perceive with their 
leaders.  If we assume that politicians want to be reelected and extend their bases of 
power, then city leaders and the community elites that support them, should be motivated 
to act in a way that places importance on delivering on their promises.  If they fail to 
represent their constituents’ interests, residents have the power to remove them from 
office.   
On the other hand, the argument can be made that a loss of faith in government 
does not matter in the broad scheme of things.  In fact, while research suggests that public 
perceptions of government are getting worse rather than better, it also shows that public 
dissatisfaction with government has not resulted in unhappiness in individual’s personal 
lives, nor has it caused residents to view democracy as an illegitimate form of 
government (Lowndes, Pratchett, & Stoker, 2001).  However, the argument can also be 
made that distrust in government does have profound and negative effects.  Public 
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distrust in government makes it more difficult to recruit capable individuals to public 
service, makes action difficult without strong popular approval, and discourages civic 
participation (Orren, 1997).   
It is important to note that elected officials are not solely responsible for 
leveraging a sport team to deliver expected benefits.  A sport team may develop and 
implement a successful leveraging strategy independently.  Or city leaders or community 
organizations may be able to leverage the team without the active involvement of the 
team – as long as their strategy does not depend upon using the team’s proprietary assets.  
As a public policy issue, however, the decision to subsidize professional sport projects 
with public monies makes city leaders ultimately accountable if expected benefits fail to 
materialize.   Thus, it is important that the city leaders understand that the ability of the 
city to reap benefits from a sports team depends on strategic planning , the contribution of 
community assets, and the community capacity to successfully implement leveraging 
efforts.   
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 Given the importance of the issues addressed in this research project, the 
implications for practice, theory, and research are considered in the following section 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND RESEARCH 
 This research project is rooted in a growing body of literature that advocates for a 
leverage-focused approach to creating value through sport properties.  Sparvero and 
Chalip (2007) developed a normative theory for professional sport team leverage, and 
this project builds on that work.  Their normative theory suggests how sport teams may 
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be leveraged to achieve economic development, place marketing, and social welfare 
goals.  This project used a case study approach to further elaborate the model that they 
developed.  This project illustrates that many of the community’s expectations are 
consistent with the areas that can be addressed through leverage and provides further 
insight into how and when community actors are motivated to leverage the team..  The 
normative theory of sport team leverage requires additional elaboration through the 
examination of cases to understand what the community’s needs are, how community 
needs are being actively pursued through leverage of the team, and why specific needs 
are not being addressed by the community. 
 Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that the specification of constructs is important to 
attempts to build theory through case study research.  The results of this project 
underscore the importance of community assets, capability, and motivation.  While these 
are not the only constructs of interest in leveraging theory, they provide guidance for the 
next stage of sport team leverage theory development.   
 The emerging theory also provides direction for additional empirical research in 
this area.  Current research is largely focused on failure.  There is little left to contribute 
to the discussion of economic benefits, yet we continue to see studies confirming and re-
confirming the already widely accepted finding that sport teams fail to generate 
significant economic impacts.  This research project suggests a change in the way that we 
think about the value of sport teams, and future research should continue in two specific 
directions. 
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 First, it is important to advance understanding of the leverage process.  Snow and 
Thomas (1994) acknowledge the utility in using qualitative methods in strategic 
management research.  As evidenced in this research project, participant observation, 
action research and interviewing provide the opportunity to develop an in-depth 
understanding of the issue at hand.  However, because these methods can produce 
volumes of data, it may be helpful to focus future research on specific parts of the 
leveraging process, while understanding how each piece fits into the broader theory.  
Process-related questions of leverage do not fit easily into survey research of 
experimental design research.  However, there are opportunities to improve 
understanding of the process by holding community workshops and focus groups with the 
stakeholders in the community that are either actively involved in leveraging efforts or 
that should be involved because they stand to realize specific benefits. 
 Second, the point of leveraging sport teams is to ultimately produce measurable 
impacts for the community.  Econometric techniques exist to measure impacts on tax 
revenues, area growth, and agglomeration effects.  In order to use these techniques to 
determine the effectiveness of sport team leverage, cross-case comparisons of leveraged 
versus non-leveraged sport properties would provide the greatest insight.  It is more 
difficult to value intangible benefits.  There is growing emphasis on using CVM or 
hedonic rent analysis in order to place a dollar value on the presence of a sports team.  
Governor Jesse Ventura of Minnesota suggested an alternative – the creation of a toll-free 
phone number that residents could call to give a credit card number to pay for a stadium.  
While this approach is not likely to be implemented, it does highlight the problems 
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associated with attempts to approximate the value of intangible benefits.  Instead of using 
proxies to determine the value of intangible benefits, a more useful approach in a 
research setting might be to present subjects with a set amount of money and give them 
the choice of how the money should be spent.  Choices could include spending on typical 
public goods (e.g., parks, education), cultural projects, or the option to keep the money, 
in addition to spending on professional sport projects.  
 Another approach to measuring intangible benefits would be to set aside the dollar 
valuation of these benefits and measure the beliefs of residents through survey methods.  
For example, community cohesiveness is commonly claimed as an intangible benefit.  
There are a number of validated scales of community and neighborhood cohesion in the 
community psychology literature.  Similarly, research can determine how the presence of 
a professional sport team and its incorporation into the city’s overall brand affect the 
image of host cities.  While these types of research do not place a dollar value on 
intangible benefits, they would increase our understanding of the effects of leveraging 
efforts. 
The ultimate goal of future theory and research in this area to improve our 
understanding of what communities are doing to maximize the contribution of their sport 
teams and what ways the team can possibly be leveraged.   
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
 Prior to this project, two main approaches have been suggested to improve 
practice related to the issue of public subsidization of sport.  Coates and Humphreys 
(2003) recognize that cities do not reap the economic benefits that they anticipate.  They 
 187 
recommend that academics to do a better job disseminating information supporting this 
view to key decision-makers.  The problem with this suggestion is that most local and 
state officials have heard the arguments against public subsidization, and rather than 
accepting them, they have become adept at diffusing and discounting them (Eckstein & 
Delaney, 2001).   
 A second approach suggested by Rosentraub (1999) would rely on federal 
intervention to break up the cartel structure of professional sport leagues, which he argues 
artificially limits the supply of teams.  His argument proceeds that if the supply of teams 
was not limited, then any city that desired a team could have one, and cities interested in 
hosting teams would not have to offer attractive financing terms in order to attract a team. 
 From a practical standpoint, both of these suggestions are insufficient.  First, state 
and local officials are likely to continue to reject academic opinions on this issue, and 
second, the federal government has consistently shown an unwillingness to become 
involved in matters of professional sport.  Thus, this research project suggests the idea of 
strategic leverage as a new approach to improving the practice of cities that host 
professional sport teams.  Benefits are not realized by accident, nor are efforts to realize 
benefits the responsibility of the team.  Rather, successful leverage requires a coordinated 
community effort.  This is increasingly important as more community pursue sport 
projects.  As additional communities add sport teams, the competitive advantage offered 
by the presence of a team is lessened.  Thus, only the cities that are best able to leverage 
their teams will realize the advantages.     
 188 
Through the identification of a community’s assets and relevant stakeholders, 
many communities have the capacity to deliver a range of benefits to their residents.  One 
important factor in encouraging the adoption of a leverage mindset is to show community 
and business leaders how practices that benefit the community can also benefit their own 
organization.  For instance, Corpus Christi was successful at creating an event bidding 
strategy around its professional sport facilities because the stakeholders needed to make 
this happen were convinced of the tangible benefits to their own core business.   
 Another consideration for practitioners in this area is that cities often only get one 
chance to attract or retain a team.  Then, if stadium location is considered an important 
factor in maximizing development benefits, the community can not afford to make a bad 
decision and then do better the next time.  As a result, it is important for potential host 
cities to learn from cities that have been successful.  This can be accomplished directly, 
through conversations between city and team officials in different cities, and indirectly, 
through the use of consultants and public accounts of the experiences of different cities. 
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Appendix A:  Map of Whataburger Field and Surrounding Area 
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Appendix B:  Interview Subjects 
 
SECTOR ORGANIZATION LABEL 
Sports Corpus Christi Hooks Baseball Club SPORTS 1 
Sports Texas League  SPORTS 2 
Sports Ryan Sanders Baseball SPORTS 3 
Sports Corpus Christi Hooks Baseball Club SPORTS 4 
Government City Council GOVERNMENT 1 
Government Engineering Services GOVERNMENT 2 
Government Office of the City Manager GOVERNMENT 3 
Government Office of the Mayor GOVERNMENT 4 
Government City Council GOVERNMENT 5 
Business Downtown Management District BUSINESS 1 
Business Port of Corpus Christi BUSINESS 2 
Business Corpus Christi Regional Economic 
Development Corporation 
BUSINESS 3 
Business Corpus Christi Convention and 
Visitors’ Bureau 
BUSINESS 4 
Citizen Corpus Christi Taxpayers’ Association CITIZEN 1 
Citizen Northside Neighborhood Association CITIZEN 2 
Advocacy Forward ALL Corpus Christi  ADVOCACY 1 
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Appendix C:  Interview Schedule (Expectations and Outcomes) 
 
Objective 
 
The objective of these interviews is to learn the various ways in which the Corpus Christi 
Hooks have affected the community and various stakeholders.  Specifically, this 
interview will provide information on (1) the roles played by community members in 
securing the team; (2) their expectations about what the team would do for the city; (3) 
how the realities of hosting the team compare with their expectations; and (4) how the 
effects of the team compare with major issues on the city’s agenda. 
 
Logic of the Interview Schedule 
 
Following a short introduction by the interviewer, the interview schedule begins with a 
discussion of organizational or individual involvement with the team and efforts to attract 
the team to Corpus.  The interview then shifts to specific expectations that the 
interviewee had about what the team could do for the city and how the team has met or 
failed to meet their expectations.  Finally, the interview focuses on the value of the team 
relative to the other needs of the city. 
 
Interview Schedule 
 
PART 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Thank the interviewee for taking time to meet with me.  Introduce myself and let them 
know that I am interviewing them as part of a research project on how the addition of the 
Corpus Christi Hooks has affected the city.  Assure interviewee that their responses will 
be treated as confidential and request permission to record the interview.   
 
PART 2:  CONTEXT/INVOLVEMENT WITH TEAM RECRUITMENT 
Begin with a general question about their organization and how it has been involved with 
the team.  Where possible, I will already have a sense of the individual’s involvement 
either with the recruitment or current operation of the team and will start from that point.  
If the individual’s level of support of the team is unclear, a more general approach will be 
adopted. 
 
EXAMPLE 1 (for Hooks supporters):  You were involved with efforts to attract the 
Hooks to Corpus from the very beginning.  Can you tell me how you initially became 
involved? 
 
POSSIBLE PROBES:  
Who else do you think was important in the process? (prompt for supporters and 
critics) 
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EXAMPLE 2 (for Hooks opponents):  You were pretty vocal about your opposition to the 
Hooks.  How did you get involved? 
 
POSSIBLE PROBES: 
How was your opposition received by others in Corpus? 
 
PART 3:  EXPECTATIONS 
Ask about their expectations as to how the presence of the team would affect Corpus.  
Their expectations should inform the nature and level of their support. 
 
EXAMPLE:  Why did you think the Hooks would be [good/bad] for Corpus? 
 POSSIBLE PROBES:  Economic, image, entertainment, social 
 
If their expectations were largely positive, probe for any anticipated negative effects.  If 
expectations were negative, probe for positive effects. 
 
PART 4:  EXPERIENCE 
Ask about how their expectations have or have not been met since the Hooks began play.  
Follow up on the expectations they initially expressed and also probe for any 
problems/benefits that were unexpected. 
 
EXAMPLE:  How do you feel about what the Hooks have done for Corpus now? 
 
 POSSIBLE PROBE:  Was it a worthwhile investment for the city? 
 
NOTE:  When the interviewee identifies benefits or problems, ask them how they 
relate to the other major issues on the agenda.  For example, if the Hooks school-
based programs are mentioned, ask for their opinion on the schools. 
 
 
PART 5:  ETC. 
 
ASK:  Is there anything else you want to make sure I know or consider?   
 
PART 6:  THANK YOU 
 
Thank the interviewee for their time.  Give interviewee my business card and encourage 
them to contact me if they have any additional comments or questions. 
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Appendix D:  Consent Form for Interviews (waiver of documentation of informed 
consent) 
Title:  Leverage of Professional Sport Teams: Reconciling Host Communities' 
Expectations and Realities 
IRB PROTOCOL # 
Conducted By:  Emily Sparvero; Laurence Chalip (Faculty Advisor) 
Of The University of Texas at Austin:  Department of Kinesiology and Health Education 
Telephone: 512-970-8593 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  This form provides you with information 
about the study.  The person in charge of this research will also describe this study to you and 
answer all of your questions. Please read the information below and ask any questions you might 
have before deciding whether or not to take part. Your participation is entirely voluntary.  You 
can refuse to participate without penalty.  You can stop your participation at any time and your 
refusal will not impact current or future relationships with UT Austin.  To do so simply tell the 
researcher you wish to stop participation.  The researcher will provide you with a copy of this 
consent for your records. 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify the benefits and/or problems expected by 
communities that host a professional sport team and to compare these expectations with 
the realities of hosting a team.  Approximately 40 individuals from across the Corpus 
Christi community will be interviewed. 
 
If you agree to be in this study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
• Provide verbal consent to participate in the interview 
• Answer questions related to their expectations of and experiences with the Corpus Christi 
Hooks Baseball Club 
• Provide the names of any individuals they think the interviewer should speak with 
 
Total estimated time to participate in study is 1 hour. 
 
Risks of being in the study 
• The risks associated with your participation are related to the confidentiality of data.  
Your name will not be directly attached to your comments without your consent.   
• This interview may involve risks that are currently unforeseeable. If you wish to discuss 
the information above or any other risks you may experience, you may ask questions now 
or call the Principal Investigator listed on the front page of this form. 
 
Benefits of being in the study 
Your participation in this interview will potentially improve the understanding of the 
ways in which a professional sport team can benefit its community. 
 
Compensation:  No compensation will be provided for your participation. 
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Confidentiality and Privacy Protections: 
With your permission, the interview will be audiotaped.  If you authorize audiotaping, the 
following steps will be taken: 
(a) tapes will be coded so that no personally identifying information is visible on them;  
(b) tapes will be kept in a secure place (e.g., a locked file cabinet in the investigator’s 
office);  
(c) tapes will be heard or viewed only for research purposes by the investigator and his 
or her associates;  
(d) tapes will be erased after they are transcribed or coded.  
 
If you do not wish to have the interview audiotaped, the interviewer will ask permission 
to take notes.  The protections listed above will also be applied to notes taken by the 
interviewer, with the exception of erasing data after transcription or coding. 
 
• The data resulting from your participation may be made available to other researchers in 
the future for research purposes not detailed within this consent form. In these cases, the 
data will contain no identifying information that could associate you with it, or with your 
participation in any study. 
 
The records of this study will be stored securely and kept confidential. Authorized persons from 
The University of Texas at Austin, members of the Institutional Review Board, and (study 
sponsors, if any) have the legal right to review your research records and will protect the 
confidentiality of those records to the extent permitted by law.  All publications will exclude any 
information that will make it possible to identify you as a subject. Throughout the study, the 
researchers will notify you of new information that may become available and that might affect 
your decision to remain in the study. 
 
Contacts and Questions: 
If you have any questions about the study please ask now.  If you have questions later, 
want additional information, or wish to withdraw your participation call the researchers 
conducting the study.  Their names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses are at the top of this 
page.  If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, complaints, concerns, or 
questions about the research please contact Jody Jensen, Ph.D., Chair, The University of Texas at 
Austin Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at (512) 232-2685 or the 
Office of Research Support and Compliance at (512) 471-8871 or email: orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu. 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
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Appendix E:  Focus Group Protocol (Social Leverage) 
 
The purpose of the focus groups is to give participants an opportunity to discuss their 
experience with the program, with an emphasis on how the Hooks involvement affected 
their participation and satisfaction with the program.  The questions below will also 
gauge the effectiveness of the program in encouraging regular physical activity. 
 
1.  Welcome, introductions, explanation of goal 
 
2.  Participation 
 
How did you hear about this program?   (media, friends, churches, etc.) 
 
Why did you join? 
 
3.  Behaviors and attitudes 
 
What are some of the ways that you currently take care of your health?   
 
How important is it to you to be physically active on a regular basis? 
 
What are the things that motivate you to be active or prevent you from being 
active? 
 
4.  Expectations 
 
 What do you want to accomplish over the course of the program? 
 
 Note:  Probe for health, appearance, social expectations.   
 
5.  Hooks involvement 
 
Ask specifically about the importance of incentive items, mascot/player 
appearances, and media. 
 
Other ways they would like to see the Hooks involved. 
 
6.  Other considerations? 
 
7.  Thank you. 
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Appendix F:  Consent Form for Focus Groups (Social Leverage)(informed consent) 
Title:  Leverage of Professional Sport Teams: Reconciling Host Communities' 
Expectations and Realities 
IRB PROTOCOL # 
Conducted By:  Emily Sparvero; Laurence Chalip (Faculty Advisor) 
Of the University of Texas at Austin:  Department of Kinesiology and Health Education 
Telephone: 512-970-8593 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  This form provides you with 
information about the study.  The person in charge of this research will also describe this 
study to you and answer all of your questions. Please read the information below and ask 
any questions you might have before deciding whether or not to take part. Your 
participation is entirely voluntary.  You can refuse to participate without penalty.  You 
can stop your participation at any time and your refusal will not impact current or future 
relationships with UT Austin.  To do so simply tell the researcher you wish to stop 
participation.  The researcher will provide you with a copy of this consent for your 
records. 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify the benefits and/or problems expected by 
communities that host a professional sport team and to compare these expectations with 
the realities of hosting a team. Specifically, the purpose of these focus groups is to 
determine how the involvement of a sports team affected your participation in this 
community walking group. Approximately 7 to 10 members of the walking group will 
participate in this focus group. 
 
If you agree to be in this study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
Provide consent to participate in the focus group 
Participate in a conversation about your experiences with the walking group, and answer 
questions related to these experiences  
 
Total estimated time to participate in study is 1 hour. 
 
Risks of being in the study 
The risks associated with your participation are related to the confidentiality of data.  
Your name will not be directly attached to your comments. 
This interview may involve risks that are currently unforeseeable. If you wish to discuss 
the information above or any other risks you may experience, you may ask questions now 
or call the Principal Investigator listed on the front page of this form. 
 
Benefits of being in the study 
Your participation in this interview will potentially improve understanding of how sport 
teams can benefit community-based programs. 
Compensation:No compensation will be provided for your participation. 
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Confidentiality and Privacy Protections: 
With your permission, the focus groups will be audiotaped.  If you authorize audiotaping, 
the following steps will be taken: 
(a) tapes will be coded so that no personally identifying information is visible on them;  
(b) tapes will be kept in a secure place (e.g., a locked file cabinet in the investigator’s 
office);  
(c) tapes will be heard or viewed only for research purposes by the investigator and his 
or her associates;  
(d) tapes will be erased after they are transcribed or coded.  
 
If you do not wish to have the focus group audiotaped, the interviewer will ask 
permission to take notes.  The protections listed above will also be applied to notes taken 
by the focus group moderator, with the exception of erasing data after transcription or 
coding. 
 
• The data resulting from your participation may be made available to other researchers in 
the future for research purposes not detailed within this consent form. In these cases, the 
data will contain no identifying information that could associate you with it, or with your 
participation in any study. 
 
The records of this study will be stored securely and kept confidential. Authorized persons from 
The University of Texas at Austin, members of the Institutional Review Board, and (study 
sponsors, if any) have the legal right to review your research records and will protect the 
confidentiality of those records to the extent permitted by law.  All publications will exclude any 
information that will make it possible to identify you as a subject. Throughout the study, the 
researchers will notify you of new information that may become available and that might affect 
your decision to remain in the study. 
 
Contacts and Questions: 
If you have any questions about the study please ask now.  If you have questions later, 
want additional information, or wish to withdraw your participation call the researchers 
conducting the study.  Their names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses are at the top of this 
page.  If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, complaints, concerns, or 
questions about the research please contact Jody Jensen, Ph.D., Chair, The University of Texas at 
Austin Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at (512) 232-2685 or the 
Office of Research Support and Compliance at (512) 471-8871 or email: orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu. 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
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Statement of Consent: 
 
I have read the above information and have sufficient information to make a decision about 
participating in this study.  I consent to participate in the study. 
 
Signature:___________________________________________ Date: __________________ 
 
 
 
___________________________________________________ Date: ___________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent 
 
 
Signature of Investigator:__________________________ Date: __________________ 
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